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Leadership, regionalisation of peace operations and conflict mediation: African Union and Southern African Development Community in perspective

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Leadership, regionalisation of peace operations and conflict mediation: African Union and Southern African Development Community in perspective

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Dedication

Always in loving memory of my mum; my thoughts of you inspires me beyond measure.

Abstract

This study analyses the topic of leadership in African Union (AU) peace operations and conflict mediation. Using the case studies of AU mediation in Madagascar, and the AU mission in Somalia, the study investigates how leadership is produced in AU interventions, how regional and sub regional actors interact with each other, and how regionalisation of peace processes match to dominating approaches in international peace and security management. The research is informed by an analysis of academic and policy literatures, as well as data gathered through 41 interviews with key policymakers and implementers at the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC) headquarters.

This thesis makes its primary contribution to studies of leadership and contemporary conflict management in Africa. It outlines the importance of socially constructed forms of leadership, and how this influence (and is influenced by) the relationship between AU states, sub-regional organisations, and the AU itself. By doing so, it poses significant questions with regards to how the AU is expected to demonstrate a hierarchical form of leadership on the African continent. It also contributes to contemporary debates regarding the role of regional and sub-regional organisations in international conflict resolution, most notably to the fields of liberal peacebuilding, and cosmopolitan approaches to peacekeeping. Moreover, the thesis broadens contemporary understanding of peace and conflict on the African continent and contributes to policy debates over strategic interventions in regionalised peace interventions.

Key words: peace operations, leadership, conflict mediation, peace interventions, African Union, SADC.

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Abbreviations

AUC	African Union Commission
AFISMA	African Union led International Support Mission in Mali
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
CASF	Central African Standby Force
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
DAC	Direction, Alignment and Commitment (DAC
EAC	East African Community
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
EASFCOM	Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESF	Economic Community of West African States Standby Force
EU	European Union
FLS	Front Line States
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army

MAES	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros
MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MOCC	Military Operations Coordinating Committee
NARC	North African Regional Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RCI-LRA	Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RMs	Regional Mechanisms
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RTF	Regional Task Force
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordinating Conference
SASF	Southern Africa Standby Force
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
STCs	Specialised Technical Committees
STCDSS	Specialised Technical Committee of Ministers of Defence, Safety and Security
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union - United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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Chapter 1: Introduction of the study

1.0 Introduction

This thesis examines the extent to which the African Union (AU) provides leadership in African peace and security, and how it coordinates with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The literature review of regional peace interventions in Africa indicates unclear boundaries of leadership between the AU and RECs in responding to regional security challenges. In response to these ambiguities, this study investigates how leadership is produced in the African Union peace operations and conflict mediation, how regional and subregional actors interact with each other, and the extent to which AU provides hierarchical leadership in relation to the RECs. In this study leadership is defined as the participant(s) ability and process of influencing a group of individuals or institutions in attaining specific own or collective goals (Northouse, 1997; Yukl, et al., 2002; Yukl, 1989, 1999; 2002; Vera, and Crossan, 2004). The thesis, therefore, integrates two topics of leadership and regional peace interventions. The African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) provides for a regionalised and delegated framework of peace interventions to subregional organisations that form AU peace and security pillars[1]. Central to the APSA framework is the idea of collective action and coordination of peace efforts between the AU and subregional partners[2]. It is from this backdrop that this study investigates the nature of AU leadership in collective action with subregional partners in peace interventions. The research further scrutinises how AU navigates the regionalisation of peace. In this light, the thesis examines the theoretical

[1] The AU has several subregional groups or RECs, some of which have developed their own subregional peace and security arrangements. These include: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). In addition, the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) and North African Regional Capability (NARC) both have liaison offices at the AU. See AU Handbook 2016.

[2] The term 'regional partners' is used to describe subregional organisations and AU member states.

underpinnings of peace interventions and how formal structure enables or constrains collective action within the AU peace interventions[3]. The term 'peace intervention' in this study is used to cover both peace operation (the actual deployment of troops for peacekeeping and peace enforcement) and conflict mediation.

Using the case studies of AU mediation in Madagascar, and the AU's peace operation in Somalia (AMISOM), the study further explores the normative value of cosmopolitan and liberal peace theories in the practice of peace interventions within the African continent. The central tenets of cosmopolitan and liberal peace theories are democracy, human rights, collective action and leadership in building sustainable peace globally. From this backdrop, the study examines the extent to which cosmopolitan and liberal peace theories explain the collective leadership of peace interventions within the AU. The central idea of collectiveness in the promotion of liberal values is a vital framework for analysing leadership and coordination of peace efforts between the AU and subregional partners. By linking these two theories, the research contributes to stronger connections between dominating peace intervention theories and contemporary regional leadership.

The case study approach is used to understand and explain the complex phenomenon of international leadership (Bryman et al., 1988; Parry et al., 2014: 137). An interpretive paradigm is adopted in order to understand how leadership is defined, exercised and experienced (Ross and Matthews, 2010). The study recognises the interactions of actors that take place in leadership and the interpretive paradigm provide the necessary tools for analysing such phenomena (Silverman, 1997; O'Reilly, and Kiyimba, 2015). Qualitative methodologies are employed in order to allow in-depth interaction between the researcher and participants in interrogating regional leadership dynamics within the AU (Mahoney, 2007). The research is informed by data

[3] For overviews, see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001; Weingast, 2002.

gathered through interviews with key policymakers and implementers at the AU and SADC headquarters.

This study recognises hegemonic leadership theories in peace interventions but is mainly using constructivist epistemologies. The constructive approach offers significant opportunities for examining the interactions that occur in African collective action and the nature of regional leadership within the AU. The study acknowledges that states' interactions, through their intentional actions, construct and reconstruct their social identities in dealing with security challenges triggered by dynamic environmental factors (Dunne, 2001; Park, 2014: 75), hence making constructivist approaches appropriate in this research. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a more detailed discussion on the constructivist epistemologies adopted in this study. The next section provides a brief background to the AU peace and security framework as a way of setting the preliminary context of the research.

1.1 A brief background of the African Union

The AU transitioned from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 9 July 2002 and adopted several mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The transition was necessitated by the increasing need for efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with political, economic and developmental issues facing the African continent (Akokpari et al., 2008; Makinda, 2008; Ayittey, 2010; Muchie, 2013; Mangu, 2014). The change to AU was made in order to streamline the organisation and prepare it more accurately for global challenges in fulfilling the African peoples' aspirations (AU Handbook, 2016). While the OAU's main objectives were to provide a united front in the fight against colonialism, the AU's objectives were different and more comprehensive. The AU is geared towards addressing the current needs and challenges of the continent, where issues of peace and security are predominant (Makinda, 2008; Ayittey, 2010).

The establishment of the AU was made on the premise of greater cooperation and strengthened links with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as pillars for achieving the objectives of the AU. The AU is inter-governmental and overly

state-centric in nature, where institutional decisions are made by the Heads of States and Governments. The Executive Council within the AU is a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or other Ministers charged with the responsibility of dealing with the AU. The policies discussed by the Executive Council feed into the AU Assembly. It is, therefore, important to note that AU decisions and policies are an outcome of member states' interactions that take place within the AU platform. The AU Commission is headed by the Chairperson and is mainly involved in the day-to-day management of the Union.[4] The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)[5] is responsible for all peace and security matters and is assisted by Specialised Technical Committees (STCs) established within the Secretariat and headed by Commissioners. The organisation chart of the AU is provided in Chapter 5.

1.2 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) adopted in July 2002 is a key framework of the AU mechanism for promoting peace, security and stability in the African continent. Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act specifically identifies peace and security as the AU's core objective. According to the AU Handbook (2014:28) APSA has several key elements, including: the PSC, which is the standing decision-making organ of the AU on matters of peace and security; Continental Early Warning System; Panel of the Wise; African Standby Force; and the Peace Fund. The various African peace and security mechanisms work in tandem with the peace and security structures of the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) set up to support regional peace and security (AU Handbook, 2014) [6]. A further discussion on APSA is provided in Chapters 5 and 6.

[4] See more at: http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell#sthash.KT6itgEP.dpuf
[5] The PSC has 15 members. All are elected by the AU Executive Council and endorsed by the Assembly at its next session. Members are elected according to the principle of equitable regional representation and national rotation. National rotation is agreed within the regional groups.
[6] See more at: http://www.au.int/en/organs/recs#sthash.2JCLvX1G.dpuf

1.3 African Union Peace Operations

A total of eight AU-led peace operations have been deployed since 2003. The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), under the AU Commission Department of Peace and Security, is responsible for the execution of all PSC decisions on the deployment of peace operations. The Department of Peace and Security is also in charge of planning, deployment, sustainment and liquidation of PSOs (AU Handbook 2014: 39). Table 1.1 shows the AU peace operations.

Table 0.1.1 AU Peace Operations

Mission	**Brief Description**
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Under UNSC resolutions 1744 (2007) and 2093 (2013). Humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians
African Union - United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)	Jointly established by the PSC and UN Security Council (UNSC) in June 2007 (PSC/PR/COMM(LXXIX) and UNSC resolution 1769 (2007). Humanitarian assistance; promotion of respect for human rights and the rule of law
Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)	AU mandate 2011 (PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXXI)). To conduct counter-LRA operations in affected countries and protect local people
African Union led International Support Mission in Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR)	Under 2013 (PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCCLXXXV)). Protection of civilians and the restoration of security and public order; stabilisation of the country and restoration of the central Government's authority; security sector reform.
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)	2003 AU mandate. To supervise, observe, monitor and verify implementation of the ceasefire agreement to consolidate the peace process in Burundi. From June

	2004, AMIB was succeeded by UN mission
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	AU PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/Comm(X). To monitor the 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between parties to the conflict in Sudan. AMIS transformed into a full peacekeeping mission in 2004, mandated to contribute to the improvement of general security in Sudan. In 2007 AMIS became the joint UN–AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) 2006 and African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) 2007	PSC/PRC/Comm.1(XLVII) 2006 and PSC/PRC/Comm.1(XLVII) 2007. Mandated to provide a secure environment for the 2006 elections. The Mission also had the duty to protect its personnel and civilians around the polling stations
African Union led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA); mandated by PSC Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM/2. (CCCLIII) of 25 January 2013	A joint AU operation with ECOWAS. Also mandated by UN Security Council resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012. Protection to civilians' mandate. Transferred its authority to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (UNSC resolution 2100 of April 2013)

It is important to note that AU has been involved in numerous conflict mediation missions using both the Panel of the Wise and subregional structures.

As indicated earlier, this research focuses on two particular case studies, which are African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007 to the present and the AU-SADC joint mediation in Madagascar from 2009 to 2014. Whilst not a standalone AU peace operation, this mediation mission has had significant implications for the AU as a peace actor on the continent and for how it interacts with the RECs beneath it. Further justification for selecting these case studies is provided in Chapter 4. The next section focuses on the rationale and motivation of the study and key research questions.

1.4 Rationale of the study

Due to the significant number of African countries experiencing security challenges, regionalism has been recommended as one important means of resolving long-standing African security problems (Williams, 2009a, 2009b; Ancas, 2011; Hill, 2011; Gelot, 2012). Regionalism has, therefore, received increasing attention as a major potential force for economic and security cooperation, and development (Gamble and Payne, 1996; Söderbaum, 2003; Acharya, 2007, 2012; Fawcett, 2016). However, 'the make-up and performance of regional organizations around the world is marked by a great deal of diversity' (Acharya, and Johnson, 2007: 1). Although some progress has been made towards regional integration and collective security arrangements, Africa still faces significant challenges towards reaching that goal. Critics have pointed out that most African countries lack the economy of effort in continental platforms due to multiple membership in different regional groupings, as a result this hinders a concerted approach towards regional integration (Herbst, 2007; Nathan, 2012; Černohous, and Kříž, 2014). At the same time, the paradox is that the continental arrangements in peace interventions seem to have gathered momentum. This research is undertaken to understand how leadership is produced in African peace interventions. What are the motivations in African collective action or peace interventions and how does the AU interact with subregional actors in the production of leadership?

The thesis carries important implications for the study of regional leadership in peace interventions and regional cooperation. More specifically, it contributes to the topics of leadership and regionalisation of peace and security. The March 2005 reporting of the Commission for Africa found that Africa had experienced more violent conflicts than any other continent in the preceding four decades (Cilliers, 2008; Cilliers et al., 2010). Peace operations had been singled out as one of the most effective ways of dealing with such conflicts. The 2004 Report of the UN High Level Panel indicated that deploying military capacities for peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement had become a valuable tool in ending wars and post-conflict recovery of states ravished by violent conflicts. However, the report noted the dwindling global supply of available peace-keepers (UN Report, 2004a, 2004b). The use of regional forces for peacekeeping has been recommended as one of the solutions to mitigate the short supply of peacekeepers (UN Report, 2004a, 2004c). On the other hand, scholars have argued that engaging African troops in regional conflicts is the most effective way of ensuring timely response to African security challenges (Dompere, 2006; Francis, 2006).

Developing from Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, regional arrangements have gradually become an important feature in contemporary conflict management in sub-Saharan Africa. It is noted that regional organisations in Africa have increasingly been involved in conflict management and have conducted more peace operations than any other continent (Bellamy et al., 2010: 309; Majinge, 2010; Paliwal, 2010). The increase of regional peace operations and conflict mediation mechanisms raises the question of how these peace efforts are led and managed. In more practical terms, there is the question of resources and necessary capabilities from member states and subregional organisations (UN Report, 2004a, 2004b). This thesis investigates how peace and conflict is led on the African continent and contributes to studies of leadership and contemporary conflict management on the continent.

Additionally, the AU has been recognised in UN literature as a developing model

in regional peace interventions. However, there is a paucity of literature on the leadership of regional peace operations and how subregional partners relate to the AU. From this backdrop, this research contributes to knowledge on regional peace and security frameworks. Although significant literature exists on the UN-AU relationship, there is little literature on how the AU negotiates its continental leadership with subregional organisations in peace and security. Hence, the conceptual analysis for AU leadership and subregional cooperation in peace interventions is lacking and this research contributes to this gap in the knowledge.

While the AU Protocol on the establishment of PSC under article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU provides for collective security and timely response to conflict crisis in Africa, few studies have been done to examine the PSC's efficacy in mitigating collective action problems. The APSA assessment study conducted in 2010, reported contradictory views from some subregional organisations on AU leadership in peace interventions. Specifically, some subregional groups argued that, 'the AU Commission should not view itself as an implementing agency, but it should rather play more of a coordination role' (AU APSA Report, 2010: 9). From this backdrop, this research investigates how the AU is expected to demonstrate a hierarchical form of leadership on the African continent and how it relates with subregional organisations. Although the AU PSC has the overall mandate for peace and security on the continent, the APSA assessment report points to controversies in leadership. Additionally, since APSA is based on a delegated peace intervention framework to subregions, this research analyses how the AU deals with inevitable problems on delegated powers (Peters, 2012; Hall and Taylor, 1996).

This study, therefore, contributes to contemporary debates regarding the role of regional and subregional organisations in international conflict resolution. Its primary contribution will be to fill an identified gap in the literature which focuses specifically on leadership in peace operations on the African continent. As the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 will show, this in turn makes important contributions to the fields of liberal peace building and cosmopolitan approaches to peacekeeping. Moreover, the thesis broadens contemporary understanding of

peace and conflict on the African continent and contributes to policy debates over strategic interventions in regionalised peace interventions

1.5 Limitations and scope of the study

The study involves a review of international relations (IR) and leadership theories that are diverse topics in their own right. These fields are wide, and no single theory can best explain the leadership phenomenon in international peace interventions. To overcome this limitation, this study does not debate the international relations and leadership theories but focuses on how leadership is produced and the extent to which leadership in African peace interventions is provided by the AU. While it adopts two wide and diverse topics, the thesis contributes to wider discussions over peace and security at regional and international levels and opens the door for further comparative case studies.

The study acknowledges that different IR theories are used to describe leadership in international politics. However, from the review of the literature, the study adopts a social constructivist approach as the most appropriate framework for understanding African peace interventions due to its conceptual power in analysing interactions and relations of participants to a collective, and at the same time recognising the role of power in collective action.

The study makes two assumptions; first, that leadership is a process, both contextual and determined through interactions of participants to a collective; second, that the AU as a continental organisation is an influential participant in the production of leadership for peace interventions in the continent. From these two assumptions, the research investigates the mechanisms and circumstances that produce leadership and how leadership can be described and analysed in AU peace interventions. The interrogation continues to find out if the AU is the influential continental actor in leadership production and to what extent it provides leadership in peace interventions.

1.6 Motivation of the study

From my current research and experience in peace operations I have found the subject of leadership challenging in regional peace interventions. As a student of African history, I have found the African regional integration unique. There seems to be no consensus on the path to African regional integration and I have been fascinated by how the AU manages to strike a consensus in regional peace interventions with subregional actors. The leadership dynamics demonstrated by the AU's failure to deploy the pledged 5000 peacekeeping troops to Burundi's conflict since 2015[7] are some motivations for this study. On the other hand, while subregional organisations are AU peace and security pillars, the leadership linkages are not clear. However, there is limited research on the extent of AU leadership and its interaction with subregional partners in peace interventions. Thus, this research affords me an opportunity to interrogate the topic of leadership, considering that AU has conducted several peace missions since its inception. The research will provide further knowledge on the conceptualisation of leadership evident in AU interventions, how they are constituted, and how they match to dominating approaches to leadership in international conflict management.

1.7 Research objectives and key questions

The main objective of this study is to investigate the extent of the AU leadership in African peace interventions, how this leadership is produced and its nature in regional peace interventions. The research interrogates how the AU interacts with subregional actors in regional peace operations and conflict mediation and examines the extent to which regionalisation of peace has developed in Africa. In

[7] In mid-December 2015 the PSC took its boldest actions to date to halt the spiralling crisis in Burundi. In its communiqué of 17 December, the PSC authorised the deployment of a 5 000-strong African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU, from French: *Mission Africaine de Prevention et de Protection au Burundi*) for six months (renewable). The PSC expressed its determination by invoking Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. This provision allows the AU – following a decision by the AU Assembly of Heads of State – to intervene in a country 'in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'. The PSC therefore recommended such an intervention to the Assembly, which ultimately decided on the deployment. However, this peacekeeping mission was never deployed.

order to achieve the overall objective, the study has the following specific objectives;

i. To investigate AU interaction with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in joint conflict mediation in Madagascar.
ii. To examine AU interaction with national contingents/troop contributing countries in the African Union Mission in Somalia.
iii. To understand how leadership is constituted in AU peace interventions.

1.7.1 Key research questions

This study answers the following key research question; using the examples of the AU mission in Somalia and AU joint mediation with the Southern African Development Community in Madagascar, to what extent does the African Union provide leadership in peace operations and conflict mediation? This question is supplemented by the following secondary questions:

i. What nature of leadership is produced in African Union joint conflict mediation with Regional Economic Communities/subregional actors?
ii. What nature of leadership is produced in peace operations authorised and mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council?
iii. How does the African Union peace and security structure facilitate the regionalisation of peace interventions?
iv. To what extent are African peace interventions motivated by liberal and cosmopolitan peacekeeping thinking?
v. What are the prospects of regionalisation of peace interventions within the African Union?

1.8 Thesis structure

This thesis contains eight chapters that are divided into three sections. Section one includes two literature reviews that address the topics of leadership and regional peace interventions. Chapter 2 presents leadership ontologies that guide the thinking and conceptualisation of leadership. Constructive and hegemonic models of leadership are described and analysed with the aim of identifying how formal and informal leadership influences cooperation in international negotiations. Chapter 3 reviews key literature on the regionalisation

of peace and how liberal and cosmopolitan peacekeeping theories influence peace interventions. The chapter further explores the linkages between cosmopolitan thinking and leadership in peace interventions. The analysis also covers anticipated collective-action problems in delegated peace interventions. Section two of the thesis includes the methodology and context of the study. Chapter 4 outlines the methodology adopted in the study and case study selection. The methodology chapter is informed by the literature review and outlines how the gaps identified in the literature will be filled by the research. Chapter 5 sets out the context of the study and provides the structural overview of the AU and SADC, in order to highlight the research focus.

Section three of the thesis provides the research findings, analysis, discussion and conclusion of the study. In Chapter 6 the focus is on the AU and SADC Joint Conflict Mediation in Madagascar. This chapter interrogates how AU interacts with SADC as a regional economic community and pillar of APSA. Chapter 7 focuses on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This chapter investigates how AU manages its peace operations and how it relates with troop contributing countries (TCCs). In both Chapters 6 and 7 the general argument is that AU leadership is socially constructed through interactions with subregional partners and at the same time highlights the significance of national and regional interests, in the processes of regional peace interventions. Chapter 8 puts the whole thesis into perspective by examining evidence of leadership, liberal peace building and cosmopolitan peacekeeping in AU interventions. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis, summarising its findings and outlining the implications of the study to leadership and contemporary conflict management in Africa. This concluding chapter also highlight areas for further research in regionalised peace interventions in Africa. The thesis identifies challenges to existing notions of AU leadership and sheds light on potential proposals for reform in AU regional interventions.

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Chapter 2: Leadership

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews major theoretical approaches to leadership that formulate the analytical framework of this study. Specifically, the chapter focuses on how leadership is produced. Leadership literature and future directions of leadership theory point to the notion of a "post-heroic" outlook of unitary leadership[8] and draw attention to a collective form of leadership (Drath et al., 2008; Avolio, Walumbwa and Weber, 2009). However, collective leadership is largely found in research dealing with organisational management, particularly, education, health care and social psychology (Bolden, 2011; Currie, and Lockett, 2011; Fitzsimons, James, and Denyer, 2011). This chapter brings the collective leadership debate to a field of research that is predominantly defined by unitary leadership. The chapter examines how leadership is produced using both unitary and collective approaches to identify leadership practices in regionalised peace interventions within the AU.

The first part of this chapter provides a conceptual analysis of leadership, how it is defined and understood. A further analysis on emerging leadership ontologies is provided in order to expand the definition of leadership and show how it is utilised in this study. The second part of the chapter analyses the conceptualisation of international leadership. In this light, mainstream theoretical perspectives on regional leadership such as hegemonic leadership and collective or shared leadership are analysed. The chapter intensifies the debate on how leadership can be understood in an African peace and security framework, highlighting the need to understand leadership in regionalised peace interventions. In doing so, the chapter contributes to leadership models of regional peace and security. Several scholars have noted that although leadership in international institution building remains a significant topic in any case of international collective action, little research has been done in the field

[8] Unitary leadership is used to describe the presence of a leader and follower relationship and the interaction between these two entities that produces leadership.

(Underdal, 1994; Sjostedt, 1999; Tallberg, 2006; Dent, 2010; Kyeong-Hee, 2012). This study will contribute to knowledge by investigating and clarifying how leadership is constituted in African peace interventions.

2.1 Conceptual analysis of leadership as a unitary phenomenon

Leadership theory is highly diverse but is unified and framed by an underlying tripod ontology of leader, follower and shared goals (Stogdill, 1974; Bass, 1990; Gardner, 1990; Sorenson et al., 2004, Bennis, 2007; Drath et al., 2008; Northouse, 2014, 2015). In this light, leadership has been conceptualised as a process that involves actor(s) intentional influence to guide a structure and facilitate activities and relationships in a group of actors or organisation (Northouse, 1997; Yukl, et al., 2002; Yukl, 1989, 1999; 2002; Vera, and Crossan, 2004; Iwowo, 2015). Leadership is defined broadly in terms of (a) influencing individuals to contribute to group goals and (b) coordinating the pursuit of those goals (Herzik and Brown, 1991; Hollander, 1992a; Hogan et al., 1994; Bryman, 1996; Yukl, and Becker, 2006). Drawn from this framework, leadership provides focus and direction for a diverse group of individuals or states with different cultural orientation to have a particular approach in encountering common problems. Leadership is then looked at as building a team and guiding it to victory (Hogan et al., 1994). Northouse in his contribution indicates that '(a) leadership is a process, (b) leadership involves influence, (c) leadership occurs within a group context, and (d) leadership involves goal attainment' (1997: 3). There is a consensus in the literature that leadership involves the pursuit of common objectives and, therefore, there exists a commonality of interests between a leader and followers (Goethals et al., 2004; Northouse, 2015). This understanding of leadership is best pictured by a rudimentary sketch, as shown in Figure 2.1 and developed by Drath et al., (2008).

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Figure 2.1 Tripod ontology framework adopted from leadership variables in Yukl (2002: 11).

Source: A framework based on the tripod ontology (Drath et al., 2008: 641)

As shown above, leadership within this framework is marked with a directional influence and interaction between leader and followers. The assumption is that the situation or context under which leadership takes place are independent variables (Drath et al., 2008). In other words, the context under which leadership is produced is not imbedded in the process of producing leadership since leaders and followers already exist.

The tripod ontology, also referred to as the traditional leadership approach, features in most leadership literature. Leadership theory has therefore, mostly been conceptualised as a dichotomy of leader-follower relationship in heroic or 'great man' theories (Galton, 1869; Woods, 1913 cited in Drath et al., 2008), or trait theories (Jenkins, 1947; Mann, 1959; Kenny and Zaccaro, 1983; Zaccaro, Foti and Kenny, 1991; Zaccaro, 2007), where followers operate under the leader's influence in a vertical relationship. The leader-member exchange theory also describes leadership as a leader-follower phenomenon (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Uhl-Bien, Graen and Scandura, 2000). It is noted elsewhere that leadership needs purpose, as the activity of mobilising others has to be linked to the larger task of providing guidance and direction in a given situation (Helms,

2014: 265). In the same vein, Nannerl Keohane indicates that ‘leaders determine or clarify goals for a group of actors and bring together the energies of members of that group to accomplish those goals’ (2010: 23). A growing number of scholars have specifically focused on the role of followers and characteristics of followers (Lundin, and Lancaster, 1990; Kelley, 1992; Bjugstad et al., 2006; Collinson, 2006). The path-goal theory has mainly focused on leader’s intuition or behaviour in guiding followers, rather than on how shared goals emerge and develop (Evans, 1970; House, 1971). There is little literature on the nature of goals, how goals emerge, and how they are achieved (Drath et al., 2008: 638). The next section explores further developments in theoretical approaches to leadership and specifically shared leadership.

2.2 Shared leadership analytical framework

Theoretical developments of leadership theory have conceived leadership as a shared or distributed undertaking. The shared and post-heroic conceptualisation of leadership has challenged the unitary command ontology and argues that leadership is mainly becoming collectively constructed and negotiated during interactions of parties to the shared goals (Gronn, 2002; Cox, Pearce and Perry, 2003; Crevani, Lindgren and Packendorff, 2007; Drath et al. 2008). Shared leadership integrates several environmental variables of leadership that are incompatible in the traditional leadership tripod. Unambiguously, shared leadership is inconceivable in the tripod and in contexts where followers participate in the construction of leadership (Cox et al., 2003). Drath et al. (2008: 636) have proposed a leadership ontology based on three leadership outcomes; (a) direction – widespread agreement in a collective on overall goals, aims and mission; (b) alignment – the organisation and coordination of knowledge and work in a collective; and (c) commitment – the willingness of members of a collective to subsume their own interests and benefit within the collective interest and benefit.

The direction, alignment and commitment (DAC) formulate the three key elements that mark the occurrence or production of leadership. On the other hand, in the traditional tripod it is the presence of leaders and followers interacting

around their shared goals that marks the occurrence of leadership. It is important to note that the DAC ontology transcends and includes the tripod ontology. However, it pulls together all the social and contextual factors in interactions that produce DAC (or leadership) rather than just focusing on leader and follower characteristics (Drath et al., 2008). DAC ontology asks questions beyond leaders and their interaction with followers in the attainment of shared goals. The proposal of Drath and colleagues seeks leadership theory 'to explain how people who share work in collectives produce direction, alignment, and commitment' (Drath et al., 2008: 636). A further review of DAC ontology and how it relates to this study is done below.

Shared leadership is conceptualised as a social construct resulting from interactions among actors to a collective with intentional influence over structure or institutions (Cox et al., 2003; Ensley et al., 2006: 220; Crevani et al., 2007; Drath et al., 2008; Hoch, 2013). In this light, leadership is approached with constructivist epistemologies and defined as a collective influence, collaborative, and a process of group interaction that is dynamic and responds to situational contexts, where partners in the collective 'negotiate shared understandings about how to navigate decisions and exercise authority' (Cox et al., 2003: 53). In other words, shared leadership reflects a situation where team members [multiple actors] engage in leadership and is characterised by collaborative decision-making and shared responsibility for outcomes' (Hoch, 2013: 161). Shared leadership can occur in the traditional vertical framework but is mainly located within teams where a collective is a key source of influence. It is important to note that shared leadership does not deconstruct the hierarchy but focuses on the processes that produce leadership. The emphasis is placed on interaction and collective influence. From this backdrop, partners to an undertaking develop competences and skills that enable them to influence group goals, acting as both leader and follower thereby diminishing the leader-follower dichotomy (Pearce and Sims, 2000).

The application of shared or collective leadership from organisational setting to regional (international) leadership has been attempted elsewhere (Osborn, and

Marion, 2009; Zwartjes et al., 2012; Park, 2014; Rattanasevee, 2014). However, such analysis on AU peace interventions is lacking. An investigation of APSA has mainly analysed the implementation challenges and assessment of the architecture (Murithi, 2008; Boutellis and Williams, 2013; Vines, 2013; Williams and Boutellis, 2014; Makinda et al., 2015). This study contributes to the conceptualisation of shared leadership within the AU through the interrogation of AU – SADC relations and AU – TCC interactions in collective peace efforts. As shown above, shared leadership is conceptualised as a group property, whose set of functions is carried out by the group of actors as a whole (Ensley et al., 2006: 220; Vugt et al., 2008; Hoch, 2013: 161). The key aspect of shared leadership is high levels of knowledge sharing where actors build on each other's ideas (Ensley et al., 2006; Drath et al., 2008). Hence, the assumption is that there exist high levels of networking and interactions among different actors in shared leadership. It is convincingly argued that peace interventions are usually a collective effort due to their political and logistical demands (Bellamy and Williams, 2004, 2009b; Williams, 2008a, 2008b; Williams, and Haacke, 2008; Bellamy et al., 2010). This study will therefore, examine how the peace interventions' goals are initiated and developed, how the AU PSC provides the traditional vertical leadership (as indicated above) and how the leadership is shared with subregional actors. These questions assume continuous interactions among parties involved in leadership. Consequently, there are inevitable relational developments that impact on the nature of leadership produced. The next section reviews the relational approaches to leadership and how these relate to shared leadership.

2.3 Relational approaches to leadership

Another important feature of leadership theory is the role of relations in leadership production. In this light, relational theory has been influential in the conceptualisation of shared leadership (Dachler and Hosking, 1995; Murrell, 1997; Drath, 2001; Ospina, and Sorenson, 2006; Uhl-Bien, 2006; Hosking, 2007). Relational theory has a constructionist ontology, whose basic argument is that meaning is generated and sustained in the context of interaction and is negotiated over time (Gergen, 2009; Nabers, 2008; Hunt et al., 2009; Metcalf,

and Benn, 2013). Using the constructivist argument in relational theory, other scholars have argued that the meaning of the terms leader, follower, and shared goals is not fixed, but is continuously being framed and reframed from context to context over a period of time (Hollander, 1992b; Drath et al., 2008: 640). An immediate implication of this argument is that the definition of a leader is contextual and can shift among participants over time during interactions. In other words, leaders, followers and their shared goals are not naturally occurring but reflect the context under which shared goals are developed. This perspective of leadership challenges the traditional tripod discussed above, where leaders and followers seem to be both given and permanent. While the tripod ontology is useful in leadership theory, it is important to note that the concept of leadership is expanding beyond the leader-follower dyad and that relational theory helps in the understanding of shared leadership.

Relational theory therefore, complements the emerging concepts of shared leadership, where leadership and contexts are interrelated social constructions created through continuous interactions (Uhl-Bien, 2006). From this background, leadership may shift over time in response to the developing challenges to an institution (Drath, 2001; Anwar, 2006). In this light, leadership might evolve from one entity or single leader to multiple influence, as well as from one single leader to another. The general argument here is that leaders and followers are socially constructed for the purpose of providing a basis for social cooperation and may change when the context on social cooperation evolves (Drath, 2001; Drath et al., 2008: 641; Dess et al., 2013). The relational theory provides another angle of viewing leadership and how it is produced. There is little literature that analyses relational dynamics in the production of African leadership in peace and security. To fill this gap, the research aims to interrogate the relational aspect in the production of leadership in peace operations and conflict mediation.

It is important to understand how meanings of leadership are developed in a regional security framework that is decentralised, as in the case of the AU. The discussion on leadership boundaries between AU and subregional organisations is missing in the literature, and it is not known where AU and SADC leadership

starts or ends in the regional peace and security framework. Building on the questions raised in the previous section on shared leadership, the study will further examine the extent to which relational approaches to leadership exist within the AU peace and security framework. The study will investigate the single versus multiple centres of influence and how they are coordinated for social cooperation of the collective. Relational approaches are emergent theoretical developments in leadership that go beyond the traditional understanding of leadership. This research will examine how these developing concepts of leadership provide new knowledge on how regionalised peace and conflicts are managed in Africa. The discussion above introduced the conceptualisation of leadership as DAC within the shared leadership approach. The section below further discusses how the DAC relates to shared leadership and what questions are asked within the framework.

2.4 Leadership as direction, alignment and commitment

DAC ontology is the emergent conceptualisation of leadership that transcends the traditional tripod approach. The framework is integrative and provides a broader understanding of leadership in virtually all contexts and all kinds of collectives with shared work (Porter and McLaughlin, 2006; Drath et al., 2008). As highlighted above, peace operations and conflict mediations are usually a collective undertaking where division of labour is evident. In this light, the study will examine the usefulness of DAC ontology in understanding the AU leadership of peace interventions in the continent. Through the DAC analysis, the thesis will contribute to the study of leadership through testing this emergent leadership ontology in regional peace interventions. The outline of the DAC framework above briefly described its basic tenets and it is important to further describe the basic definitions that have been provided. Drath et al., (2008: 647) define direction as a short form of shared direction, which is the agreement in the collective about the aim, mission, vision, or goal of the collective's shared work. Under this definition, members of the collective are assumed to have a shared understanding of the goal and broad agreement on the value of that aim. They define alignment as the organisation and coordination of knowledge and work, achieved through a given structure. Alignment is conceived to be produced when

the group work is coherent and might be loose, flexible, and change over time. Finally, they use commitment as a short form of mutual commitment and define it as the willingness to integrate own efforts and benefits within the collective effort and benefit. Commitment in a collective is said to be produced when group members 'allow others to make demands on their time and energy' (Farley, 1986 cited in Drath et al., 2008: 647). The level of commitment may vary from undivided loyalty to low level commitment. DAC is conceptualised as a dynamic outcome that responds to changing contexts and the environment in which the shared work of the collective operates. Hence, DAC is continually reconstructed or reframed and developing. This section uses the basic sketch of DAC ontology developed by Drath and colleagues in order to review their approach to leadership and examine how it is differentiated from the traditional tripod ontology.

Source: A framework based on the DAC ontology (Drath et al., 2008: 642)

Figure 2.2 provides the contrasts in leadership conceptualisation that require further studies. According to Drath and colleagues, the focus in this conceptualisation is on the DAC outcomes or leadership outcomes and how those outcomes are produced, and less emphasis on leaders and followers. The overall assumption within the framework is shared work on how DAC or leadership is produced leading to collective leadership beliefs and practices. The basis of defining leadership in this framework is both the collective and

independent existence of DAC elements. These elements are interrelated and enable cooperation and shared work to be achieved, while in the tripod-based framework all three elements must exist for leadership to occur. Another major difference between the DAC framework and tripod framework is that the 'outcome of leadership in the tripod is the attainment of shared goals, while the outcome of leadership in the DAC framework is DAC - a means to attaining ends of various kinds' (Drath et al., 2008: 643). Additionally, since leadership is identified by the production of DAC, the context or situations have a significant influence on leadership. This is in contrast to traditional leadership where context is an independent variable. Context and leadership, in the case of DAC, become constitutive and interdependent elements that are mutually interacting and reinforcing each other. In this light, the DAC framework defines the basis of shared leadership as a contextually generated practice where the leader and follower participate on an equal footing and their leadership understanding mutually supports each other.

The DAC conceptualisation of leadership is therefore, integrative and broadens the existence of leadership. Additionally, an analytical advantage of using an integrative conceptualisation of leadership lies in its functionalism, where the focus is on outcomes that are generated in leadership (Morgeson and Hofmann, 1999; Goethals and Sorenson, 2007). The work of Morgeson and Hofmann indicates that while structure and processes are important in leadership theory, the focus on leadership outcomes has the potential to integrate several levels of leadership analysis. For instance, within the DAC ontology, leadership is still produced where one or two elements of DAC are absent, while in the tripod ontology missing one element may constitute the non-existence of leadership (Drath et al., 2008). Although this conceptualisation runs the risk of defining a greater range of social interaction as leadership, it provides the specificity of outcomes that must be generated for the interaction to qualify as leadership.

The conceptualisation of leadership in a DAC framework has its roots in the work of Gardner (1990) who described direction as the process of creating shared goals and how a unity of purpose (alignment) can be achieved for goal

attainment. The work of Bass (1990), Kouzes and Posner (1987), and Kotter (1990) discussed the process of motivating others in sharing the vision, creating the path for goal attainment, and inspiring commitment. All these scholarships formulate DAC as the outcome of leadership where all interactions and networks created are aspects of leadership practice. This abstract framework is used in this study to understand how the work of member states individually or as a group of states (in a subregion) and their interaction with AU produce DAC in peace interventions. Within this DAC scholarship members can produce leadership without having any overall implicit or explicit concept of leader-follower as framed by the tripod. The assumption is that all members to a collective have beliefs on how to produce DAC. Hence the combination of their leadership beliefs will produce collective leadership without creating the leader-follower dichotomy (Boehm, 2001). It is important to note that the element of power and influence still exists in the formulation of DAC. As members to a collective interact, their beliefs[9] (on how to produce DAC) interact with other beliefs thereby forming collective beliefs that are widely shared. The beliefs of members with more power and authority are more likely to be adopted in leadership practices, than beliefs held by members with less power and authority (Drath et al., 2008: 644). It is argued that for leadership beliefs to exist, they must be supported and justified by other beliefs (Quine and Ullian, 1978; Rorty, 1990). For instance, one's membership or leadership to a collective must be acknowledged and supported by other members in the group. Hence, beliefs occur in mutual support and justification (Quine and Ullian, 1978; Drath and Van Velsor, 2006). Beliefs in DAC production have a historical account and cannot be changed easily since they require a simultaneous change of beliefs in the other parties in a collective (Rorty, 1990; Drath, and Van Velsor, 2006).

The DAC framework is relational as it provides for interpretation of interactions and beliefs held by a collective (Palus and Drath, 1995; Murrell, 1997; McNamee and Gergen, 1999; Fletcher and Kaufer, 2003; Hosking, 2007; Uhl-Bien, 2006; Gergen, 2009). Members of a collective continuously justify the leadership

[9] The term 'beliefs' is used to describe knowledge or ideas.

practices and beliefs held in the production of DAC. It is argued that for DAC to exist, members to a collective must accept that the group efforts will yield intended outcomes (Morgeson and Hofmann, 1999). As shown above, the DAC framework broadens the definition of leadership as all three leadership outcomes (DAC) are independent (though interrelated) where each outcome can be produced without the other and in different quantities. For instance, a collective can produce direction without alignment or commitment (Drath et al., 2008). Drath and colleagues further illustrate the existence of alignment without direction or commitment through the Abilene paradox[10] (Harvey, 1996). On the other hand, 'there can be commitment without direction or alignment, as when members of a collective are passionate in their desire to act but cannot agree on a shared outcome to aim for and cannot organize themselves' (Drath et al., 2008: 647). However, the desired and effective leadership outcome is when all three elements of DAC are produced and complement each other. In this light, the effectiveness of leadership can be assessed by reference to the degree of DAC produced. The study will therefore, examine the extent to which a DAC framework is useful in analysing AU leadership in peace interventions. As highlighted above, the DAC framework provides an approach to understanding a wide range of leadership contexts that transcend and include the tripod ontology of leaders, followers, and their common goals, hence the traditional leadership ontology is not replaced but viewed together with DAC in AU peace and security framework.

Within the tripod ontology, leadership originates from leaders and is acknowledged or accepted by followers through commanding, persuading, influencing and motivating. In the DAC ontology, leadership is produced through dialogue, interaction and sense-making where group members in a collective meet in the middle in mutual transformation (Palus and Drath, 2001; Osborn and Hunt, 2007; Drath et al., 2008). Within the DAC framework, the tripod leadership elements are re-conceptualised as mutually and socially constructed, achieved through a joint effort outside the lens of leader and follower. The work of Huxham and Vangen (2000a, 2000b) has analysed how shared leadership works in inter-

[10] In this paradox a group pursues collective ends that are counter to the preferences of individual group members.

organisational collaborations. They concluded that leadership mechanisms in collaborations requires media (structures, processes and participants) and activities (managing power, setting and controlling the agenda, and empowerment). The structures allow leadership roles to be performed by participants to the collaboration. Similarly, processes allow communication to take place in collaboration and channel participants' activities. There is little research that explores how leadership is produced and practised in AU peace interventions, despite several peace interventions having been undertaken by the AU. This work examines how each of the two leadership ontologies works in AU regionalised peace interventions and how they supplement each other. The next section review approaches to regional leadership that emanate from both the leadership ontologies discussed above.

2.5 Approaches to regional leadership

Reviews of the leadership literature in international relations mainly define leadership following the two epistemological and ontological approaches discussed above. The first approach adopts a realist view that emphasises the power and national sovereignty of states (Carr, 1946 Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1984). A further discussion on the realist approach is given below. The second approach is mostly constructive, focusing on interaction, and constitutes the shared ideas about self, other and the world, relying on the intersubjective internalization of ideas, norms and identities (Burns, 1978; Young, 1991; Wendt, 1992; Dunne, 1995a; Wiener, 1995; Abshire, 2001b; Nabers, 2008a, 2010; Keohane, 2010; Zhang et al., 2012; Helms, 2014). The term 'intersubjectivity', frequently used by constructivists, is equivalent to 'common knowledge,' as used in everyday language referring to the beliefs held by individuals about each other (Nabers, 2008: 11). The constructive approach to leadership is also discussed further below. The thesis utilises both approaches to understand how leadership within the AU is conceived and practised.

Since the end of the Cold War, regional interactions have become the vessel of legitimacy, leadership, and soft power among countries in specific geopolitical localities (Vieira and Alden, 2011: 514). Soft power is mostly associated with the

use of attraction in country's values and policies rather than coercion as in hard power (Nye, 2004, 2006, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011). Dirk Nabers (2008a: 5) convincingly observes that, 'leadership plays a crucial role in tackling internationally relevant problems and … strong leadership seems to be essential for guiding and directing a group of countries towards collective action.' There is a thin line that separates leadership from power in international relations. In other words, the two concepts are integrative and at times synonymously used. For instance, the question of leadership and cooperation among international actors becomes critical when some actors are economically and/or militarily more powerful than others (Midford, 2000). It is acknowledged that those states that bear more costs in tackling international problems have more weight than those with little military and economic muscle, because their voice is considered crucial for the outcome of the given political process and these states can be considered "leaders" in international affairs (Nabers, 2008a: 5). In this light, leadership is conceived to follow the traditional tripod discussed above.

The observation by Nabers deserves more attention when regional leadership is considered from the AU perspective. Leadership becomes a pertinent topic of inquiry because the AU does not have the status of a state in terms of military and political elements, but it is a collective of states that intervene in African conflicts. As highlighted above, little research has been done to understand how the AU provides leadership in regard to peace interventions or how leadership is conceived in this collective. What makes leadership more appealing for research is the argument that most African countries have a high propensity for sovereignty and are relatively small with small economies (Francis, 2006; Hill, 2011; Nathan, 2012; Flemes and Lobell, 2015). Additionally, there are several subregional organisations that are actively involved in peace interventions, for instance, SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD. It is therefore, important to know how small states with small economies come together and tackle contemporary conflicts within the AU. The next section provides a further discussion on the realist approach to leadership through the analysis of hegemonic leadership theory.

2.6 Hegemonic leadership theory

The term ‘hegemony’ features prominently in many contributions from the ‘structural leadership’ school, which focuses on ‘the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order’ (Ikenberry, 1996: 389). In other words, hegemonic global leadership essentially refers to the state leadership of a global or regional system on the basis of its superior structural capabilities and ability to provide public goods, such as stability, order, or peace (Keohane, 1988; Cooper et al., 1991, Nye, 2004, 2008a). Hegemonic leadership fundamentally describes an actor’s position of predominance within the international system (Helms, 2014: 266). Within international relations scholarship, it is argued that leadership is effective and sustainable when states acknowledge a leader’s vision of international order and internalize it as their own (Nabers, 2008a: 24). In the study of international politics, states are the principal actors and most literature has referred to states as leaders in the international political system (Dunne, 1995b; Nabers, 2008b; Hill, 2011; Vieira, and Alden, 2011). According to hegemonic-stability theory, a regional or global hegemon can contribute to securing the peace and stability of the international system (Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1988). However, it is also noted elsewhere that they also have the potential to destabilise the international order (Nye, 1990, 2004). It is argued that the existence of a hegemonic or dominant actor, serving as an institutional focal point and regional paymaster, is an important precondition of a successful regional integration and leadership (Mattli, 1999a: 65).

From a realist perspective (Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz 1979), power capabilities are the determining factor in states’ choices. For classical realists, international institutions are always a function of the power and interests of the leading state (Carr and Cox, 1964: 170-1; Morgenthau, 1967: 175). The neorealist hegemonic-stability theory explains the link between power distribution in states and the stability of international institutions, where those states with power (hegemonies) provide leadership in international relations (Krasner, 1983, 1985; Strange, 1983). According to this approach, international institutions are usually created

or prevented by dominant powers during periods of hegemony. In contrast, however, other branches of neorealism maintain that the consideration of relative gains, stop states from cooperating with one another (Nabers, 2008: 6). However, as we shall see in the next chapter, states do share common interests in maintaining international order. It is argued elsewhere that common interests and threats provide incentives for states to exercise collective leadership in dealing with these threats (Yamashita, 2012; Wunderlich, 2013, 2008; Park, 2014). While states' cooperation in tackling peace and security challenges that have the potential to destabilise international order or cause widespread humanitarian crises can be achieved through hegemonies, not all circumstances of cooperation require hegemonic leadership. Cooperation of states is also determined by common interests and threats, as shown above.

The case of the AU provides a unique perspective of cooperation that transcends hegemonic influence. For instance, it is argued that there are no clear hegemonies within the African continent due to their small economies (Francis, 2006; Hill, 2011; Nathan, 2012). A quick review of AU peace operations in Somalia indicates that the mission is spearheaded by poor states. A detailed review of the AU mission in Somalia is done in Chapter 7. Hence, while hegemonic leadership theory provides an important viewpoint for analysing leadership in international peace interventions, it is insufficient to explain how leadership within AU peace interventions is conceived. The next section therefore, further reviews how power is conceptualised and how this understanding of power is reflected in constructive approaches to leadership.

2.7 Conceptualisation of power and constructivist approaches to leadership

Steven Lukes (1974) defined power from three dimensions: First, power is exercised when 'A' makes 'B' do what 'B' would not do otherwise. In this regard, there are sanctions or threat of sanctions attached to power relations in a hierarchy. This dimension of power relates to the traditional leadership tripod that is realist in nature. The second dimension of power concerns the *de facto* power

of the members within a group in the decision-making process. Lukes maintains that the rules within any decision-making system naturally bias the mobilisation of resources for competing agendas against some individuals and groups in favour of others. This dimension of power therefore incorporates not only coercion, but also influence, authority, and manipulation. As discussed above, this dimension relates to hegemonic leadership theory, where leadership is determined by the state economy and a desire to influence others. Notions of power and leadership have developed over time, where the distinction is made between hard and soft power, as shown above. This distinction reduces the conceptual tension between leadership and power (Helms, 2014: 265). Whereas hard power relies heavily on the possibility of coercing people, soft power 'co-opts people rather than coerces them' (Nye, 2010c: 307), and its use effectively involves a change from power over others to power with others (Nye, 2011, p. xvii)[11]. There is now a broad consensus that, while 'leadership involves power', 'not all power relationships are instances of leadership' (Nye, 2010c: 305). It has also been well illustrated elsewhere that 'leadership mobilises; naked power coerces' (Burns, 1978: 439). Helms (2014: 262) observes that over the past decades, notions of leadership have become considerably more complex and demanding. For example, there is a growing understanding that power and leadership are related, but not identical, and that coercion and force are largely incompatible with contemporary understandings of leadership (Nye, 2004, 2008b, 2011; Helms, 2014). Hence, leadership literature demonstrates a further development and departure from superior structural position to that of cooperation on the basis of values that are promoted. More specifically, leadership has been considered to relate to actors seeking change. This discussion takes us to the third dimension of power as advanced by Lukes (1974).

In the third dimension, a global or regional organisation or state exercises power over another state by influencing, shaping, or determining its wants, beliefs, and understandings about the world. This third dimension refers to a process of what

[11] In such a relationship, domination and coercion are being replaced by attraction and persuasion, see Ludger Helms (2014: 265)

is described as discursive hegemony (Nabers, 2008a: 8). It is this third dimension of power that predominantly relates to states' contribution to and participation in regional or global peace interventions. It has been argued elsewhere that power in leadership can also be analysed by focusing on discourse (Nabers, 2008b, 2010; Destradi, 2010). 'Leadership is mainly a discursive project, relying on intersubjective understandings for collective action to become possible' (Nabers 2008a: 13). In this case leadership is generated through interactions that produce political coalitions for action. As highlighted by Wiener, international leadership should also be studied from a constructivist perspective, independently from the possession of material power resources by the leader (Wiener, 1995). More generally, there is a consensus that leadership does not imply in a strict sense the exercise of power by the leader since the followers' participation is sometimes voluntary and in their own interest (Wiener, 1995; Drath et al., 2008), where participation is mostly on a voluntary basis and frequently shaped by states' interests and values. Acceptance, of the leader and the production of leadership in this case, will be determined by the leader's influence, legitimacy and the states' beliefs and shared values and norms (Wendt, 1992; Dunne, 1995a).

Constructive approaches to leadership lie within the third dimension of Lukes' description of power, where institutional legitimacy (which influences the production of leadership) has to be internalized in the intersubjective understandings of states in a given regional setting (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; Dunne, 1995b, 1998). Several studies have discussed the AU legitimacy in regional peace interventions (Dompere, 2006; Francis, 2006; Williams, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b; Hill, 2011; Nathan, 2012; Murithi, 2017). This study will add more knowledge by investigating the extent to which AU institutional legitimacy is viewed by subregional actors and how it influences the production of leadership. Additionally, the study investigates the power approaches to leadership adopted by the AU in its regional peace interventions. The existence of several subregional institutions in peace interventions implies the need to understand how leadership in African peace interventions is produced. Understanding how collaborations are formed in resolving regional conflicts is

vital for the coordination and support of peace efforts. Through this analysis, the study will contribute to knowledge of contemporary regional peace interventions and how they are led and implemented on the African continent.

Another conceptualisation of power and leadership is provided by Oran Young (1991). He defined the concept of leadership in international institutional bargaining by examining three forms of leadership: structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual. In agreement with others, in structural leadership international actors or states translate their relative power capabilities into bargaining leverage by making use of material threats and promises '… in the form of bargaining leverage over the issues at stake in specific interactions' (Young, 1991: 287-288). In entrepreneurial leadership, Young indicates that a leader will be able to act as an agenda setter, finding innovative solutions to overcome stalemates, or operate as broker to gain support for salient solutions. The emphasis here is to achieve mutually acceptable outcomes within actors for the collective good. Finally, intellectual leadership is a reflective process, where the 'power of ideas shape the intellectual capital available to those engaged in institutional bargaining' (Young, 1991: 300). Within the intellectual leader scholarship, the emphasis is on the power of ideas to shape the way in which participants in institutional bargaining understand the issues at stake and to orient their thinking about options available to resolve the issues' (Young, 1991: 287-288). In identifying goals and breaking those goals into manageable pieces, the leadership process is driven by particular ideas. Vivian Schmidt argues that 'actors can gain power from their ideas even where they may lack the power of position' (2010:18). The argument of expert knowledge (power of ideas) in producing leadership in international politics is increasingly acknowledged in the more recent literature on international relations (MacDonald, 2009; Hurrell, and MacDonald, 2012). What is apparent in the production of this leadership is the emphasis on the interaction of actors that allows the ideas to be shared and accepted by others in the collective. However, what is lacking is an investigation on how ideas are shared among actors in regional peace interventions and how these ideas shape the regional approach in resolving conflicts within the AU. It is important to

understand the value attached to expert knowledge by a collective, in order to determine the extent of cooperation and coordination in tackling identified security challenges. This study investigates how expert knowledge is shared through the division of labour among the AU and subregional actors in undertaking peace operations and conflict mediation. The research further interrogates how leadership production is shaped by expert knowledge.

Intellectual leadership is, therefore, in agreement with soft power and constructivist approaches as values are shared in the interaction that produces leadership (Nye (2004, 2006, 2010c). Young's separation of power from leadership implies that international leadership is not only performed by a hegemonic state but also by a widely accepted leader through inter-subjectivity, and whose decisions are voluntarily accepted by international actors (Wiener, 1995: 221). Following Nye's soft power argument and Young's intellectual leader conceptualisation, leadership can also be exercised by regional institutions such as the AU even though they lack the qualities of a hegemonic state. On the other hand, the processes of producing leadership in Young's contributions are typified in the DAC ontology, since leadership involves the creation of vision (direction), defining values, creating strategic reforms (alignment) and motivating actors in capitalizing on opportunities and mitigating collective challenges (commitment) (Burns, 1977, 1978, 2003; Abshire, 2001a; Zhang et al., 2012). As the DAC conceptualisation transcends the traditional leadership, it is understood through constructivist epistemologies since the aim is to achieve a common and collective good, through the unifying purpose, and facilitated by collective values and beliefs of actors involved in a collective (Burns, 1977, 1978, 1998, 2003; Abshire, 2001b; Zhang et al., 2012). Hence, the constructive approach to leadership involves identifying and articulating a vision, sharing it among the group and creating a path for realising those goals (Zhang et al., 2012). Using this framework, this study will investigate the extent to which the AU and subregional partners jointly identify, share and pursue common goals in resolving conflicts on the African continent. From this backdrop, the study will shed more light on the understanding of leadership in regional peace and security interventions in Africa.

Leadership in collective action can also be understood from the global political leadership conceptualisation (Beinecke and Spencer, 2007). Global political leadership refers to the actions of actors that pursue particular goals and seek to mobilise support in favour of these goals among potential participants (Helms, 2014: 266). These goals may relate to regional approaches in resolving specific collective problems like cross border conflicts. In this light, mobilisation efforts by regional actors are primarily based on attraction to the goal itself and specific strategies of persuasion implemented by the initiators. Constructive approaches to leadership, therefore, provide a strong conceptual approach in understanding global political leadership. From Helms' analysis, (other things being equal) the chances of accomplishing goals (in this case, mobilising participants to act in a specific situation) will be strongly shaped by the ability to identify and exploit existing opportunities to act, and by the amount to which potential participants perceive the architect's actions and goals as legitimate (Helms, 2014: 266). This can also take the form of 'inclusive leadership', as leadership 'on behalf of the world' not just in line with the initiator's own interests (Bradford and Lim, 2011, 5-9). While a realist theoretical perspective can also explain the global political leadership approach, there are two different leadership outcomes produced. The hegemonic approach aims to realise the leader's own self-interested goals by presenting them as common to those of subordinate states, while the constructive approach focuses on internalising those goals among the collective as their own in order to realise or facilitate their common objectives (Destradi, 2010: 921). The interaction within the constructive approach then produces DAC among the group of participants. In this instance, members interact, communicate and negotiate to realise the shared goals. The study will analyse how goals are set (peace missions and their expected goals), how participants are mobilised to act for certain goals, what values and motivations (of participants) are attached to the goals and how those goals are achieved.

2.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has explored several approaches to leadership from both realist and constructivist perspectives. The emphasis throughout this chapter has been on how leadership is produced in each school of thought. The

constructive forms of leadership proposed by (Burns, 1978; Young, 1991; Wendt, 1992; Dunne, 1995a; Wiener, 1995; Zhang et al., 2012; Abshire, 2001a; Keohane, 2010; Nabers, 2010; Helms, 2014) and the idea of 'soft power' developed by Nye (2004, 2008b, 2011) formulate the backbone of discussion in this study and provide supportive frameworks for analysing leadership within the AU.

The chapter has also provided two ontologies that are used to conceptualise leadership. The traditional leadership approach provides a hierarchy of a leader and follower that is defined by directional influence. On the other hand, the DAC theoretical approach to leadership provides for shared leadership, where environmental factors to leadership production are more pronounced than the leader-follower dyad. It is shown in the chapter that regional leadership is a discursive project based on interaction and socialisation of international actors (which are usually states) with the aim of creating shared or collective goals.

From this theoretical backdrop, this study will examine how this directional influence occurs in AU peace interventions. The key assumption here is that there exist leaders and followers (or leader and follower roles) in AU peace and security architecture, and leadership is produced through the interaction of the AU as a leader and subregional actors as followers. On the other hand, a further analysis of leadership scholarship indicates that the field has increasingly undergone new theoretical developments that have rendered the tripod understanding insufficient in conceptualising leadership. It is argued that while the leader-follower dichotomy is important in understanding leadership, it is too simplistic and 'prescribes, rather than describes, a division of labour' that exists in leadership production (Gronn, 2002: 428; Bennis, 2007). It is also noted that other important variables in leadership theory, such as context and relational factors, are significant but remain outside the leader-follower dyad framework (Crevani et al., 2007). In this light, the study will further examine how the DAC theoretical approach to leadership is reflected within the AU peace and security leadership.

The study will also examine how African regional actors in peace and security link their own interests to those of the AU in creating a regional response to conflicts. In order to do this, the next chapter provides a review of regionalisation theories that relate to peace interventions. The chapter goes further to analyse dominating theories that explain the motivations towards peace interventions. Specifically, the chapter pays attention to liberal and cosmopolitan peacekeeping theories in regional peace interventions and contributes to contemporary debates regarding the role of regional and subregional organisations in international conflict resolution. The next chapter, therefore, broadens the contemporary understanding of peace and conflict on the African continent and contributes to policy debates over strategic interventions in regionalised peace interventions. In this study, both leadership and regionalisation are connected to collective action in peace and security.

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Chapter 3: Perspectives on regionalisation of peace and security

3.0 Introduction

The chapter will first define terms used in peace interventions, and then move to review debates in the regionalisation of peace and security. It will assess the motivations for regional peace frameworks and how they have developed over time in Africa. The use of regional organisations and regional cooperation has become an increasingly important phenomenon on the African peace and security agenda for the past 40 years and requires further research (Hill, 2011). The literature review will also pay attention to liberal and cosmopolitan peacekeeping theories, which both posit that organisations coordinate and take a degree of leadership in peace interventions. This review is done to identify gaps in the literature and formulate the basis for the study. Following this analysis, the study will review the UN-AU relationship as a basis for interrogating the AU relationship with subregional actors. Peace interventions have mostly been tackled from a global perspective where the UN through the UN Security Council has provided the hierarchical leadership. The review of the UN-AU relationship, therefore, provides a significant foundation for understanding AU regional perspectives in peace interventions. This chapter will therefore provide a relevant framework for analysing the African regionalisation of peace and the extent to which African peace interventions are motivated by liberal and cosmopolitan peacekeeping thinking. The next section provides the definition of terms used in the study.

3.1 Definition of terms and evolution of peacekeeping

This section defines relevant concepts in peace interventions and regionalism used in this study. In particular it examines the conceptual framework of conflict mediation, peace operations, peacekeeping and peace building. It is acknowledged that the conceptual understanding of the terms used is wide and

diverse. The definitions are therefore, narrowed to describe their meaning in this study.

3.1.1 Conflict Mediation

Scholars have defined conflict mediation as a process of conflict management, that involves a third party in influencing conflicting parties to change their perception or behaviour without resorting to physical force, or invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch, and Gartner, 2009: 6). This study uses the mediation definition provided by Bercovitch, and Gartner (2009). It is important to note that there is no single definition of mediation and the term is defined differently by scholars from different academic backgrounds. However, there is a consensus in the literature that mediation is a form of joint decision-making in which a third party has some influence on the process of conflict settlement; and there is a system of exchange and social influence; i.e. communication, expectations and interests (Folberg and Taylor, 1984 Augsburger, 1992; Bercovitch, 2009; Kleiboer, 1996; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2009; Eisenkopf and Bächtiger, 2013; Jones, 2013; Moore, 2014). In this light, mediation is a problem-solving approach without the use of force that is shaped and influenced by the interaction of a wide range of dimensions, such as mediators, and the general environment, such as the context of dispute and nature of conflicting parties. While a third party plays a significant role in influencing the behaviour of the parties, the outcome is ultimately decided by the disputants (Moore, 1986). The topic of mediation is wide and diverse; hence, this study does not engage itself in the content and analysis of mediation within the AU but asks questions on how mediators (AU and SADC) initiate mediation and what considerations influence this process; and how mediators relate to each other and interact with conflicting parties. These questions are specifically answered in relation to AU joint mediation with SADC in Madagascar.

3.1.2 Peace operations, peacekeeping and peace building

The term ‘peace operation’ is more practical than theoretical and is not covered in the United Nations Charter. It encompasses peacekeeping, peace building and

peace enforcement. There are broader ranges of practice covering these terms that bring some ambiguity to their definition. This study will utilise the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conceptualisation, which defines Peacekeeping as the use of military, police and civilian personnel to lay the foundations of sustainable peace; Peace enforcement as the use of military and other measures to enforce the will of the UN Security Council; and Peace building as measures aimed at transforming relationships and structures in society to reduce future conflicts (UN, 1992; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Bellamy, 2009; Bellamy et al., 2010; Zelizer, 2013). William Durch (2006: xvii) defined peace operations as 'internationally authorised, multilateral, civil-military efforts to promote and protect… transitions from war to peace'. This definition is in agreement with Bellamy et al. (2010: 18) who view peace operations as the use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN authorisation, with a mandate to;

1. Assist in the prevention of the armed conflict by supporting a peace process;
2. Serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or
3. Enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build peace.

Peace operations are generally used to prevent, limit and manage violent conflicts and combine military force and the civilian component in order to effectively reach out to local societies and achieve stable peace. Hence, the major element in peace operations is the deployment and use of the military in order to provide public security to citizens in host countries. There is emphasis on robustness of the military component for the protection of civilians to be achieved (Williams, 2009b; Curran et al., 2015).

According to the UN, peace building is a more 'complex, long-term process aimed at creating necessary conditions for positive and sustainable peace by addressing the deep rooted structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner' (UNDPKO, 2008: 18). Peace building measures address

core issues that affect the functioning of society and state. Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peace building as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' (UN, 1992: 11). Other scholars have defined it as measures taken to prevent the recurrence of violence and all efforts employed to transform the underlying structural, cultural, and relational roots of violent conflict (Lederach, 1997; Zelizer, 2013). Hence, peace building involves a wide range of international and national actors, such as civil society and governmental actors. It also involves sets of processes and tools to transform the relationships, culture, and institutions of society in order to prevent, end and transform conflicts (Imboden, 2012; Zelizer and Oliphant, 2013: 8; Hatto, 2013). In general, peace building focuses on transforming relationships and structures in society to decrease the likelihood of future conflicts, while peacekeeping and peace operations involve the deployment of the military and civilian components to support the implementation of a ceasefire, where peace agreements exist or to enforce peace where there is no peace to keep.

3.1.3 Evolution of peacekeeping

Peacekeeping foundational standards and rules have generally been established on three aspects that include: consent of all parties to conflict; strict neutrality of peacekeeping forces; and prohibition of the use of force, except in self-defence (which has later been modified to cover defence of the mandate) (MacQueen, 2006; Bellamy et al., 2010). These standards reflect the first-generation peacekeeping[12] where ceasefire is already in place and peacekeepers' responsibility is to observe the adherence of the ceasefire agreements. The UN peacekeeping has emphasised consent of the host party, based on the principle of sovereignty of all UN member states. However, as discussed later in the chapter, the UN has made some modifications to consent, especially where consent cannot be granted by all parties in the conflict. Neutrality of peacekeeping forces entails peacekeepers remaining neutral in their conduct and does not actively support, protect or favour one party over another in the conflict

[12] The first-generation peacekeeping covered the period between 1956-1987

area. This neutrality, however, must make a positive contribution to peace for the mandate to be effective and not indicate inaction (Thakur, 2006). Non-use of force, except in self-defence, has been one of the most challenging practices of peacekeeping, especially when peace enforcement is added to the mandate (Williams, 2009b). However, this limitation has at times been modified to include the defence of the mandate as demonstrated by UN Security Council Resolution 2098 of 2013 for the UN intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo (UN, 2013).

The second-generation peacekeeping[13] brought in more complex conflict dynamics where peacekeepers were more active and were deployed in situations where there was no peace to keep. This, therefore, gave peacekeepers the mandate to create conditions for peace, including early peace building activities after the conflict (De Carvalho and Ettang, 2011; Fraser 2015: 60-1). Contemporary peacekeeping[14] has brought in even more complex roles of peacekeepers that include peace enforcement, where peacekeepers are actively involved in direct combat with belligerents in the protection of the mandate and of civilians (UN, 2013). This evolution of peacekeeping has mainly been developed on an *ad hoc* basis depending on the dynamics and nature of the conflict. Trudy Fraser indicates that 'the problem with this developmental model is that best practices have not proven to be unilaterally transferable, nor does each specific peacekeeping mandate fit neatly into the prescribed rules of law for decision making and implementation' (2015: 61). In this light, there is a problem of predictability of peacekeeping practices. What makes it even more complex is that peacekeeping has evolved from global to regional and subregional levels. Although peacekeeping has developed over time and in different conditions, the standards and rules for peacekeeping practice have remained the same, focusing on the same assumptions of consent, neutrality and non-use of force. At this point, it is important to note that AU peace operations (regional peace operations) have been conducted in situations where there is no consent from all parties to

[13] The second-generation peacekeeping covered the period between 1987-1993.
[14] This is from1993-present (i.e. 2016).

conflict and no peace to keep (Francis, 2006; Williams, 2009b). The departure of AU peace operations coupled with the lack of predictability of peacekeeping practices necessitates the need to understand how regional peace operations are conducted. Significant literature on AU peace operations has paid attention to the key issue of resources (financial and logistical); however, the analysis on what leadership looks like in AU peace interventions is missing. This research will make contributions in this area of regional peace interventions.

3.1.4 Region and regionalism and regional integration defined

The central question of what constitutes a region has been examined by several scholars (Hettne, 1996a, 2006b; Väyrynen, 1997a; Tarling, 2006; Wunderlich, 2008; Söderbaum, 2009; Fawcett, 2016). Some scholars indicate that regions are units or 'zones' based on groups, states or territories, whose members share some identifiable traits (Väyrynen, 1997a; Fawcett, 2016). The distinguishing characters of a regional zone are in terms of size and nature, in that they are larger than a single state and can exist as a temporary or permanent organisation (Fawcett, 2016). Others indicate that regions can be identified by cultural, linguistic, economic or political ties (Mansfield and Milner, 1999: 591; Mattli and Stone, 2012). Wunderlich (2008: 49), in summarising Björn Hettne (1996b), adds that regions can emerge as collective or international actors in their own right with a distinct identity, actor capabilities, and a certain degree of legitimacy and decision-making structures.

There is a consensus in the literature that regions are not permanent fixtures of international relations but historical, cultural, political and economic structures, which change in form and function over time (Ravenhill, 1995; Väyrynen, 1997b; Hettne, 2005; Söderbaum, 2009; Fawcett, 2016). This implies that regional boundaries are always fluid and arbitrary (Väyrynen, 1997a: 6). A growing number of scholars acknowledge that 'there are no natural or scientific regions' but that 'all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested' (Söderbaum, 2009: 479). Regions are first and foremost imagined constructs depending on social, economic and political interaction of the actors involved in

the regionalisation processes (Hettne, 2005: 544). They evolve in particular economic and socio-political contexts (Ravenhill, 1995: 181, Söderbaum, 2005: 91). The definition of what constitutes a region is, therefore, to a large extent self-determined by the external and internal public, private actors, and participants involved in regionalism and regionalisation (Allison 2008; Wunderlich, 2008: 49). There is an understanding that regions are a construction of human action through the lens of cultural identity, shared values and norms (Bressand and Nicolaidis, 1990). Hence, they can be constructed or deconstructed, intentionally or non-intentionally in the process of global transformation (Tarling, 2006:12). The construction of regional institutions is, therefore, a result of interactions among states and is shaped by their norms and values. Constructivist theoretical approaches indicate the importance of cognitive and ideational factors in regionalism and these approaches are discussed later in this section.

Regionalism has been described as 'a conscious awareness of shared commonalities and the will to create institutions and processes to act upon those commonalities' (Evans, 1996: 11; Park, 2006). It is a deliberate effort by states in a given region to improve their conditions, solve common problems, or project influence beyond the region (Evans, 1995; Emmerson, 2009a: 3). Regionalism is formal and managed by governments and other state-sponsored actors with an aim of achieving regional order (Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001: 5; Wunderlich, 2008: 4). Wunderlich (2008) points out that the theories of regionalism originated from the need to find theoretical explanations for the development of regional integration and solutions to the security dilemma arising out of the condition of international anarchy (the absence of a supreme authority above the state level). Zajontz and Leysens (2015: 302) introduced the concept of 'developing regionalism' to highlight the evolutionary nature of regionalism in social and structural terms. This points to the departure of a narrow definition of regionalism in terms of economic growth, but also to include other forms of regional development paradigms, such as security cooperation and collective conflict management. It has been highlighted above that common threats are some motivating factors that bring states together to resolve common problems.

Regionalism and regionalisation have at times been used interchangeably to mean the same thing although other scholars have defined them differently. For instance, some have defined regionalisation as the informal processes that result from forms of co-operation, integration, connectivity and convergence within a particular cross-national territorial area (Bressand and Nicolaidis, 1990; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 458; Park, 2006). This definition focuses on the informal nature of cooperation and excludes other actors such as states or governments in regionalisation. Another study has defined regionalisation as a process (formal or informal) of adapting norms, policy making process, structures and identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of norms, priorities and interests at the regional level (Warleigh-Lack, 2007: 51). The second definition is broader and represents an intentional process of political, security or economic cooperation based on some commonalities of objectives among states in a given region (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998, 2003; Heng, 2014). This study uses the second definition of regionalisation which refers to the process of integration in the search for manageable solutions to common problems by states and regional organisations (Wunderlich, 2008: 24; Heng, 2014). Philomena Murray observes that regionalism constitutes attempts within historical time-frames to move towards interstate cooperation and even beyond national sovereignty (Murray, 2010: 611). For instance, Murray points out that East Asian regionalism is a framework based on open economic regionalism, normative priors and security imperatives. Normative priors are defined by Acharya (2009: 4) as existing local beliefs and practices that determine how external norms are incorporated. In this instance, the Asian regionalism is dominated by political imperatives in managing their own intra-regional conflicts, and accelerating economic growth, social progress and cultural development (Murray, 2010: 611). This study will assess the motivations leading to African regionalisation of peace and security. It will examine the extent to which African regionalisation facilitates leadership production and collective action.

Regional integration is linked to regionalism and is a process of forming institutions and creating a new polity by bringing together a number of different

constituent parts (Christiansen, 2001). Other scholars observe that regional integration is a strategy of small and medium-sized states to survive in an ever-changing external environment (Milward, 1992; Shaw and Söderbaum, 2003; Söderbaum, 2009). As rightly observed by others, globalisation and the related increase in transnational activities (resulting in security interdependencies) imply that contemporary problems faced by states have extra-territorial dimensions that require common solutions (Wunderlich, 2008: 44-46). In this context, regional cooperation provides one possibility of adapting the nation-state to an increasingly interdependent and globalised world. Such adaptation and interdependence is projected through state and regional policies. This study will investigate the extent to which AU and SADC peace and security policies are harmonised to promote clear leadership in peace interventions and how the two organisations interact with each other to complement a common approach to security challenges. The next section provides the theoretical approaches to regional cooperation and regionalisation of peace and security.

3.2 Theoretical approaches to regionalism

The theoretical debate in explaining regionalism has always revolved around supranational and intergovernmental approaches (Crombez, 1996; Hooghe, 1999; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2006). As earlier indicated, this research will not engage in the debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism but will use their central tenets to form a framework for the study. Supranational approaches aim at restraining sovereignty of national states by establishing institutions and decision-making bodies that supersede and override the sovereign authority of the national states. On the other hand, intergovernmental approaches emphasise the centrality of sovereignty and the national state within the context of international and regional cooperation. There is a consensus in the literature that supranationalism is non-existent in African regionalism (Francis, 2006; Murithi, 2008, 2017; Williams, 2008a, 2008b; Nathan, 2012; Olivier, 2010. In this light, the theoretical approaches discussed in this section are mainly intergovernmentalist in nature.

State-centric theories and intergovernmental approaches to regionalism share the centrality of the nation-state as the primary subject of analysis (Wunderlich, 2008: 16; Fabbrini, 2013). In this regard, sovereignty is the central theme of national states. According to Wunderlich, sovereignty is a twofold concept with an external and an internal dimension. A state as a 'sovereign' does not recognise an external superior, nor does it accept an internal equal. Thus, sovereignty gives state control a legitimate basis. 'At the bottom line, sovereignty is a right, a socially recognized capacity to decide matters within a state's jurisdiction' (Caporaso, 1996: 35). States also control exclusively the use of external violence, and sovereign states have to recognise each other and their territories. States are often depicted as unitary, sovereign and rational actors following certain national interests, although such approaches have been criticised as too simplistic (Moravcsik, 1999; Wunderlich, 2008). Due to the assumed lack of hierarchy (because of sovereignty) among states, international relations literature has explored ways of cooperation in the international system of states from both a realist and constructivist perspective. A review of realist and constructivist approaches is important in order to examine AU leadership and subregional cooperation in peace interventions. Below is an overview of both schools of thought.

3.2.1 Anarchy and order in the international system

The question of anarchy and order has been attempted by many in international relations scholarship (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979; Wendt, 1992; Dunne, 1995a, 1995b). There is a consensus, however, that potentially mutual benefits and gains provide the binding element necessary for inter-state and regional cooperation. Realism and neorealism focus mainly on security-related forms of regionalism, where cooperation is aimed at enhancing states' relative security (Waltz, 1979; Mattli, 1999a, 1999b; Kim, 2014). The dominant position of the hegemonic power imposes a clear hierarchy and leadership in the provision of security (Gilpin, 1981). Hence, regionalism and regional security, for realists, is considered within the context of material possession, geopolitics and national interests (Mearsheimer, 2001). The emergence of alliances and other forms of

cooperation has been argued as a means of improving security and ensuring state survival (Mattli, 1999a, 1999b; Wunderlich, 2008; Kim, 2014). The resulting balancing behaviour among states from this perspective is bound up with the distribution of the relative capabilities of each participant in the international system. Wunderlich and others observe that regional cooperation, conceptualised in such a manner, is hardly anything more than the institutionalisation of an alliance against a common threat or against the hegemonic sphere of interest of a great power (Fry, O'Hagan and Tayeb, 2000: 129; Wunderlich, 2008: 19). Although realists' perspectives of regional security and cooperation provide a significant basis for understanding the process of regionalisation, it is insufficient to explain the regional cooperation in regions that lack hegemons. Additionally, the realist approach attaches cooperation to national security interest, and therefore fails to explain social factors that develop due to interaction or socialisation of states in the international system. As pointed out earlier, this study will not provide a detailed analysis of international relations theories but will use their basic tenets to understand how cooperation of states is attained. This is done to provide a framework of analysis for the study of AU regional interventions. Constructivist theories in international relations provide the social as well as the power perspective for understanding the process of regionalisation. The next section reviews some constructivist approaches in the collective action of states.

3.2.2 Conceptualisation of International Society

International Society is a central concept within the English School understanding of international relations (Buzan, 1993; Dunne, 1998; Buzan and Little, 2002; Barnett and Duvall, 2004; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Brown and Ainley, 2009; Adler, 2013). Its basic idea is that just as individuals live in human society, states live in an international society of states which they shape and are shaped by. This concept is mainly approached with constructivist epistemologies. A society of states is characterised by common interests and common values that form a common set of rules in their relations with one another (Bull, 1995; Bull, and Watson, 1984: 1). However, Hollis and Smith argue that 'there is no single

international society, if by society one means an integrated grouping with a common identity and a common way of seeing the world' (1990:95). Bull's position was that international society can exist in the absence of linguistic, cultural or religious agreements. English School writers argue that international society can be multi-domination and include states that have radically different cultures and philosophies of government. In their view, the central task of diplomacy is to promote understanding and discover common ground between societies that are wedded to different cultures and prone to misunderstand each other's aspirations and intentions (Linklater, 2009: 94). Bull's overview of international society provides a holistic understanding of international relations that drive international order. Bull argues that states are usually committed to limiting the use of force, ensuring respect for property and preserving trust in their relations with one another as independent political communities (1995). Those shared interests in maintaining international order – rather than any common culture or way of life – are the ultimate foundations of international society (Linklater, 2009: 92-3). Bull differentiated international society as a 'system of states' (or international system), which he argued, is formed by continuous interaction among states that influence their decision-making processes and behaviour, but the degree of integration is less than in international society (1995). International society is also viewed as the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states, leading to the creation of shared norms, rules and institutions (Buzan, 2004: xvii). The central debate within international society is on the degree of integration and cooperation between pluralists and solidarists.

Pluralism according to Buzan defines second-order societies of states with a relatively low degree of shared norms, rules and institutions amongst the states. In this regard, the focus of society is on creating a framework for orderly coexistence and management of collective problems of a common fate (Buzan, 2004). On the other hand, solidarism defines international societies with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions among states, where the focus is not only on ordering coexistence, but also on cooperation over

a wider range of issues, whether in pursuit of joint gains, for instance trade, or realisation of shared values, such as human rights (Buzan, 2004: xviii; Linklater, 2009). Pluralists argue for non-intervention and sovereignty for order to be sustained in international relations, while solidarists are progressive in that they believe that international society can develop wide-ranging norms, rules and institutions, covering both coexistence and cooperation in pursuit of shared interests, including some scope for collective enforcement (Buzan, 2004: 8; Linklater and Suganami, 2006).

Nicholas Wheeler using humanitarian interventions and building on a solidarist version of international society argues that the growing intrusion of humanitarian norms in post-cold war and cosmopolitan moral awareness demands that we respond where practicable to what he calls 'supreme humanitarian emergencies' (2000: 238). Pluralist international society theory, however, rejects humanitarian intervention as a violation of the cardinal rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force (Wheeler, 2000: 11). The evolution and diversity of international society conceptualisation attempts to address the concerns of whether societies of states can develop the protection of civilians through peace interventions. Solidarism envisions states in international society coming together to enforce human rights laws. This conception of international society recognises that individuals have rights and duties in international law, but it also acknowledges that individuals can have these rights enforced only by states (Wheeler, 2000: 11). It is acknowledged that states have different and often conflicting ideas about protection of civilians; however, some human rights violations are so immense that states have to consider setting aside sovereignty and intervene in each other's internal affairs (Linklater, 2009: 98). The prevailing debates within the English School and concept of international society are diverse and beyond the scope of this study. However, there are links in international society approaches to regionalism that are relevant to this study.

3.2.3 Constructivist approaches to regionalism

In international society, states are always in the process of creating their own

primary rules, as well as secondary rules that govern their creation, interpretation and enforcement (Linklater and Suganami, 2006). What is central in this concept of international society is that states interact with each other and create norms and values that are not driven by material possession. In other words, states will agree to create a condition of order that is translated to common action in dealing with common problems such as cross border conflicts (Hurrell, 2007; Emmerson, 2009b; Diehl, 2014). International society is, therefore, approached with constructivist epistemologies (Dunne, 1995a; Reus-Smit, 1999, 2000, 2009; Linklater, 2009). The interaction between international society and constructivism, explains how states cooperate in anarchy (Dunne, 1995a, 1995b). This relationship between international society and constructivism provides understanding of international order and fills the gap left by other theories in international relations such as realism. International society is mainly close to the constructivists' argument in that the interests of states must always be considered in conjunction with the moral and legal principles of international society (Linklater and Suganami, 2006). Wheeler observes that 'states follow their interests, but the way they define these interests is shaped by the rules prevailing in the society of states' (2000: 24). Wheeler here emphasises that rules of international society enable and constrain state actions. Constructivists argue that states can be social agents participating in 'games' with unqualified acceptance of the appropriate set of conventional assumptions (Dunne 1995a: 377). In this light, the constructivist approach provides another building block for the analysis of regionalism. Social constructivism 'provides a theoretically rich and promising way of conceptualising the interaction between material incentives, intersubjective structures, and the identity and interests of the actors' (Hurrell, 1995: 72). Instead of focusing solely on material incentives, constructivists emphasise the importance of shared knowledge, learning, ideational forces and normative and institutional structures. It is argued that belonging to a particular grouping may in time redefine national interests and geostrategic preferences (Wendt, 1994; Dunne, 1995a). The international and regional systems are seen as socio-political constructions driven by collective interactions, emerging from social, political, economic and strategic interactions

(Wunderlich, 2008).

Within the constructivist school national-states' interests emerge and change in the regionalisation process where actors may not only pursue material objectives but also group goals. Constructivism generally rejects rational theory arguments that regionalisation processes and international cooperation are determined by strategic interests and relative gains and losses of states (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981). 'Cooperation relies not only on reason (as the term rationalists implies) but on the consensus established by the customs of state practice' (Dunne 1995b: 135). The interaction between international society and constructivism provides a different and plausible explanation in understanding the evolution of cooperation in other regions of the world, such as Africa, where trade or human rights have not been the major source of integration. Constructivists argue that interests and preferences of states are determined through processes of interaction and are socially constructed (Fierke, 2006). This indicates that conditions such as anarchy and security dilemma situations are not inevitable but are socially constructed and, therefore, can be de-constructed (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995). Through socialisation, member states coordinate their national policies to find a solution to common regional problems.

From this background, this research will investigate the extent to which states' interactions through subregional frameworks cooperate and construct leadership in peace interventions. Social constructivism grants explanatory power to non-material factors such as identities, norms and principles that allow states to cooperate in collective action. Little research has shown the roles of African subregional actors in peace interventions (Williams, 2009b; Cawthra, 2010; Ancas, 2011; Gelot, 2012). Indeed, there is little literature on how central tenets of international society produce and shape leadership of peace interventions within the AU. The extent to which AU leadership norms and beliefs shape the behaviour of states and orient them towards collective action is still missing in the literature (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000). Norms and identities are also argued to shape the awareness and acceptance of certain objectives and a sense of

belonging (Wendt, 1994; Fierke, 2006). In this light, this research asks the following question: To what extent do the leadership norms and beliefs of the AU shape the conduct of peace interventions and influence the production of leadership among African peace and security actors (AU and subregional actors)? Leadership identities that are shaped in the process of interaction and intersubjective understanding constitute the crucial link that connects the structure of the international or regional environments, interests of various actors, and formation of policies (Hettne, and Söderbaum, 2000; Sweeney, 2005; Wunderlich, 2008). Hettne and Söderbaum (2002: 33), stress the necessity for a wider framework for the analysis and understanding of regions and regional processes, beyond political and economic factors but also socio-cultural aspects. This study will contribute to this knowledge through the regional leadership analysis of AU peace interventions.

3.2.4 Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism provides another building block for the analysis of regionalism. As in international society, within intergovernmental approaches, states are the main actors in the international system. International institutions provide a common framework for cooperation that reduces uncertainty and minimises transaction costs (Moravcsik, 1994; Emmerson and Walter, 2008; Fawn, 2009; Burchill et al., 2013). Within the intergovernmental scholarship, the regional bodies or institutions provide a platform for interstate bargaining. Policy making is made through negotiation among member states or through carefully circumscribed delegations or authority (Pierson, 1996). Theoretical debates within this perspective have dealt with questions of states' influence on collective decision making (Moravcsik, 1991; Ferguson, 2003). Within the liberal intergovernmentalism scholarship, states define their underlying preferences and negotiate with other states to create appropriate international institutions for collective action and fulfilment of their goals (Kim, 2014). The key claim within liberal intergovernmentalism is that the main driving force of regional integration is the international economic interdependence, rather than geopolitical goals, security concerns, or the ideological visions of politicians (Moravcsik, 1993, 1995;

Wincott, 1995; Tatham, 2011). However, in some cases integration is driven more by political reasons than economic interests. Beeson points out, that regionalism is not just a functional response to intra-regional economic developments but 'an essentially political process informed by multidimensional economic and strategic factors' (2005: 970). In agreement with Beeson, Kim indicates that states pursue regional integration as a way of enhancing both their regime security and their bargaining position against major economic powers in the world (2014: 389). The central point here is that a common interest among states drives integration among states. The emphasis on the central role of the state in integration provides powerful lens through which we can explain the integration process elsewhere. Integration outcomes constrain, and control collective action problems associated with rational choices to enhance the credibility and commitments to international institutions (Moravcsik, 1991, 1998; Beeson 2005). Intergovernmentalism provides another analytical framework through which we can assess African regionalism and peace interventions. It is observed that African regional integration is still work in progress (Nathan, 2012, 2013; Olivier, 2010). However, African leaders seem to agree that conducting regional peace interventions is a common goal. What is unclear in this instance is how they cooperate under the AU framework in the conduct of peace operations and joint conflict mediations. This research is therefore undertaken to interrogate how cooperation and collaboration is achieved among AU and subregional actors, thereby providing more insights on leadership.

3.2.5 Security governance

The security governance approach provides the last building block for the analysis of regionalism in this study. Governance consists of rule systems, through which authority is exercised and accepted as legitimate by the governed (Rhodes, 1996; Dean, 2007; Miller and Rose, 2017). Global and regional governance can, therefore, be understood as a loose framework of global and regional regulation, in both institutional and normative domains (Wunderlich, 2008; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010). A central question is: How is governance carried out within international settings? Network analysis provides a framework for interaction upon which governance is facilitated (Breslin et al., 2003;

Rosamond, 2005). Other scholars indicate that network approaches see a network as a set of relatively stable relationships which are non-hierarchical and interdependent, linking a variety of actors who share common interests and acknowledge that co-operation is the best way to achieve those common goals (Börzel, 1997). Transnational linkages and networks play a critical role in both formal and informal integration (Bressand and Nicolaïdis, 1990). Norheim-Martinsen (2010) provides a comprehensive summary of security governance as advanced by Webber et al. (2004). Security governance in this case consists of five features, which are: (a) heterarchy, or the existence of multiple centres of power; (b) the interaction of multiple actors, both public and private; (c) formal and informal institutionalisation; (d) relations between actors that are ideational in character; and (e) a collective purpose (Webber et al., 2004: 4–8).

Heterarchy[15], as the first feature of security governance, 'reflects the central proposition in the governance literature that the hierarchical mode of policy-making associated with government must be supplanted by an understanding of how actors other than government … take part in increasingly complex and decentralised policy-making processes' (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1353). In this instance, the provision of security has become less hierarchical, partly due to new roles adopted by regional organisations. However, the role of states is still vital in security governance. Secondly, the provision of security involves multiple actors, hence, the interaction of multiple actors beyond the state, for example, the growing involvement of the military, aid workers, police officers, and private contractors in post-conflict reconstruction (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1354). Thirdly, the interactions in institutionalised settings provide a socialisation and networking context that allows actors to develop shared ideas and a common understanding of what the organisation's purpose and legitimate scope of action is, which is then sustained and enforced as they develop an allegiance to the institution and the cause. Finally, Norheim-Martinsen indicates that the central

[15] The growth of multiple centres of power and co-ordinated actions taken in response to common and increasingly complex security challenges, cited in Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1353

message conveyed in the security governance literature is that institutions act as socialising agents. Not merely as arenas for coordinated action, suggesting that there exist certain collectively held *ideas* and *norms* that structure the relations between the actors involved whenever they interact in institutionalised settings (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010:1357). Such ideas are interpreted and reproduced by international institutions, which, in turn, project them as appropriate norms of legitimate behaviour (Risse-Kappen, 1994; Desch, 1998; Parsons, 2002). The conceptualisation of security governance based on socialisation, internalization of norms and interaction, allows regional peace and security to be studied and understood using constructivist approaches. On the other hand, due to the presence and active role played by the states, security governance acknowledges the notions of power and influence associated with realist approaches to security cooperation in the international system. This study utilises the security governance framework to examine networking, coordination and cooperation that exist in African peace interventions.

3.3 Motivations for regional peace operations and conflict mediations

The study of peace operations has mainly been focused on state level analysis. However, several scholars indicate that regional level analysis can help explain how states in given regions reach shared understandings about their role in peace operations, which may be different from other regions (Katzenstein, 2000; Tavares, 2008; Bhattacharyya, 2010; Schulz and Söderbaum, 2010; Taylor, 2011; Rein, 2015). Through the analysis of regional peace interventions more knowledge is developed on the nature of leadership, motivations and division of labour in the conduct of peace missions (Bhattacharyya, 2010; Schulz, and Söderbaum, 2010; Taylor, 2011). From this backdrop, the interaction between the regional and subregional actors in the African context requires further study in order to fully understand how regional networks interact with each other in contemporary conflict management. There is little literature that has analysed the interactions that occur between the AU and subregional partners in the actual conduct of joint conflict mediations or peace operations (Cawthra, 2010; Ancas,

2011). The review of this literature indicates gaps in knowledge in this regard. For instance, the APSA Assessment study (2010), observed a lack of clarity within the principles that guide the regional and subregional peace frameworks. On the other hand, Vines (2013) has assessed APSA since 2002 but did not examine the subject of leadership and nature of interactions between the AU and subregions. By investigating the leadership trends in both subregional and regional peace efforts, this study will contribute to the knowledge of leadership in regional and subregional interactions – specifically, on how liberal and cosmopolitan theories promote collective action and leadership in peace interventions. The next section provides a review of these theories and asks questions on how they relate to African peace interventions.

3.3.1 Liberal peace theory

The Liberal peace model comprises commitments to democracy, the rule of law and human rights as basic tenets that sustain peace (Doyle, 2005; Jackson, 2011; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). There is a consensus within the liberal school of thought that the basis of a lasting peace is the provision of a legitimate political authority of the state that is provided through democratic elections[16]. The promotion of liberal peace theory has been the driving force for UN peace operations and conflict mediations. For instance, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that:

> 'There is an obvious connection between democratic practices such as the rule of law and transparency in decision making, and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities' (UN 1992: §59).

[16] See World Development Report 2011. Conflict, Security and Development. World Bank; see also DFID and UK-AID 2010. Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper.

He further stated that: ‘democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice’ (UN 1992: §82). Similarly, another former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, speaking in 2005 indicated that:

> ‘The right to choose how they are ruled, and who rules them, must be the birth right of all people, and its universal achievement must be a central objective of an organisation (the UN) devoted to the cause of larger freedom… The UN does more than any other single organisation to promote and strengthen democratic institutions and practices around the world’ (UN 2005: §§148 and 151).

The views of the UN peace interventions have normally reflected the broader international perspective of state construction based on liberal peace and democracy. Within the liberal peace literature, democracy and capitalism are critically viewed as the vehicles for peace (Paris, 2004; Jackson, 2011; Jackson, 2015). It is important to note that, while liberal practices are generally considered the best option for governing in a post-conflict environment (Paris 2002, 2003), the transfer of the political liberal practices from the international community (usually Western liberal countries) to non-liberal states has received a fair level of criticism (Morphet, 2000; Duffield, 2001; Pugh, 2004). Other scholars acknowledge that although liberal peace is the dominant theory that underpins contemporary peace interventions, its application in the state formation of post-conflict states requires comprehensive analysis (Nadarajah, 2009; Bellamy et al., 2010; Chandler, 2010; Jackson, 2015; Nadarajah and Rampton, 2015; Jackson and Beswick, 2018).

Literature on liberal peace has mainly focused on the role of International/Western democracies in the promotion of liberal practices in post-conflict countries (Doyle, 2001; Kolm, 2005; Jackson and Albrecht, 2010). There have been relatively few studies that have described the African peace architecture as a liberal peace instrument, but they have not fully linked AU peace interventions with the broader liberal peace debate (Vines, 2013). This research

will examine the linkages between the AU peace interventions and promotion of liberal values and practices within the AU. In this light, the research investigates the extent to which liberal peace is reflected and promoted in AU peace intervention and how liberal peace perspectives enhance leadership in African collective action. The study therefore will contribute to knowledge of common practice in AU peace interventions and such knowledge is necessary for policy support in African peace interventions.

3.3.2 Cosmopolitan peacekeeping

Cosmopolitanism has strong links to the post-Westphalian view that states have the responsibility to protect their citizens (Linklater, 1996, 1998; Fraser, 2007). Likewise, individual states are accountable to international society in upholding their citizens' rights. On the other hand, international society has a responsibility to assist and if need be force states to fulfil their responsibilities to protect civilians (Bellamy et al., 2010: 41). The underlying tenets of cosmopolitan theory are democracy, human rights and human security for all human beings and therefore, conceptually linked to the promotion of liberal peace. Additionally, the theory promotes collective action and leadership in implementing cosmopolitan values. Scholars in cosmopolitan thinking argue for principles of democracy to apply in the international arena for the peace and stability of all human beings (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Archibugi, Koenig, and Marchetti, 2011) and human security for all peoples (Brown and Held, 2010). While cosmopolitan school of thought supports collective action in promoting democratic values and human security, the question of leadership in the collective remains an issue of debate.

The basic approach of cosmopolitan theory has mainly been the antithesis of sovereignty and the role of the state in ensuring human security (Tan, 2004; Van Hooft and Vandekerckhove, 2010; Brown, 2011). Other scholars have argued that the state is the limiting factor in achieving human rights for all peoples and international organisations should play a pivotal role in ensuring human security (Archibugi, 2012). In addressing the issue of global peace, others have provided a framework of how peace at the local and national level can build into a global

level through the development of a cosmopolitan peacekeeping framework (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005). Cosmopolitan peacekeeping theory argues for the 'enforcement of cosmopolitan norms, i.e. enforcement of international humanitarian and human rights laws' that would enable the protection of civilians (Kaldor and Salmon, 2006: 31-2). In this light, the enforcement and promotion of human rights values ties liberal and cosmopolitan theories to leadership. A further discussion on these linkages is provided below. The cosmopolitan theory highlights the development of high capability in both military and civilian components in conflict resolution. It projects peace beyond creating political and humanitarian space, as in the negative peace dimension[17], to development and peace building in a positive peace dimension. In other words, cosmopolitanism argues for the creation of space for civilian activity to operate on the long-term political, economic and cultural dimensions of change that address power asymmetries, poverty and marginalization (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007: 1055). Cosmopolitan values connect peacekeeping and peace building, to make peace building a focus of peacekeeping activities. Central to the theory is the deployment of a robust peace operation to protect civilians. It values the creation of a credible force that is willing and able to enter into combat to protect ordinary people. Cosmopolitan theory argues that military force can and should be used to 'save strangers' (Wheeler, 2000). Elliott and Cheeseman suggest that there is a growing recognition that militaries have been deployed as 'forces for good' within the cosmopolitan peacekeeping ethic, in response to genocide and gross abuse of human rights (2004: 24-28). The use of force is central to this theory, since there would be no consent from belligerents or those that threatened civilians (Kaldor and Salmon, 2006; Bellamy et al., 2010: 27).

Cosmopolitanism provides 'a normative framework that can be used to redefine peacekeeping by applying international humanitarian standards to realise notions of human security' (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007: 1056). Several scholars have

[17] Negative peace is essentially the condition where there is no active violence, but structural causes of violence are present, while positive peace is beyond negative peace and the structural causes of violence are removed.

envisaged the means by which cosmopolitan peace operations can be led. The idea of developing a standing United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) that is capable of protecting civilians from harm and implement the full range of UN's human security agenda has received much support from cosmopolitan scholars (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Curran and Woodhouse, 2007; Bellamy et al., 2010: 26). The conceptualisation of UNEPS involves the establishment of an independent international organisation for the implementation of peace operations. While the UNEPS has not yet been developed, regional peace interventions within the AU have increased, where states have a major influence. This study, therefore, examines how cosmopolitan ideas promote the leadership of peace interventions among African regional institutions and partners.

Studies on cosmopolitan peacekeeping have mainly been conceptualised from a Western or European perspective and no research has been done to examine cosmopolitan peacekeeping theory in AU peace operations. Although some scholars have argued against the involvement of the state in the implementation of cosmopolitan values, the African peace interventions have been led by states. In this light, this research contributes to cosmopolitan peace operations in the African context in two ways. First by examining the extent to which AU peace operations are driven by cosmopolitan principles of democracy, human rights and human security for all. Thereby linking cosmopolitan and liberal peace theories together. Second, by analysing the role of the states in the implementation or promotion of the cosmopolitan values. It is in the second contribution that this study provides clear linkages between cosmopolitanism and leadership of peace interventions within the AU. From this backdrop, the research provides more insights in contemporary African conflict management and how it relates to the international conceptualisation of peace operations.

The theoretical approaches to the understanding of peace operations and conflict mediations provided in this chapter are not exhaustive. As demonstrated above, the dynamics of peace interventions are too practical to be explained by a series

of theories alone. Hence, the last part of this chapter reviews some practical literature on regional and global peace interventions and how they have developed over time.

3.4 The United Nations and regionalisation of peace and security

Insofar as globalised peace interventions are a growing reality, the nature of global-regional cooperation including the role of the UN is worth exploring (Yamashita 2012; Weiss and Welz, 2015). Such analysis also identifies how further developments at the global, regional and national levels have progressed. The traditional role of the UN in peace interventions has evolved and regional organisations have been encouraged to also take a lead, especially in Africa (UN 2004c; Weiss, 2007). The UN Agenda for Peace (1992 §64) pointed out that,

> 'regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in [...] preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-making and post conflict peace building … regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and cooperation with UN efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs'[18].

The UN charter, Chapter VIII encourages 'regional arrangements' in peaceful resolution of regional conflicts within their regions. With the increased demand for peacekeepers, regional organisations are seen as a solution since the UN is overstretched. Article 51 acknowledges the right of states to act in collective defence, which permits regional organisations to defend member states without prior authorisation from the UN Security Council. However, article 53, emphasises that regional organisations may not conduct enforcement actions without authorisation from the UN Security Council. As noted by Bellamy et al., 'in practice the legal bases both for the cooperation between the UN and regional

[18] An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, A/47/277-S/24111 (17 June 1992), para. 64.

organisations have not been made clear within the resolutions of either the security council or the regional organisations concerned' (2010: 304). The principle of subsidiarity between the UN and regional groups is acknowledged in both Art. 33 (1) and Art. 52 (2) of the UN Charter. However, the view that regional organisations have priority in dispute settlements in their own region has received a fair level of support (Goulding, 2002; Francis, 2006; Gelot, 2012). On the other hand, it is argued that the 'global legitimacy pyramid' (Coleman 2007: 57) puts the UN at the top of the pyramid followed by regional organisations and subregional organisations at the bottom of the pyramid. The hierarchy in international peace and security is mainly justified by the collective legitimation process that is determined by the number of member states forming each organisation (Claude, 1966; Coleman, 2007). The concept of legitimacy in regional peace operations is contested. There is also considerable support for the idea that each region should develop mechanisms for peace interventions and resolve conflicts in their regions because regional organisations have more legitimacy in their localities (Goulding, 2002; Williams and Bellamy, 2005; Gelot, 2012). Despite much debate on regional and global legitimacy in peace interventions, there is less clarity on legitimacy of regional and subregional actors in peace interventions. The question of legitimacy becomes even more important where the boundaries of authority are not clearly defined. For instance, it remains unclear on how regional peace operations are led and how regional and subregional actors interact and produce leadership in Africa. This research is undertaken to contribute to this knowledge by investigating the extent to which legitimacy varies in regional and subregional peace interventions.

3.4.1 Potential advantages and disadvantages of regional peace interventions

Several scholars have made contributions towards potential advantages and disadvantages of regional PSOs (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, 2010; Williams, 2009b; Angelov, 2010; Gelot, 2012). It is acknowledged that there are great variations in regional capabilities, as well as in the nature of conflicts. As a result of this, there should be a flexible model of co-operation, where the modalities of co-operation should be determined on a case-by-case basis according to the

added value of each organisation (Angelov, 2010: 605). Studies indicate that, first, there is a potential greater legitimacy and sensitivity due to greater working knowledge within the regional organisations (Goulding, 2002). The states of a region have a better grasp of a conflict situation and its cultural backdrop than other nations (Williams, 2013a). Here it is assumed that local knowledge is vital to negotiation.

Second, their geographical proximity allows regional actors to deploy and supply troops relatively quickly (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). The assumption is that regional actors have the capability and resources to deploy in a timely way for peace operations.

Third, it is argued that in some cases parties to a conflict may prefer the involvement of regional actors rather than the UN or other external bodies; hence the frequent calls for Arab, or Asian, or African solutions to regional problems (Gelot, 2012; Diehl and Balas, 2014). This argument 'relies on the notion that the people and government in the region have a natural affinity with those in the same geographic area and have suspicion on what they perceive as outside intervention' (Diehl, 2007: 541; Diehl and Balas, 2014). An example of perceived outside intervention is given in the Darfur region of Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea-Ethiopia conflicts.

The fourth argument suggests that the region's proximity to the crisis in question means that its members have to live with the consequences of unresolved conflicts, such as refugee crises and hence, are more likely to sustain engagement over the long run (Murithi, 2008).

Finally, regional operations may be the only realistic option in conflicts where the UN has declined to intervene. Regional arrangements can fill the gap left by the selective approach of the UN Security Council in international conflict management (Francis, 2006; Gelot, 2012), for instance, in Burundi, Darfur, Liberia and Somalia. It is acknowledged in the literature that these advantages

are to some extent overstated, and there are obvious disadvantages associated with regional interventions (Diehl, 2007; Francis, 2006). This research will investigate the extent to which these potential advantages are reflected in AU and subregional peace interventions and draw lessons that can be learnt from these regional interventions. In this light, the research results have the potential to inform future peace interventions in Africa. It is important to note that there are potential disadvantages of regional peace interventions that require further review.

Peace operations are costly to conduct and require massive financial and logistical support, and there is significant evidence from the research that most regional structures lack the experience, bureaucratic structures, and resources necessary to conduct peace operations effectively (UN 2002: 217; Francis, 2006; Williams, 2009b; Bellamy et al., 2010). The issue of resources in peace operations has been widely acknowledged; however, their link to leadership of regional peace interventions is missing. This research will make its contribution by investigating the extent to which lack of resources in African peace interventions affects leadership production in peace interventions. Among the potential disadvantages of regional peace interventions, it is argued that geographic proximity to the conflict does not automatically generate regional consensus on how to respond (Diehl, 2007). Diehl observes that internal state conflicts are least likely to generate regional consensus (2007: 540-1). Diehl's observation agrees with others who argue that regional organisations are particularly susceptible to the pull of partisan interests, especially those associated with regionally influential states such as Nigeria in ECOWAS. South Africa in SADC, and the United States of America in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Francis, 2006; Bellamy et al., 2010: 312). It is argued that because of the inability of regional organisations to act against their most powerful members, regional organisations' peace operations 'are unlikely to be authorised in conflicts that directly involve global powers or regional powers' (Francis, 2006; Diehl, 2007: 543). David Francis (2006) in his analysis of ECOWAS deployments in the 1990s indicates that the Nigerian led ECOWAS in

Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), used regional arrangements to legitimise their activities in conflicts that were of direct relevance to them and where Nigerian leaders had personal interests. This manipulation was also observed in the South African led SADC operation in Lesotho (1998), and the Russian led CIS operation in Abkhazia/Georgia (1994). While the argument of influential regional powers is valid, it fails to explain the leadership of peace interventions where the influential regional powers are absent, for instance, in the AU mission in Somalia. This research will therefore investigate the extent to which the absence of regional powers balances the partisan interests and how it affects the production of leadership.

Despite the potential disadvantages, in sub-Saharan Africa, regional arrangements are increasingly becoming an important feature in contemporary conflict management, where peace operations are the major tool. The AU and other subregions within the continent, such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, have shown considerable willingness and initiative to undertake peace interventions, though they lack relevant capabilities (Bellamy et al., 2010). Most of these peace missions have been short-term with the intention of handing them over to the UN forces, for instance, the ECOWAS mission to Cote d'Ivoire (2002-3) and Liberia (2003), the AU operation in Burundi (2003-4), the AU mission in Somalia (2007-present). By the end of 2007 the AU mission in the Darfur region of Sudan was merged into a hybrid AU-UN operation known as UNAMID. It is therefore important to understand the mode of cooperation that has been implemented between the UN and regional organisations, in order to establish the basis of investigating the AU relations with subregional organisations such as SADC.

3.5 The trends in UN-Regional peace support coordination

The debate on UN-regional peacekeeping cooperation has evolved over time and there has been incremental progress in the development of global-regional peacekeeping cooperation over the past decade. The Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, established the forms and principles of coordination between the UN and regional organisations in peacekeeping. The forms of coordination include:

(a) consultations; (b) mutual diplomatic support; (c) mutual operational support; (d) co-deployment of field missions; and (e) joint deployment of a mission. The principles are: (a) the need for agreed mechanisms for consultation; (b) the primacy of the UN; (c) the need to set out a clearly defined and agreed division of labour: and (d) the need for states to pursue a consistent policy in tackling the same situation through the UN as well as the regional organisations (UN, 1995).[19] The predominant question has not focused on the question of principles and forms of cooperation *per se* but rather on the practical one of how to 'meet the increase in demand for UN peacekeeping, particularly in Africa'.[20] The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in 2004 noted that 'the experiences of the past few years suggest that this new multi-layered security architecture is already beginning to emerge. The challenge today is to move beyond purely ad hoc arrangements and put in place a system capable of generating a rapid and flexible response to crises in Africa and elsewhere' (UN, 2005)[21]. These statements point towards the notion of partnering, where there is a need to institutionalise an emerging network of peacekeeping partners and sharing of peacekeeping resources and expertise (Yamashita 2012: 175).

Scholars have analysed the relationship of the UN with regional organisations in peace operations (Gelot, 2012; Yamashita, 2012). It is shown that subcontracting and partnering have been the conceptual models, defining the UN-regional organisations' relationship in peace operations (Yamashita (2012: 169). In the subcontracting mode of global-regional cooperation, regional peace operations are in essence authorised by the UN, monitored and delegated to regional organisations. Within this arrangement, the UN enjoys a lesser operational burden while regional organisations enjoy the availability of UN resources and clear legality for their robust operations (Gelot, 2012; Yamashita, 2012). Subcontracting, however, presumes a hierarchical relationship, while partnering

[19] Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN, A/50/60-S/1995/1 (25 January 1995), paras 86–8; see also para. 24.
[20] Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/694 (26 January 2004), para. 3.
[21] Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/694, para. 84.

is non-hierarchical and interactive in nature. Partnering implies a 'more horizontal relationship wherein the UN and regional peacekeeping bodies form a network of peacekeeping partners with interconnected capabilities' (Yamashita 2012: 170).

The Peace Operations 2010 directive (which is the current framework of peacekeeping reform) links the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the AU as important partners. Its plan of action proposed the development of a DPKO strategy for the enhancement of AU peacekeeping capacities; technical modalities and procedures for the engagement of EU Battle Groups in support of UN peace operations; and an action plan to take forward practical UN-NATO cooperation in peacekeeping. At the same time, the directive describes the AU as a 'key external partner' and confirms a commitment to supporting the building of African peacekeeping capacities.[22]

While regional organisations, such as NATO, EU and AU, in general express support for the idea of strengthened cooperation with the UN, there have been differences in tone among them (Wilson, 1995; Simma, 1999; Kaplan, 2010; Weiss and Welz, 2014; Reichard, 2016). NATO and EU have generally resisted more control from the UN (Kaplan, 2010; Reichard, 2016). It is observed that for the EU, a less hierarchical relationship is presupposed in institutionalising operational linkage with UN, and yet at the same time it is fairly careful in recognising the mandating authority of the Security Council (Major, 2008; Brantner and Gowan, 2008). The AU for its part, while it has expressed some concerns, has taken a more affirmative approach to the issue, emphasising the 'complementary and mutually reinforcing' roles of the two organisations (Yamashita, 2012: 170). The AU supports the idea of UN support for capacity-building mainly on the sub-contracting model but is less committed to outright control of its peace operations by the UN (Ancas, 2011; Boutellis and Williams, 2013; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). It is observed that both organisations selectively use both models to promote their interests.

[22] UN 'Peace Operations 2010', pp 4-6

While the UN has stressed its hierarchical supremacy, it has also acknowledged that cooperation between the UN and regional organisations should take place in accordance with 'their respective mandates, scope and composition' and 'in forms that are suited to each specific situation, in accordance with the Charter' (Yamashita, 2012: 173).[23] However, the role of regional efforts remains critical and, where appropriate, should be supported by the Security Council (Gelot, 2012). The observations and acknowledgements by the UN in support of regional engagements, demonstrate a flexible hierarchy and network of peace interventions. The UN partnering model is based on the realistic acknowledgement of the emergence of regional organisations as peacekeeping actors 'in their own right' and the assessment that this 'offers substantial opportunities' to the UN.[24] There is substantial information on the UN perspective of regional peace operations and how they must be coordinated. Other studies have highlighted the competition and tension among the UN, AU and RECs, in developing a regional partnerships capability in Africa (Ancas, 2011). What is missing, however, is an analysis of how this competition and tension is generated, what leadership outcomes are developed and what mode of co-operation between the AU and its subregional actors is adopted. This study will examine the AU interaction with the subregional organisation (SADC) and National Contingents in AU peace operations in order to respond to this identified gap in regional peace interventions. It is acknowledged that regional organisations have different views on the mode of partnership and relationship with the UN, despite a clear legal framework. With the increased African involvement, it is vital to understand the mode of cooperation that has been developed through practice within the AU and subregions for timely responses to conflicts in the region. In order to understand the regionalism and leadership in peace interventions within the African continent, it is important to further review the relationship between the UN and AU.

[23] General Assembly Resolution 49/57 (17 February 1995), Annex, paras 4–10 (quotation from paras 4–5).
[24] Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/640 (29 December 2005), para. 29.

3.6 UN-AU Framework in perspective.

The UN-AU collaboration on peace and security has evolved since 1965.[25] Williams and Boutellis (2014: 258) convincingly indicate that: (1) collaboration becomes a necessity because the majority of the UN Security Council's activities has been on African peace and security; (2) UN Security Council has the primary – but not exclusive – responsibility for maintaining international peace and security; (3) neither institution can cope with the multitude of peace and security challenges in Africa; and (4) while the AU is a critical political authority for conflict management in Africa, it lacks the necessary material and financial capabilities for rapid and decisive action in peace interventions as evidenced by the 2012-2013 crisis in Mali which is still ongoing.[26] The UN-AU relationship has an important impact on both the legitimacy and success of peace operations in Africa (Ancas, 2011; Gelot, 2012). However, the relationship between the UN and AU has not developed to predictable levels. The increased levels of violent conflicts in Africa indicate that the AU will continue to organise peace missions outside the UN umbrella, although there have been calls to establish the UN-AU cooperation beyond *ad hoc* arrangements (Williams and Boutellis, 2014).

Although there is an apparent need for collaboration, Williams and Boutellis indicate that the UN-AU relationship 'has at times been characterized by considerable conflict, mistrust, and tension, often hindering the predictability and conduct of effective peace operations' (2014: 254). For instance, unlike the UN, the AU has actively developed 'a different peacekeeping doctrine; that engages peacekeeping troops in active warfare' (Williams and Boutellis, 2014: 263).

[25] The Organization of African Unity signed a cooperation agreement with the UN on 15 November 1965, which was updated on 9 October 1990 by the two Secretaries-General of the organizations. Further UN-OAU cooperation with regard to peacekeeping was called for in a variety of UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, perhaps most notably Security Council Resolution 1197 (18 September 1998). This trend continued with the new AU and is in evidence in UN Security Council Resolutions 1809 (16 April 2008) and 2033 (12 January 2012).

[26] The planned regional intervention, termed the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), was authorised by the U.N. Security Council in December 2012. However, AFISMA required many months to prepare. See African Union, 'Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the Establishment of an "African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises"' (AU doc. RPT/ Exp/VI/STCDSS/(i-a)2013, 29–30 April 2013), para. 53.

Williams and Boutellis observe that these different views have been a source of conflict on force requirements and budget for peace operations within the UN and AU collaboration. They further note that while the AU enjoyed a deep, multi-dimensional and maturing relationship notably in Darfur and later in Somalia on the one hand, on the other hand, the UN Security Council and the AU PSC were deeply divided over how to respond to the crises in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire and over the financing of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is also argued that the AU's limited bureaucratic, logistical, and financial capabilities have produced a highly unequal partnership with the UN (Gelot, 2012). Hence, some scholars argue that peace operations in Africa have been characterised by the great power politics[27] (Černohous and Kříž, 2014; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). Despite these limitations the AU has demonstrated its willingness to conduct more peace operations.

There are several unanswered questions emanating from the AU-UN doctrinal differences that relate to leadership and coordination of peace missions within the UN-AU and AU-Subregional frameworks. What is obvious with this new doctrine is that, first, AU troops are involved in full combat with belligerents, hence, troop contributing countries (TCCs) are willing to put their troops are risk. Second, the military component is required to be robust enough to establish credibility and enforce belligerents' compliance. Third, there must be comprehensive logistical support to sustain the operations, on which the AU is already challenged. Finally, there is a need for clear leadership structures for guiding such operations. Additionally, the financial benefits (allowances) for TCCs for such deployments are minimal at the AU level as compared to the UN (Gelot, 2012). These observations originating from the AU's new doctrine in peace interventions generate a puzzle regarding how the AU negotiates with African partners in its implementation. How does the AU garner the support from member states to engage in full blown warfare that has minimal financial

[27] See John Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer argues that great powers behave according to certain "offensive realist" principles in promoting their national interests in the international system, similarly to the history of great powers over the last two centuries.

benefits? And how is leadership produced in this framework of peace interventions with subregional partners? The answers to these questions are missing in the literature and this research will respond to these questions.

Williams and Boutellis also point to another challenge in the UN-AU relationship in regard to authorisation of 'humanitarian military intervention' in Africa.[28] The source of tension is Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, in which the Union's Assembly gives it the right to intervene in its member states in 'grave circumstances', namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. On the other hand, the UN Charter stipulates that military force against a sovereign government can only be used in self-defence or with the express authorisation of the UN Security Council.[29] In this instance, legitimacy struggles over which institution should exercise political authority in responding to a particular crisis still linger between the UN and AU, as demonstrated in the Libyan civil interventions by NATO and Western countries in 2011 (Williams and Boutellis, 2014: 276). It is important to note that the UN-AU relationship has been developing over time, yet it still has apparent challenges. On the other hand, the AU-subregional relationship in peace operations is comparatively new. With the exception of a few studies (Agoagye, 2004; Williams, 2009a, 2009b; Cawthra, 2010; Ancas, 2011) there are relatively few studies on AU relations with subregional partners. Additionally, these studies have focused on existing challenges and did not look at how leadership is produced and developed within the AU relations with subregional actors. This study will, therefore, address this gap and provide more insights on how the mode of cooperation in AU and subregional structures works. The results will inform future studies on AU peace and security frameworks and how African regional actors produce leadership in their peace interventions.

[28] Humanitarian military intervention is defined as the use of military force by external actors, without host state consent, aimed at preventing or ending genocide and mass atrocities.
[29] Article 53 of the UN Charter states: 'no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council'.

3.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted several regional theoretical frameworks that will be used in the study. Although international society conceptualisation has primarily focused on understanding international order, scholars in this field have also considered the prospects of applying it to regional analysis (Buzan, 2001; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Navari, 2008). This study will utilise international society and constructivists' tenets to understand the leadership and conduct of peace operations within the AU. The analysis of international society provides the conceptual understanding of shared interests and collective action in international system society. This analysis is central to the study of leadership and regional peace and security. Although international society acknowledges the existence of anarchy, it also provides an understanding of how order is achieved in international relations through constructivist approaches. The construction of norms, values and identities is central to the understanding of regionalism and collective conflict management. Intergovernmentalism and security governance frameworks also provide a basis for understanding the AU's institutional structure and its role in continental peace and security outcomes. They also provide an analytical framework for understanding decision making processes in regional organisations. The common feature in all theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter, is the view that states come together when they have a commonality of interests and common threats. In this light, regional institutions provide a platform for collective action in international anarchy. Although material incentives matter; the power of socialisation among member states facilitates the coordination of their national policies in finding solutions to common regional problems. The theoretical approaches presented above are therefore, constructivist in nature and will guide the methodological approaches of the study.

The chapter has also discussed the evolution of peacekeeping from the traditional trinity of consent, neutrality and non-use of force, to contemporary use of force and non-consent. The evolution of peacekeeping has been necessitated by conflict dynamics in Africa. While some studies have shown the challenges in

the use of force in contemporary conflict management in Africa, these studies did not examine how leadership is produced or constructed in African peace interventions. This study is therefore, undertaken to contribute to knowledge of leadership and regionalisation of African peace and security.

This chapter has also highlighted the role of liberal peace and cosmopolitan peacekeeping theories in understanding the motivations for collective action in peace operations. The discussion in this chapter has underlined the importance of scrutinising these theoretical assumptions in relation to African regional peace interventions. Analysing the extent to which these theories influence collective action and shape leadership production in African peace interventions is necessary. It is also acknowledged that regional peace operations do not take place in isolation, but rather they are shaped by the globalised security governance originating from the UN, and other international society norms and universal humanitarian values. In this light, the chapter has drawn understandings from the interaction of the UN and AU, to ask questions on how peace interventions are coordinated within the African continent with subregional actors. This research, therefore, will provide a unique perspective on understanding how leadership is defined and produced in contemporary conflict management in Africa. The increasing participation of African subregions and the AU in peace interventions leads to the need to comprehend the regional strategies, motivations and leadership in these peace efforts.

The literature review on leadership and regionalisation of peace and security has, therefore, provided significant theoretical framework for analysing AU peace interventions. The reviews are linked to overall research questions in examining how leadership is produced and what shape it takes in AU conflict management with subregional actors. Additionally, the reviews have shown the predominant international motivations for peace interventions and allow this research to examine their relevance in African peace interventions. Leadership conceptual reviews are also linked to regionalisation processes in that they are both produced through the interaction of actors, making the constructive approach

appropriate for the study. The next chapter provides the methodology used in this study and the methods employed. It also highlights the challenges of the study and strategies used to overcome the shortfalls.

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Chapter 4: Methodology

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the research methodology of this study. The first part of the chapter outlines the research paradigm in order to highlight the epistemological and ontological foundations of the research. This discussion is followed by the research methods and techniques used in the study. The second part of the chapter reflects on the framework for data analysis. Finally, ethical considerations and reflexivity of the research are discussed. The chapter mirrors the theoretical frameworks provided in Chapters 2 and 3 to highlight how they have guided the methodological approach.

4.1 Research paradigm and approach

A paradigm is defined as a 'net that contains the researchers' epistemological, ontological and methodological premises' (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008b: 31, based on Kuhn, 1970; Hennink, Hutter and Bailey, 2010: 11). Paradigms are perspectives or ways of looking at reality, and they 'are frames of reference we use to organise our observations and reasoning' (Hennink et al., 2010: 11). This study uses an interpretive paradigm as it recognises the interactions that take place in leadership (Bryman, 2006). Leadership is contextual and involves the interpretation of shared meanings among actors to a collective. The information collected in this study included policy makers'/implementers' perspectives on AU leadership in peace interventions. Hence the research is qualitative in nature. 'Qualitative research is an umbrella term for a wide variety of approaches to and methods for the study of natural social life' (Saldaña, 2011: 3). The study involves descriptions and analysis of leadership among different African subregional actors operating in a social setting. An interpretive paradigm is therefore appropriate for the study due to the social and interactive nature of leadership processes (Silverman, 1997; Bryman, 2006). It is rightly observed elsewhere that 'leadership is acutely context sensitive' and 'embedded in a social setting at a given historical moment' (Bryman et al., 1996: 355). Leadership in peace

interventions is also more complicated due to the large number of actors involved (Bellamy et al., 2010). The nature of conflict also determines how roles are shared among those involved in the intervention (Williams, 2009b). In this light, interaction of actors produces leadership outcomes (Drath et al., 2008). This study is therefore, mainly approached using constructivist epistemologies. 'A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them' (Wendt, 1992: 396-397). It is also observed elsewhere that the sociological approach to international relations inspired by constructivists predicts some correlation between identity (of states and their communities) and policy outcomes (Moravcsik, 1999: 675). This study is approached from the view that leadership is mutually constituted through collective meanings that define structures in which actors (states or individuals) organise their actions (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995). The study further acknowledges that leadership is constructed and reinforced through the knowledgeable practices of the actors involved (Reus-Smit, 2009: 221). Hence, the study is social constructivist in nature because it is a kind of inquiry that requires an involvement of several actors in interaction to see how they understand and provide meaning to a phenomenon (Hennink et al., 2011; Ross and Matthews, 2010.

As shown in Chapter 3, resolving conflicts through peace interventions mainly requires collective action through established subregional, regional or global arrangements. In this light, some elements of shared leadership or collective leadership are necessary. It is also acknowledged that in some instances, specific states or a single state, may take up the leadership mantle, as discussed in hegemonic leadership theory. The interpretative dimension in this case plays a significant role as it allows the researcher to analyse how leadership is defined, exercised and experienced in a given setting (Conger, 1998). This makes qualitative methods more effective in capturing these interpretative dimensions since the method is appropriate to study social settings that cannot be quantified (Silverman, 1997; Conger, 1998; Kelle, 2006).

The advantages of qualitative methodology are that they allow researchers to interact with research participants and this allows flexibility (Neuman, 2000; Flick et al., 2007; Hennink et al., 2010). From this backdrop, the researcher can follow up on unexpected ideas during research and effectively explore processes that are sensitive to contextual factors (Bryman et al., 1996; Conger, 1998). The qualitative approach allowed in-depth interaction between the researcher and participants in exploring the topic of leadership within AU interventions. This approach also allowed participants to respond freely based on their knowledge and experience, to uncover the meanings of leadership they had based on their experiences (Hennink et al., 2010: 10). At the same time, the researcher explored more information by probing into the responses given. Probing provides an opportunity for more information to come out and enrich the research process (Conger, 1998). It is acknowledged that qualitative research enables the exploration of detail beyond what is provided by statistical data; it provides a possibility of identifying detail in social, organisational, and individual characteristics and attaching meaning to them (Schendul, 2011). The qualitative approach allowed the researcher to gain more descriptive insights on how leadership is produced and what it looks like within the AU peace interventions in Africa. It allowed the researcher to examine how the AU relates with subregional actors in conducting peace interventions. Hence the qualitative approach allowed the contexts and dynamics that produce leadership to be interrogated.

4.1.1 Case study approach: AU-SADC and AMISOM.

The study uses a multiple case study strategy in its analysis and investigates the leadership and interactions among different African peace and security actors (AU, SADC and TCCs). Case study strategy is used to 'describe a process or the effects of an event, especially when such events affect many different parties; and to explain a complex phenomenon' (Parry et al., 2014: 137). The number of actors involved in this study and the complex nature of their interaction makes the multiple case study approach appropriate. Additionally, 'multiple case studies offer the prospect of producing results that are less likely to be deemed to be idiosyncratic' (Bryman, 2004: 750). Further, the process of comparison enhances

the researcher's capacity for drawing theoretical inferences (Eisenhardt, 1989 cited in Bryman, 2004: 750). The method adopted by the study is therefore, appropriate because it allows the researcher to draw conclusions from each case study and make strong arguments on leadership production within the AU peace interventions. The approach therefore, contributes to the comprehensiveness of the study and allows the research results to be generalised. As noted by others, the primary purpose of qualitative research is to understand behaviour, perceptions or experiences that can be used to predict outcomes (Hennink et al., 2010: 17). Through the analysis of AU leadership in the selected case studies, the research results can be used to understand or predict leadership outcomes of other AU peace interventions.

4.2 Data collection methods

The study is state-centric and inter-governmental in nature due to the nature of the researched institutions. In order to gather credible information, the study used written survey questions and elite interviews with policy makers, practitioners, politicians and academicians. The "elite" notion implies 'a group of individuals, who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such, as far as political scientist is concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public' (Richards, 1996: 199; Littig, 2009: 99). Among the research participants that were interviewed, 30 were directly involved in leadership processes of AU and subregional organisations, while 11 participants were politicians and experts in African peace and security.

This research reached data saturation during data collection when collected information started to replicate the study (O'Reilly and Parker, 2012; Walker, 2012), and the information collected from different research participants started to repeat itself. There is a consensus among scholars that data saturation is necessary for a comprehensive study (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 2006; O'Reilly and Parker, 2012; Walker, 2012; Fusch and Ness, 2015). There is no answer to how many interviews are enough to reach data saturation (Bernard, 2012), and it remains with the researcher to make a judgement when all necessary information pertaining to research questions have been collected. The main data

collection tool was semi structured interview questions and due to their focused nature, they facilitated the research to reach data saturation.

4.2.1 Semi structured interviews

This project incorporated 41 interviews with key military personnel, politicians (country representatives), policymakers and policy implementers from the AU and SADC. Programme officers responsible for peace and security from the Institute for Security studies (ISS) – Ethiopia; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit - Botswana (GIZ) and SADC Non-Governmental Organisation (SADC NGO). ISS and SADC-NGO are International Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) and GIZ is classified as a donor agency in this study since it operates under the Germany Government. Semi structured interviews were used because they aim at 'obtaining descriptions of the life world of the interviewee in order to interpret the meaning of the described phenomena" (Kvale, 2007). The use of semi structured interviews allowed the researcher to gain insights on inter-organisational interactions between the AU and subregional actors. Semi structured interviews were specifically selected for this study due to their perceived advantages and applicability to this research. They allowed the interviewees to open up to new and unexpected phenomenon rather than to ready-made categories and schemes of interpretation that were set in structured questions, and at the same time allowed for clarification of some points (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The researcher utilised the open nature of the interviews to explore the dynamics that lead to leadership production among the AU and subregions. In other words, the semi structured interviews provided flexibility and allowed the researcher and participants to open up to some aspects of leadership that were not in the interview guide (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Mason, 2002). At the same time the focused nature of the interviews allowed key questions and areas of the research to be explored. It is observed elsewhere that semi structured interviews allow the gathering of more information because of their conversational nature (Moore, Lapan and Quartaroli, 2012). The researcher developed a good rapport with research participants that allowed a good flow of information during the interviews. Furthermore, because of the focused nature of the interviews, the researcher was able to conduct a reliable comparative data

analysis from different research participants. From this backdrop, semi structured interviews were appropriate for this research since data were collected from the AU, SADC and other institutions that have different organisational settings. The list of interview questions is attached in Annex 1.

Scholars have acknowledged that in elite interviews, it is difficult to have access to a large number of research participants and once interviewed it is extremely difficult to interview them again (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). In this project, the researcher had access to over 30 elite participants in policy initiation and implementation at the SADC and AU. Additionally, the researcher had access to politicians and peace and security experts from international non-governmental organisations dealing with African peace and security. These research participants allowed the researcher to gather a sufficient volume of data for the research project. Semi structured interviews are also best used when the researcher will not have more than one chance to interview the participants (Kvale, 2007). In this study 15 research participants interviewed were contract-based personnel with a specified contract duration that was coming to an end, hence the researcher could not have access to them after they had left their organisations. In this light, the use of semi structured interviews was appropriate since it allowed in depth discussion. At the same time the research participants were more open in the discussions because they would be leaving the organisations.

Although the study focused on key players who possess significant information on the functioning of regional peace and security frameworks, it also appreciated the disadvantages that come with it. It is acknowledged that elite participants have the potential to influence the conduct of the research through the responses they provide (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). In this light, face to face interviews were conducted to allow the researcher to have direct interactions that provided probing opportunities. Probing during interviews was vital in verifying the information given. Research participants signed consent forms for interviews to be audio-recorded which was vital to maximise the information gathered from the

elite interviewees. In all 41 interviews, only one research participant opted not to be recorded and the researcher took detailed notes during the interviews.

In addition to semi structured interviews, research participants were given written survey questions that were followed by the interview session. The survey questions allowed the researcher to screen appropriate research participants and also compare with data collected from the interviews. Data were also collected by examining different institutional documents, both published and unpublished related to the research. Institutional documents, written surveys and interview data allowed more reliability of the data and provided a plausible analysis of leadership strategies in AU interaction with different actors (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Cameron, 2001; Bhatia, Flowerdew and Jones, 2008).

4.2.2 Sampling

Within the AU there are more than six subregional organisations and 54 countries. The SADC was selected due to its significant interactions with the AU in peace and security, specifically during the joint conflict mediation in Madagascar. The interactions between the AU and SADC were considered to be a vital source of information on how AU interacts with subregional organisations in peace interventions. On the other hand, the AMISOM case study was selected because it is the first long-term AU peace operations mission. From this backdrop, the case study provides significant information for analysis. Table 4.1 shows the sample size.

The study also drew a significant number of participants from the AU headquarters. The focus at the AU was on those officials who have been directly or indirectly involved in the peace operation mission in Somalia. Expert practitioners in the department of peace operations and peace building at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) were also part of the research participants. These samples provided rich sources of data that are used to understand and interpret the leadership trends in African regionalism with regard to peace interventions.

Table 4.0.1: Number of Interviews

Organisation	**Participants status**	**Interviews conducted**	**Total interviews**
African Union	Military, Politicians, Policy makers	20	**41**
SADC	Military, Politicians, Policy makers	15	
Institute for Security Studies – Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (NGO)	Peace and security practitioners/ Programme Officers	3	
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ): Botswana Office	Peace and security practitioners/ Programme Officers	2	
SADC NGO (NGO)	Peace and security practitioners/ Programme Officers	1	

In coming up with the interview sample, the study uses purposeful, expert and snowball techniques to identify research participants. Purposeful sampling seeks to maximise the depth and richness of the data, by selecting participants most relevant to the study (Hennink et al., 2010). Expert sampling involves assembling persons with known experience and expertise. In this instance, it was those participants with expert knowledge of regional organisations and African peace and security that were selected. Snowball sampling, also known as the referral sampling/process, involves identifying more research participants from previously interviewed participants (Denzin, 2001). The study adopted these sampling techniques after considering the potential limitation on the number of participants who possess knowledge on peace and security. However, the study

also acknowledges the potential methodological and ethical limitations in adopting these approaches, especially in accessing research participants who are members of the armed forces. Hence, consent was sought following the diplomatic and military chain of command where appropriate. Research participants were drawn from the directorate of peace and security at the AU, officials from the Organ on Politics Defence and Security at SADC, officials from SADC-NGO, and peace and security experts from the GIZ-Botswana Office and ISS office in Ethiopia.

4.3 Study Sites

The study field research sites include the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; the SADC headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana; The Institute for Security Studies offices in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ): Botswana Office; and SADC NGO (a conglomerate of non-governmental organisations within SADC member states) in Botswana. These sites were chosen to allow the researcher gain access to a number of experts, policy makers and practitioners on African peace and security. A wide variety of participants were interviewed to gather the most relevant and fundamental information for the study.

4.4 Data analysis

From all data collected (documents and interview recordings), the texts and transcripts were analysed using framework analysis and NVivo software. Framework analysis is a five-step systematic process of data analysis. It includes, 1. familiarisation; 2. identifying a thematic framework; 3. indexing; 4. charting; and 5. mapping and interpretation (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). NVivo is a qualitative data analysis software. Within the familiarisation process the researcher was familiarised with the collected data by listening to audiotapes, studying the field notes or reading the transcripts to obtain a comprehensive overview of the collected data (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). This first stage allowed the researcher to become aware of key ideas and recurrent themes.

Identifying a thematic framework involved recognising emerging themes or issues in the data set. The research themes developed during the literature review and prior to data collection were further refined, as the researcher allowed the collected data to dictate the themes and emerging issues (Spencer and Ritchie, 2002; Srivastava and Thomson, 2009). At this stage the key issues, concepts and themes expressed by research participants formed the basis of the thematic framework that was used to filter and classify the data (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). In this light, interview transcripts, field notes and documents were analysed according to emerging categories that define the leadership strategies in the AU and regionalisation processes in peace intervention. The identifying process involved making judgements about the meaning, relevance and importance of issues raised during interviews.

The indexing process involved identifying sections of data (from transcripts in cases of qualitative research) that correspond to a particular theme. NVivo was used for this task. The indexing process was followed by charting as the fourth stage of framework analysis, where the indexed data were arranged in charts of the themes (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994; Srivastava and Thomson, 2009). The pieces of data were lifted from transcripts (original text) and placed in charts that consisted of the headings and subheadings drawn from the thematic framework (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994).

Finally, mapping and interpretation of data involved the analysis of research themes from charts. In other words, categorised data within a theoretical model were classified and then developed an account based on the relationship between the themes (Creswell et al., 2003). It is highlighted that interpretation is a reflection of the participant and the researcher must ensure that it echoes the true attributes of research participants (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994: 186). Framework analysis is driven by and based on the original accounts of research participants. Since the study adopts an interpretive paradigm, the analysis and interpretation acknowledge the subjective meanings that research participants attach to their experiences. The ‘interpretive paradigm acknowledges that

people's perceptions and experiences of reality are subjective; therefore, there can be multiple perspectives on reality, rather than a single truth' (Hennink et al., 2011: 15). Framework analysis is used in this study due to its systematic approach, which allows a methodical treatment of data (similar accounts) and access to original textual data for validity and transparency of the study (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994; Archer et al., 2005; Collis and Hussey, 2013). From this backdrop within-case and between-case analysis is done thereby enabling comparisons to be made (Srivastava and Thomson, 2009: 78). The framework approach to data analysis, therefore, strengthens data reliability and validity in this study.

4.4.1 Reliability and validity

The methods used in data collection and analysis allowed the study to achieve reliability and validity. Reliability is the degree of consistency achieved by both the methods and instruments used in measuring a given entity (Bryman, 2008; Hennink et al., 2010; Denzin, 2013). On the other hand, validity is ensuring that an instrument is measuring what it is intended to measure (Johnson, 1997; Fusch and Ness, 2015; Denzin, 2017). The use of semi structured interviews and written surveys allowed consistency to be achieved since all participants were asked similar questions with additional probing questions to verify the information given. The researcher also used the triangulation method to ensure that there was agreement of evidence from the collected data. Methodological triangulation is achieved by correlating data from multiple data collection methods (Thurmond, 2001; Denzin and Lincoln, 2008a; Denzin, 2013, 2017). This study used semi structured interviews, written surveys, institutional documents and field notes to achieve the methodological triangulation. It is also argued that data sources can vary based on the times the data were collected, the place, or setting and from whom the data were obtained (Mitchell, 1986; Denzin, 2017). This research collected data from two different study locations (AU headquarters and SADC headquarters) and from a variety of participants (military personnel, policy makers and implementers, non-governmental staff and practitioners). By collecting data from different locations and a wide range of personnel this study achieved data triangulation. Data-analysis triangulation was also achieved

through the use of framework analysis, written surveys and NVivo software to ensure that the large quantity of data was systematically and comprehensively analysed.

4.5 Major themes for data analysis

This study is mainly approached with constructivist epistemologies. Constructivist approaches to leadership indicate that conceptualisation of leadership is a social construct determined through interactions based on intersubjectivity and power conversion capacities (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; Park, 2014: 74). The study developed themes originating from shared leadership in order to understand the nature of regional leadership within the AU.

4.5.1 Leadership boundaries and networks

Data in this study are analysed by looking at leadership boundaries between the AU and subregional actors. The study examines where subregional actors' leadership starts and ends, and where AU leadership begins. In this light, the question of leadership boundaries is significant in understanding how leadership is produced in peace interventions. In other words, leadership boundaries are used to assess instances of cooperation (collective) leadership and competitive coexistence among the AU and subregional actors (Park, 2014). The measure of success in establishing successful regional leadership is determined by how regional and subregional networks bridge leadership boundaries among participants to a collective (Osborn, Hunt and Jauch, 2002: 811)**.** Data are analysed by examining the extent to which AU regulations and policies are institutionalised within subregions and how they guide peace interventions.

The level of communication in a collective has an impact on how leadership is produced and projected in collective action (Osborn and Strickstein, 1985). The interactions in a collective allow important information to be passed and establish frameworks for action, hence leadership emerges as a socially constructed pattern (Osborn et al., 2002: 811). Data collected are analysed by examining how AU peace interventions are initiated and how the AU communicates and

negotiates with subregions in collective action. The study examines the nature of networks developed by the AU in its interactions with subregional actors in conducting peace interventions.

4.5.2 Collectiveness as a theme for data analysis

The outcome of interactions among international actors in collective action can be cooperation (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; Reus-Smit, 2009; Park 2014). Regional and subregional actors can be cooperative partners in pursuing collective threats. Established networks and shared leadership beliefs among international actors facilitate cooperation in collective action (Reus-Smit, 2009). In this light, data analysis examines the perceptions of research participants on how subregions view the AU PSC as a continental leader in African peace interventions. At this point, the analysis dwells on instances of cooperation between AU and subregions, and how such coordination is established. It is argued elsewhere that established communications and exchanges within a collective increases mutual understanding and trust, and in turn enhances the cohesiveness of the collective and leadership (Ensley et al., 2006; Drath et al., 2008). Through these interactions, participants to a collective can produce and reproduce shared ideas and interests in tackling common problems and enhance regional stability (Hoch, 2013). Data are analysed by examining the AU interactions with subregional partners to establish cooperation among African peace and security actors in regionalised peace and security. The research results therefore, have an implication for policy interventions in the African security framework.

4.5.3 Competitive coexistence as a theme for data analysis

When a group of participants fails to establish cooperative relationships in collective action they may engage in intense competition to gain acceptance of their proposals (Nye, 2011). Data are analysed using both positive and negative connotations of competitive coexistence within the AU peace interventions (Lukes, 1974; Helms, 2014). Positive competitive coexistence is analysed when leadership dynamics encourage further cooperation, and when AU and subregional actors reflect on their strategies for cooperation and change their

policies for cooperation (Nye, 2010a, 2011). On the other hand, negative competitive coexistence is analysed when competitive actions lead to an unstructured and uncoordinated approach to peace interventions. The negative aspect of competitive coexistence results in a blocking power relationship in which participants seek to block their competitor's leadership initiative (Park, 2014: 79).

From constructivist assumptions, scholars argue that international actors have the capacity to change their strategies through critical reflections of their own relative power conversion capacities and those of the competitor (Wendt, 1992; Park 2014). For instance, as actors in a collective interact, those with more influence emerge as leaders and at the same time reflect on the need for support of their agenda, thereby creating a context of dependency in leadership. Conditions for leadership, in this instance, are affected by how leaders view themselves and how they are viewed by other actors. Here there is more emphasis on the roles and influence of potential supporters since their actions will determine the leadership outcome. Using this framework, data are analysed by examining the extent of competitive coexistence (in both positive and negative forms) among regional and regional actors in peace interventions, and how any problems of competitive coexistence are navigated by the AU.

4.5.4 Regionalisation of peace as a theme for data analysis

Regionalisation of peace forms another basis for analysing data. The focus is on how the processes of regionalisation have developed over time, paying particular attention to how leadership is produced and exercised. Here data are analysed based on research participants' perspectives and institutional documents on how AU and subregional actors have interacted in the selected case studies. The analysis also pays attention to aspects of regional sovereignty and proximity to conflicts. The case of AU-SADC joint mediation in Madagascar analyses how regional and subregional perspectives promote or hinder the processes of regionalisation in peace interventions. In the AMISOM case study, the analysis dwells on how peace operations dynamics affect AU leadership and regionalisation of peace. The study, in both case studies, draws conclusions on

the degree of cooperation and development of regionalised peace and security. Through this analysis, the study reveals the nature of AU leadership and how it is produced in African regional peace interventions.

4.6 Ethical consideration

This section describes the ethical considerations undertaken in this study. The study received ethical approval from Coventry University and operated under its ethical requirements, which are comprehensive and cover all aspects of data collection and usage. Ethics is required to ensure that there is no harm (to both the researcher and research participants) as a result of the study (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2008). This section outlines the following key issues: consent from participants; issues of privacy and confidentiality; accessibility of data; and reporting of results to participants.

4.6.1 Informed consent and confidentiality

During data collection the researcher obtained full consent from research participants before the interviews and additional consent for the interviews to be audio recorded. Participants were given the participant information sheet that outlined the research topic and purpose, the conduct of the interviews, data protection and confidentiality, and how data collected would be utilised. Research participants were also informed of their voluntary participation and option to withdraw at any time, including the withdrawal of information, but at least three months before the study completion. Research participants were also informed that there were no known risks associated with the project. Before the commencement of the interviews, participants were also verbally informed of their freedom to opt out of the study at any point if they were not willing to proceed or participate and were finally given the consent form to sign to indicate their voluntary participation in the study. Annex A contains full details on consent forms and Annex B provides the interview information sheet.

To ensure confidentiality, all participants' names were not attached to the responses for anonymity. Instead, numbers and letters were attached to the

interview recordings, and pseudonyms were used for the transcripts and reporting of the recorded responses.

4.6.2 Reporting results to participants

The researcher will have the opportunity to share the results of the study with the researched institutions (mainly the AU and SADC) through a summary of the findings and an executive summary of the study at the end of the research programme when the thesis passes the examination stage. The results will also be shared with the general public, through academic conferences and journal contributions.

4.6.3 Reflexivity of the research

As with all qualitative methods the researcher is part of the research process. It is encouraged that 'researchers should take into consideration their positionality and the effect they can have on the situation' (Hennink et al., 2010: 191). The researcher exercised due diligence to ensure objectivity and reflexivity at all stages of the research. 'Reflexivity enhances the quality of research through its ability to extend our understanding of how our positions and interest as researchers affect all stages of the research process' (Wax, 1967; Bourdieu,1990; Primeau, 2003: 9-10). Within this study, I can describe myself (the researcher) as both an insider and outsider in the research. I have 12 years of military experience and much of it involved peacekeeping training and actual deployments under UN peacekeeping. Hence, I was constantly aware of my existing knowledge and pre-existing assumptions of leadership of peace interventions at all stages of this research. On the other hand, this background assisted me to ask relevant questions during interviews and gain appropriate data from military officers who have experience in peace operations and other research participants. In this light, I can be considered as an insider.

On the other hand, I am also an outsider, since I have never worked for the researched institutions. This position assisted me in being objective at all stages of the research. 'Reflecting on the process of one's research and trying to

understand how one's own values and views may influence findings adds credibility to the research and should be part of any method of qualitative enquiry' (Jootun, McGhee and Marland, 2009: 42). As a researcher I tried to be neutral and stayed outside my existing knowledge where necessary, although other scholars argue that it is impossible in qualitative research to completely detach the manner of generating and interpreting data without the 'self' (Barry et al., 1999; Jootun et al., 2009: 42-43; Medved and Turner, 2011: 109-110). I endeavoured to engage in critical thinking of self and constantly scrutinise 'what I know' and 'how I know it' to help me avoid misinterpreting the phenomenon as it was experienced by research participants (Barry et al., 1999). The self-critical process helped me approach the topic honestly and openly during data collection and analysis. This process was used to separate personal views and preconceptions from the phenomenon under study (Jootun et al., 2009: 43).

4.7 Limitations of the study

The study was conducted in two different countries that added some financial constraints and the researcher could not stay for long periods. However, the study approach and methods allowed the researcher to interview a large number of participants and access relevant institutional documents. Another limitation is that about 15 participants who were interviewed at the AU and SADC were towards the end of their assignments and would be returning to their home countries, making it difficult for the researcher to conduct a data verification exercise after the data analysis. In order to overcome this, the study adopted a comprehensive framework analysis that allowed different data sources to be verified through access to original texts from transcripts.

The researcher could not collect data from national contingents in Somalia due to financial and high-risk security challenges. However, the researcher had access to unpublished institutional documents on the field mission and interviewed military and civilian personnel who have participated in the Somalia mission. Similarly, the researcher could not collect data in Madagascar, but the

GIZ, SADC-NGO, SADC and AU officials with first-hand information provided all the required information.

4.8 Conclusion

In conclusion this chapter has discussed the research paradigm and how research data were collected and analysed in this study. The purpose of this study was to answer “how” and “why” questions and cover contextual conditions that affect and are affected by leadership production in AU peace interventions, making both the qualitative and case study approaches relevant for the research (Yin, 2003). A multiple case study enables the researcher to explore differences within and between cases, thereby allowing the research findings to be applied across cases (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The context in both case studies is different in that one case study involves deployment of troops and war fighting, while the other involves conflict mediation and without the use of force. Multiple case studies allowed the researcher to analyse within each setting and across settings to understand the similarities and differences between the cases on how leadership is produced in AU peace interventions. It is argued that the evidence created from this type of study is considered robust and reliable, but on the other hand, it can be complex and consuming (Yin, 2003: 47; Baxter, and Jack, 2008). In this light, framework analysis is used in the data analysis to bring in the systematic and comprehensive approach of analysing large datasets within a limited time frame. The framework method provided clear steps to follow in th edata analysis and produced highly structured outputs of summarised data (Gale et al., 2013). Themes for interpreting or explaining aspects of data were developed and used for analysing the whole dataset, with several sub themes developing and then explained.

The next chapter provides the study context in order to give relevant background. The chapter therefore, outlines the structure of AU and SADC and how the APSA provides linkages to the two organisations. Additionally, an outline of the AU peace operation framework is provided to establish the existing leadership framework with TCCs/national contingents.

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Chapter 5: The Context of African Union leadership framework

5.0 Introduction

This chapter provides the context of the AU peace interventions and leadership framework. The first part of the chapter provides the AU background and its transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The focus here is on the Pan-African renaissance which revived the idea of AU peace and security architecture (APSA), and the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' philosophy. Second, the chapter gives an overview of the AU peace and security structure and its decision-making mechanism. Third, the chapter provides a brief overview of SADC peace and security structures and the legal structural framework that connects the UN and regional peace interventions. Finally, the chapter concludes by providing pointers to the next chapter and the contribution of the study to regional peace interventions in Africa.

The definition of terms in Chapters 2 and 3 provides an overview of concepts used in this study and how they have been defined by the UN, AU and different scholars. As demonstrated in the definitions, there is an ambiguity and lack of consensus on how the UN and AU conceptualise peace operations and peacekeeping. Chapter 1 has indicated that the definition of peace interventions used in this study is limited to two aspects: the deployment of a robust military force with a significant civilian component in order to stabilise war-torn societies, and mediation for peaceful resolution of conflicts (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005: 153; Durch, 2006: xvii; Curran and Woodhouse, 2007; UN, 2008: 18; Bellamy et al., 2010: 18). It has further been shown that peace operation in the study is used interchangeably with peace intervention and they both carry the connotation of peaceful resolution and use of force.

AU peace and security initiatives have been guided by a notion of 'African solutions to African problems', which essentially means that the African countries

must own the peace processes and provide leadership in resolving conflicts rocking the continent (Møller, 2009; Beswick, 2010). It is important to mention that while this catchphrase is supported by the AU and its member states, it also has ambiguity in its meaning and implications for African peace processes (Ferim, 2013b; Černohous and Kříž, 2014; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). Critics have pointed out that the persistent political and economic strains on the African continent pose the greatest challenges to the view of 'African solutions,' hence, African problems require international solutions (Černohous, and Kříž, 2014). Some scholars have argued that the African continent lacks prerequisites for successful peace operations in the form of leading state(s) or hegemon, that is able to inspire others or possess some significant threat to use force in order to ensure compliance from conflicting parties (Ferim, 2013a: 147). These hegemons also ensure the availability of much needed financial and logistical support for peace operations. This study, however, does not discuss this ambiguity but rather examines how the AU institutional framework works in providing leadership for peace and security in the continent. The dynamic nature of peace operations and conflict mediation requires well defined leadership processes in guiding different stakeholders towards collective action in peace efforts. There is a consensus in the literature that the transition of OAU to AU has enabled the AU to increasingly respond to conflicts in the region (Dompere, 2006; Francis, 2006; Boutellis and Williams, 2013a; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). It is therefore important to review this evolution and outline the AU leadership framework.

5.1 Transition from Organisation of African Unity to the African Union

The establishment of the AU was initiated by African Heads of State and Government to expedite the process of economic and political integration in the continent. Significant direction in this regard was provided by the former President of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi. A substantial number of OAU structures formed the foundation of the AU. Similarly, many of the OAU's core commitments, decisions and strategic frameworks continue to frame AU policies (AU Handbook, 2016: 11). However, the AU Constitutive Act and Protocols marked a significant

departure from the OAU and a number of new structures have been established since 2002. For instance, Article 4(f) of the Constitutive Act of the AU provides for humanitarian intervention in a member state in the case of genocide (crimes against humanity). This is a significant departure from OAU's emphasis of non-interference.

The AU transition started in the Sirte Extraordinary Session (1999) of the African Heads of State and Government held in Libya that decided to establish an African Union. This was followed by the Lome Summit (2000) in Togo which adopted the Constitutive Act of the Union, and the Lusaka Summit (2001) in Zambia that drew the road map for the implementation of the AU. Finally, the Durban Summit (2002) in South Africa launched the AU and convened the first Assembly of the Heads of State of the African Union.

The dawn of new African integration established a new vision of the AU which was 'an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena' (AU Vision Statement). As noted in the AU Vision Statement, the institution shifted its focus from the OAU's main agenda which was the fight against colonialism. In this regard, there has been special attention to more integration, leading to economic development and enabling Africa to become a global partner. The focus has also been on peace and security and self-determination in the African development agenda. It is acknowledged within the AU institutional documents that such a vision is a long-term effort with significant challenges, and therefore urges resilience and focus on the part of African countries. To underscore this African vision, the AU objectives, among others, make special mention of the following: achievement of greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; encourage international cooperation by taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities (RECs) for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union (AU Handbook,

2016). A summary of these objectives indicates that the transition from OAU to the AU revitalised the Pan-African agenda and established norms and values for African unity.

5.1.1 The Pan-African renaissance and African unity

The Pan-Africanism or African nationalism is the rise of collective consciousness of the African people searching for collective solutions or responses to common problems facing the African continent (Murithi, 2017). Pan-Africanism is also 'a struggle to reactivate the African traditional values of governance, statecraft and social management' (Dompere, 2006: 7). Central themes in this notion of Pan-Africanism are collective consciousness, unity and the commitment of African people to drive their own African agenda for the direct benefit of African people (Asante, 2010; Edozie, 2014). In Pan-African literature, regional integration is seen as a tool for achieving more unity, solidarity and political stability in the continent (Dompere, 2006; Ajayi and Oshewolo, 2013; Murithi, 2017). The role of international partners is also encouraged and emphasised as a vital component for achieving this African dream. It is noted that 'African leaders have renewed their commitments to regional integration efforts to overcome the challenges that confront the continent and serve as the political architecture for peace, stability and a secured future' (Ajayi, and Oshewolo, 2013: 3).

African political history is replete with integration efforts in the fight against a multitude of challenges including colonisation, poverty, drought, hunger, political instability and violent conflicts. Pan-Africanism was the founding philosophy and uniting force for the OAU and later for its transformation to AU. The earlier dynamics that motivated regional integration in the 1960s and 1970s were, therefore, the struggle against colonialism and uniting Africa. However, the violent conflicts from the 1990s to the present day have brought several African countries together in order to resolve these conflicts, leading to more integration driven by peace and security challenges. It is noted in the preamble to the Constitutive Act of the AU, that the ultimate aim of economic development in Africa cannot be achieved in an environment scourged by violent conflicts. The

revival of the Pan-African renaissance leading to the creation of the AU has renewed the African focus on integration processes, and peace and security.

5.2 Regional integration processes and leadership in Africa

As highlighted above, the notion of regional integration in Africa is not a new phenomenon. Since the creation of the OAU, African leaders have attempted to unite the continent and advance concerted efforts towards its social and economic development. However, despite such efforts, limited progress has been made, paradoxically due to a lack of alignment, commitment and divisions among African leaders (Ajayi and Oshewolo, 2013; Ferim, 2013b). An agreement on a particular path of integration in the continent has been a bone of contention and a source of division among African leaders. As shown in Chapter 3, international relations literature has mainly defined regional integration as the process by which supranational institutions replace national ones, where sovereignty is gradually shifted from state to regional or global structures (Goldstein et al., 2008: 354). Through this process, states achieve maximum interconnections through economic and political union (Nolan, 2002: 793). The African integration in this regard has differed.

During the process leading to the establishment of the OAU, two groups emerged – commonly known as the Casablanca and Monrovia groups (Kloman, 1962: 387-404). These groups had opposing roadmaps to African integration. The Casablanca group led by the former Ghanaian President, Kwame Nkrumah, and supported by Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt, and Sékou Touré of Guinea, proposed a more integrated Africa with a supranational structure. On the other hand, the Monrovia group supported by Liberia, Nigeria and most Francophone countries, was for a gradual and less integrated OAU structure. As a result of this division, the OAU was created with limited or no powers at all and unable to undertake any significant leadership in political and economic development of the continent. However, there are claims in the literature that the organisation facilitated the drive in the fight against colonialism and achieved its objectives in that regard (Dompere, 2006; Gutto, 2006). Inasfar as the history of regional

integration and supra-nationalism in Africa is concerned, there has been limited sharing of powers between states and regional institutions (Olivier, 2010; Nathan, 2012). African states, whether small or large have been unwilling to give up their exclusive claim of sovereignty and have reduced the powers and authority of regional institutions (Ajayi and Oshewolo, 2013: 7; Olivier, 2015). A significant number of African leaders have supported the existence of a functional body rather than the establishment of a supranational body (Ferim, 2013b: 151).

It is also observed that African regional integration efforts have mostly been individually driven rather than institutionally led. For instance, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, has been credited as a notable force behind Pan-Africanism and integration in Africa. His ideas shaped the new thinking in African leaders and scholars on the possible path to unity and prosperity in Africa (Dompere, 2006; Addo, 2008; Asante, 2010). However, after his demise the ideas were not further pursued until 50 years later when the former President of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, significantly influenced the Pan-African agenda and steered the transformation of OAU to AU. The failures of the OAU and the emergence of several crises in Africa in the 1990s, notably civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Rwanda genocide, coupled with the dwindling of Western interests in resolving African conflicts, marked a significant turn of events in African renaissance (Dompere, 2006; Francis, 2006; Gutto, 2006; Ajayi and Oshewolo, 2013). On this backdrop, African leaders felt the need to transform the OAU into a viable institution that could tackle these challenges. This was when the former Libyan President, Muammar Gaddafi, rose to the occasion and the Sirte Declaration of 1999 by African leaders cleared the ground for the establishment of the AU in 2002 as a successor to the OAU.

5.3 Hegemons and leadership of peace efforts within the AU

The review of the past African peace efforts indicates the absence of consistent hegemonic leadership in peace operations and mediation within the AU. African political history has some evidence of isolated hegemons who have taken charge of African peace efforts for a limited time. Such countries include Nigeria, South

Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Libya. Since the early 1990s Nigeria has been instrumental in deploying its troops for humanitarian interventions in West Africa under The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), specifically in Liberia and Sierra Leone. There is some evidence that points to the significance of Nigerian deployments, for instance, in cases such as Guinea Bissau where Nigerian leadership was not present, and the West African states leading the peace interventions failed to successfully deploy and deal with the humanitarian crisis (Adebajo, 2002a, 2002b; Francis, 2006; Laporte and Mackie, 2010). The role of Nigeria in peace interventions was further driven by former President Obasanjo; however, the country 'no longer seems keen to assume a leadership role given the grave internal problems it now has to tackle' (Ajayi, and Oshewolo, 2013: 10). Similarly, South Africa since the end of apartheid in the mid 1990s, under the leadership of former President Nelson Mandela and later President Thabo Mbeki, played a significant role in providing leadership for peace operations and mediation, and in promoting African integration. South Africa led several peace interventions for several periods. For instance, it was the only country that deployed troops in Burundi in 2003 for a year under the AU while other countries that made commitments failed to deploy (Agoagye, 2004; Murithi, 2008). South Africa also later deployed in Darfur under AU. South Africa's deployments and peace efforts for the past 20 years demonstrated the country's leadership in resolving African conflicts. However, it now faces significant economic challenges and seems more preoccupied in resolving internal problems and more interested in leadership within the subregional group SADC (Ferim, 2013b: 148).

Ferim (2013b) further notes that despite South Africa's significant contribution to the AU budget, there is a realisation that the country cannot afford to be everywhere in the vast continent due to economic strains. In the cases of Egypt and Algeria, the countries have a geo-political dilemma and dual focus on both the AU and Arab League due to their affiliations to both organisations. Despite being part of the largest financial contributors to the AU budget, they have not assumed any significant leadership in African peace interventions. Moreover,

since the Arab Spring, Egypt has had significant challenges internally and has been more preoccupied with its own political instability and security. Similarly, Libya since the death of President Muammar Gaddafi, has been rocked with significant instability. As a result of this, the country cannot afford to proactively engage itself in African peace efforts. Additionally, it was only President Gaddafi who had a special interest in African renaissance and shifted his focus from the Arab League to the African Union and the same may not apply to new Libyan leaders (Sturman, 2003).

In the absence of hegemons to steer peace interventions in Africa, the AU and subregional organisations, such as the SADC and others, have collectively been engaged in peace operations and conflict mediation. To achieve this, member states pool their resources and personnel, in addition to international donors, to enable the AU and RECs to conduct peace operations. Significant interactions among the AU, RECs and international partners are seen as a prerequisite for smooth coordination and conduct of peace operations. Additionally, clear leadership in these interactions is vital for peace operations and joint mediations to be conducted smoothly. This research explores how these interactions occur and how leadership is produced within the AU peace interventions. The diversity of the African continent, coupled with economic underdevelopment and little integration, has to some extent paradoxically influenced African leaders to support the philosophy of 'African solutions to African problems,' since there is no blueprint that can be followed in mitigating African problems. Conceptually the idea of African solutions has significant connotations of African leadership in peace efforts.

5.4 African solutions to African problems?

The notion of 'African solutions to African problems' has for the past 10 years gained momentum among African leaders and scholars. This notion has a dichotomy of meanings. It has come in response to what is considered Western or foreign intervention in the internal affairs of African countries, while at the same time African states require Western financial resources to deal with African

problems. On the other hand, it has come as a response to devise ways of dealing with ever increasing insecurity in Africa, due to fading interest in Western countries to intervene in these conflicts (Møller, 2009; Beswick, 2010). The notable case is the Rwanda genocide in which the international community failed to intervene, despite having credible information on the impending horrific massacre of the Tutsi minority group (Corey and Joireman, 2004: 73-89). It is argued in this case that if African leaders had been proactive and intervened in Rwanda using African troops, this deplorable incident could have been avoided (Beswick, 2010; Bachmann, 2011). Hence, there is a need to have an African capability to intervene without waiting for international assistance. On the other hand, the notion of African solutions suggests a resurrection of African renaissance to fight against the tyranny of Western imperialism (Dompere, 2006). At the same time, it also indicates a commitment by African leaders to retake control of the continent and be instrumental in influencing the socio-political and economic affairs of the region (Kaye, 2011; Ferim, 2013b: 143; Hansen, 2013). In this light, the AU has viewed its peace interventions as the apogee of 'African solutions to African problems'. The peace interventions have provided the symbolic signpost of African decolonisation and self-determination.

Inconsistently, the slogan has also been used to insulate African leaders from the consequences of bad governance (Mills, 2012); for instance, the International Criminal Court (ICC) interventions following cases of human rights abuse and genocidal tendencies during Kenyan electoral violence in 2008; Ivory Coast electoral violence in 2010; and targeted violence in Darfur – Sudan from 2003. The intervention of the ICC has led some African countries including Kenya, Burundi, and Sudan to give notice of withdrawal from the court and evoke the slogan of 'African solutions' to devise African mechanisms of dealing with African problems (Mills, 2012; Keppler, 2012). Some African leaders have argued that ICC interventions are only targeting African leaders and are argued to be prognoses of neo-colonialism that must be resisted by African countries (Clarke, 2009; Kaye, 2011; Hansen, 2013; Tiemessen, 2014). It is against this backdrop that African leaders have condemned Western intervention in African politics. For

instance, African leaders through the AU heavily condemned the French intervention in 2011 in the Ivory Coast that led to the overthrow of President Laurent Gbagbo and his subsequent charges and convictions by the ICC. In the same year the intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Libya in 2011 that led to the disposition and extermination of President Muammar Gaddafi received heavy criticism from the AU. These Western interventions have increased efforts within the AU to collectively resolve African security challenges.

The proximity to conflict argument has also promoted the notion of African leadership. As shown in Chapter 3, it is argued that regional and subregional actors often have a better understanding of the conflict dynamics in their regions, as they share the same cultures and understandings and are therefore more able to resolve the conflicts in the given region (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Williams, 2009a; Angelov, 2010; Gelot, 2012). Additionally, they are more likely to commit themselves to the resolution of the given conflicts since they are directly affected by the conflicts in the form of cross border criminal activities and flow of refugees (Olonisakin, 2000; Francis, 2006). Hence, the assumption is that Africans must provide the leadership in resolving their problems. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki indicated that 'it's critically important that the African continent should deal with these conflict situations… We have not asked for anybody outside of the African continent to deploy troops in Darfur. It's an African responsibility, and we can do it' (Rice, 2005: B4). Similarly, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda in talks with former American President George W Bush in 2008 indicated that 'the best approach is . . . to help Africans develop their capacity to deal with these [security] problems' (Williams, 2008a: 311). Relatedly, the former African Union Commissioner Alpha Oumar Konare at the UN Security Council debate on peace and security in Africa suggested that 'it was important to build African capacities, because the responsibility is, first and foremost, our own' (UN doc. S/PV.5868 2008: 34, cited in Williams, 2008a: 311). It is against this backdrop that the notion of African solutions incorporates international cooperation and promotes African interactions with global partners. However, there is a gap in knowledge on the extent and nature of leadership when

conducting peace operations and mediation within the African regional setting. There are numerous partners that provide support to AU peace interventions; however, this study focuses on national contingents/TCCs and SADC as they represent key subregional actors. To understand the overall context of the study, the following section outlines the AU peace and security structures for decision making processes in peace operations and mediation.

5.5 African Union structures for peace and security

The AU has developed several structures that promote peace and security in the continent. These include: The AU Assembly; Executive Council; The Commission; The Permanent Representatives' Committee; Pan-African Parliament; Peace and Security Council (PSC). The basic pictorial representation is shown in Figure 5.1.



Figure 5.1 AU Peace and security structure

Source: The author

The Assembly is composed of Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme organ of the Union. It is also the ultimate authority for the PSC and decides on peace operations deployments (AU Handbook 2016: 16). The Executive Council is composed of Ministers or Authorities designated by the Governments of Member States, usually from the foreign affairs ministry. The

Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly and it also forms the middle layer of the PSC. The AU Commission is composed of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners and staff members. Within the eight commissions there is a portfolio for peace and security. The AU Commission is the key organ playing a central role in the day-to-day management of the AU. Among others, it also represents the Union and defends its interests; elaborates draft common positions of the Union; prepares strategic plans and strategies for the consideration of the Executive Council; and elaborates, promotes, coordinates and harmonises the programmes and policies of the Union with those of the RECs (AU Handbook 2016: 68-70). The Permanent Representatives' Committee is composed of Permanent Representatives of Member States accredited to the Union. These are usually ambassadors from the member states of the AU. The Permanent Representatives Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing the work of the Executive Council and it is the lowest level of the PSC (AU Handbook 2016:30).

The AU has a Pan-African Parliament (PAP) whose aim is to ensure the full participation of African peoples in governance, development and economic integration of the continent. PAP representatives are elected by the legislatures of AU member states, rather than directly by citizens. The ultimate aim is for the Parliament to be an institution with full legislative powers. However, PAP is not as fully functional as intended, and only has consultative and advisory powers within the AU (AU Handbook 2016: 86). Within all the components of the AU, the PSC is the key institution that provides leadership and coordinates continental conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms.

5.5.1 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The APSA is a key framework of the AU mechanism for promoting peace, security and stability in the African continent (core AU objectives under article 3 of its Constitutive Act). Figure 5.2 shows the APSA structure:

Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.

Figure 5.2 African Peace and Security Architecture Framework

Source: The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)

According to the AU Handbook (2014: 28) APSA has several key elements, including the: PSC which is the main pillar of APSA and a standing decision-making organ of the AU on matters of peace and security; Continental Early Warning System (which monitors and reports on emerging crises); Panel of the Wise (which is a consultative body established to provide advice); African Standby Force which is mainly a regional mechanism structure intended to provide rapid deployment peacekeeping forces for the AU; Peace Fund (which is intended to fund peacekeeping and peace support operations). The various African peace and security mechanisms work in tandem with the peace and security structures of the RECs[30] and RMs set up to support regional peace and security (AU Handbook, 2014).

The AU has several subregional groups, some of which have developed their own subregional peace and security arrangements. These include: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD);

[30] See more at: http://www.au.int/en/organs/recs#sthash.2JCLvX1G.dpuf

Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). In addition, there is the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) and North African Regional Capability (NARC) (AU Handbook 2016). The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa is mainly a trade related regional organisation, although it has at times been involved in conflict mediation; however, it is not regarded as an APSA pillar. The RECs are shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: AU Regional Economic Communities

Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

5.6 Peace and Security Council (PSC)

The PSC as the main pillar of APSA is the standing organ of the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. APSA, as shown above, is the umbrella term for AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa (AU Handbook 2016: 50-54). The PSC operates hierarchically at summit (assembly), ministers' and ambassadors' levels, as shown in Figure 5.4:

Figure 5.4 AU Peace and Security Council

Source: The author

The PSC was established to be a collective security and 'early warning' arrangement with the ability to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations. The PSC's core functions are to conduct early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, establish peace operations and, in certain circumstances, recommend intervention in member states to promote peace, security and stability. The PSC also works in support of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction as well as humanitarian action and disaster management.

The PSC was established by the AU Assembly and is legally mandated by the Constitutive Act (2003) together with Article 2 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the AU. Under article 7 of the Protocol, the PSC's key powers include to: anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies, which may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; undertake

peace-making, peace building and peace-support missions; recommend intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; implement the AU's common defence policy; ensure implementation of key conventions and instruments to combat international terrorism; promote coordination between RMs and the AU regarding peace, security and stability in Africa; and support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters.

5.6.1 Structure of PSC

The PSC has 15 members. All are elected by the AU Executive Council and endorsed by the Assembly. Five members are elected for three-year terms and 10 for two-year terms. Members are elected according to the principle of equitable regional representation and national rotation. National rotation is agreed within the regional groups. Regional representation is usually: Central Africa: three seats; Eastern Africa: three seats; Northern Africa: two seats; Southern Africa: three seats; Western Africa: four seats (AU Handbook, 2016).

Article 5(2) of the PSC Protocol lists responsibilities for members that include: contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa; participation in conflict resolution, peace-making and peace building at regional and continental levels; willingness and ability to take up responsibility for regional and continental conflict resolution initiatives; contribution to the Peace Fund and/or Special Fund; respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights; and commitment to AU financial obligations. The PSC Secretariat, established under article 10(4) of the PSC Protocol, provides direct operational support and operates within the AU Commission's Peace and Security Department.

The PSC meets in continuous session and all members are required to keep a permanent presence at AU Headquarters (AU Handbook, 2016). Meetings are held at three levels: permanent representatives, Ministers, and Heads of State and Government. Article 8(2) of the PSC Protocol requires Permanent Representatives to meet at least twice a month, and Ministers and Heads of State

and Government at least once a year. Article 8(6) provides that the Chair shall be held in turn by the members, in the English alphabetical order of country names, for one calendar month. PSC meetings include closed sessions, open meetings and informal consultations. PSC decisions are guided by consensus. Where consensus is not possible, decisions on procedural matters are taken by a simple majority; and on substantive matters, by a two-thirds majority (PSC Protocol, article 8(13)). To avoid any conflict of interest within its membership, Article 8(9) of the Protocol states that a member that is party to a conflict or situation under consideration by the PSC may not participate in the discussion and decision-making process relating to that conflict or situation. Figure 5.5, shows the organisational chart of the peace and security department that implements PSC decisions.

Figure 5.5 *AU Peace and Security Department*

Source: Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program

5.6.2 The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) / African Standby Force Continental Planning Element (ASF CPE)

The AU Commission's PSOD, alternatively referred to as the African Standby Force Continental Planning Element, was set up pursuant to the provisions of Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (2002), and also Article 3.4 (a) and Article 18 of the Policy Framework on the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (2004). PSOD provides the operational leadership of peace operations and reports to the PSC.

5.6.3 Functions of the PSOD

The functions of the PSOD are to plan, launch, sustain, monitor and liquidate all peace operations authorised by the PSC and/or the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU (Assembly), as appropriate. It also assists in directing and managing such operations. The PSOD is, as per Article 7 of the Specialised Technical Committee of Ministers of Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) Declaration 2010, composed of four units, namely, Policy Development Unit (PDU), Capability Development Unit (CDU), Plans and Operations Unit (POU), and Mission Support Unit (MSU).

The PSOD is responsible for coordinating with the RECs, RMs in the peace operations under the APSA. Among other functions, the PSOD is responsible for developing terms of reference and generating civilian, police and military personnel, equipment and assets provided by AU member states for deployment in AU peace operations. The department has the direct planning and coordinating responsibility for all transitions of peace operations from AU to joint UN and REC/RMs operations. Through the PSOD, the AU provides strategic oversight, monitoring, support, guidance and evaluation of AU approved peace operations to the African Union Commission (AUC). PSOD is the primary contact point of the AUC for the RECs/RMs and AU partners on matters related to peace operations.

5.6.4 PSOD Policy Development Unit

The overall function of the Policy Development Unit is to develop strategic level policies for peace operations. It is responsible for the overall policy development by actively undertaking ongoing policy research, lessons learned and developing best practices. The Unit is therefore actively engaged in field mission visits and gathering of information that inform the policy development under the PSOD and PSC.

5.6.5 PSOD Capability Development Unit

The overall function of this unit is to develop capabilities for standby forces of AU peace operations. It has three cells: the training and development cell responsible for planning and co-ordinating continental training processes for peace operations; the monitoring and evaluation cell, which is responsible for the evaluation of ongoing AU peace operations, monitoring and evaluating the training impact to ensure adequacy in enhancing the implementation of the mandate; and the capability generation cell, which is responsible for facilitating and coordinating with RECs/RMs, facilitating the deployments and rotations of AU peace operations personnel and maintaining a database of forces/capabilities. Hence, the focus for the unit is on training and preparations for peace operations deployment.

5.6.6 PSOD Plans and Operations Unit

The overall function of this unit is to plan and manage peace operations. It has three cells: the planning cell whose responsibility is to identify and advise on areas of potential conflict/humanitarian emergencies for intervention on the African continent in collaboration with the Conflict Management Division or other relevant AUC Departments. The planning cell also serves as the focal point with RECs/RMs on planning of peace operations. The operations cell is responsible for managing the peace operation centre (PSOC) in conjunction with the information analysis cell, and also conducts regular inspection visits to current AU Missions to ensure compliance with AU procedures and policies. The information analysis cell is responsible for analysing daily situational and other

reports from the missions in order to maintain situational awareness. This includes providing real time situational awareness on ongoing AU missions to relevant AUC units, and also collating, assessing, evaluating and disseminating information on AU PSOs to AU stakeholders.

5.6.7 PSOD Mission Support Unit

The overall function of this unit is to provide support to ongoing peace operations. It has two main cells: the Integrated Support Services Cell whose responsibility is to develop logistical frameworks, strategic guidance and operational guidance on all aspects of integrated support services for the peace operations, and also serve as the focal point in the liquidation of ongoing peace operations; and the General Services Cell whose responsibility is to develop frameworks, strategic guidance and operational guidance on all aspects of general services including contracts and recruitment for the peace operations.

In conclusion, the PSC has clear structures for decision making and support for peace interventions. It has designed a number of institutions to assist the implementation of its tasks in a field mission. The study, therefore, investigates how the AU through the PSC Protocols and instruments has guided peace missions in Somalia and joint mediation with SADC in Madagascar. The study examines the extent to which these AU structures facilitate the production of leadership in peace interventions. The AU peace and security architecture also demonstrate the significance of RMs/RECs in implementation of AU peace efforts. The PSC through AU Peace Support Operations Division provides the interface and operational direction and coordination with RMs in conflict interventions. At this point, it is important to describe the SADC role in peace and security and how it supplements the gradual attainment of the AU objectives in peace efforts.

5.7 Southern African Development Community background

The SADC was established as a development coordinating conference (SADCC) in 1980 and transformed into a development community in 1992. SADCC and

Front-Line States (FLS) were created to advance the cause of national political liberation in Southern Africa, and to reduce dependence, particularly on the then apartheid South Africa[31]. The transformation from SADCC to SADC was undertaken in order to achieve more integration and economic development in the region. Not all countries within SADC are part of the Southern African region in terms of the AU's division of the continent. In Figure 5.6 is the map of SADC.

Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.

Figure 5.6 SADC Map

Source: SADC

As shown on the map, Madagascar and Tanzania are in the eastern region of the African continent, while the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is in the central region of Africa. During the creation of the OAU, states were allowed to choose where to belong depending on their self-perception (Cawthra, 2010: 10). Like the AU, the SADC is an inter-governmental organisation whose main objectives are

[31] From 1976 independent countries in Southern Africa came together to form the Frontline States in order to fight against colonialism in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa and these countries included Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania.

to achieve economic development, peace and security, and alleviate poverty through regional integration among 15 Southern African Member States.[32]

In the same spirit as the AU, there is greater emphasis on regional integration and peace and security within SADC in order for the region to achieve its objectives. SADC policies that form the SADC common agenda and are reflected in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) include the following: promotion of common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions that are democratic, legitimate, and effective; consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability; promotion of self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of member states. In order to achieve its objectives and support its policies, SADC has put up structures for integration, but the region still lacks strong economic, social and political ties to integrate all the countries (Cawthra, 2010: 10). However, political, peace and security agendas provided a uniting factor for states within the Southern Africa region and have promoted integration.

5.7.1 Structures for peace and security within the SADC

The SADC has been involved in peace interventions and has attempted to resolve crises in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Cong (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar and Zimbabwe. From this backdrop, SADC has established a range of structures for peace and security guided by several protocols and the SADC Treaty. The SADC Treaty is the legal document for the establishment of SADC and within it a series of institutional mechanisms similar to those of the AU have been established. Some of them include the Summit of Heads of State or Government; Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation; Council of Ministers; Standing Committee of Officials; a Secretariat; The Tribunal; and the

[32] SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

SADC Parliament. The rudimentary picture of SADC peace and security architecture is shown in Figure 5.7.



Figure 5.7 SADC Structure for peace and security

Source: The author

The SADC Summit is made up of all SADC Heads of State or Government and is managed by a troika system[33]. The summit at the SADC, like at the AU level, is responsible for the overall policy direction and makes all decisions for the institution. This is followed by the Council of Ministers which prepares policies for the summit approval and ensures their implementation. The Council consists of Ministers from each member state, usually from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Planning, or Finance and also operates on a troika basis. The SADC Secretariat is then responsible for strategic planning, co-ordination and management of SADC programmes. It is therefore, responsible for the implementation of policies and is headed by an Executive Secretary.

The SADC Tribunal was designed to ensure adherence to, and proper interpretation of SADC provisions, the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, and adjudicate upon disputes referred to it. However, after several judgement rulings against the Zimbabwean government, the Tribunal was *de facto*

[33] SADC troika consists of a Chairperson, Incoming Chairperson and Outgoing Chairperson, and reports to the SADC Summit Chairperson.

suspended at the 2010 SADC Summit, following the pressure from the Zimbabwean government (Nathan, 2013a). In 2012, the SADC Summit resolved that a new Tribunal mandate should be confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between member states. In this case, the powers of the Tribunal were significantly removed by the Heads of State and Government within the SADC. Relatedly, established under Article 9 (2) of the SADC Treaty, the SADC Parliamentary Forum does not have any reporting relationship to Summit and other SADC Institutions, but works together with them on matters of common interest. Established by the SADC Summit on September 8, 1997, the Forum consists of Presiding Officers, and a maximum of five representatives elected by the National Parliament of each member state. The Forum only provides a platform for member states' parliamentarians to interact and promote best practices in democracy, human rights and other practices for the promotion of regional integration and cooperation (SADC, 1997). The weaknesses of both the SADC Tribunal and SADC Parliamentary Forum in determining issues of peace and security, make the organ on politics defence and security the only powerful institution for peace and security within the SADC.

5.7.2 The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS)

The SADC OPDS (also known as the Organ) is a key institution on matters related to peace and security cooperation. It is equivalent to the PSC of the AU. It is managed on a troika basis and coordinated at the level of Summit, consisting of a Chairperson, Incoming Chairperson and Outgoing Chairperson, and reports to the SADC Summit Chairperson. It also operates at a ministerial level, usually foreign affairs, defence, police, intelligence and home affairs, and at the level of officials, mainly chiefs of defence, police and intelligence. There are two significant ministerial committees within the Organ and these include, the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (IPDC). The issues of peace and security are more predominant within the SADC, hence, ISDSC is more active in this regard.

The implementation of peace and security is guided by a Strategic Implementation Plan for the Organ (SIPO) adopted in 2004. According to Article 2 of the SADC Protocol on the establishment of OPDS (2001), the Organ is responsible for promoting regional co-operation on matters related to defence and security, preventing, containing and resolving inter- and intra-state conflict through peaceful means, 'enforcement action ... as a matter of last resort ... only with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council', promotion of democracy and human rights, promoting regional cooperation between police and state security services, encouraging the implementation of UN and other international treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states, and developing regional peacekeeping capacities (SADC Organ 2001).

5.8 Continental and regional integration and cooperation: UN, AU and SADC peace and security framework

As discussed in Chapter 3, there are theoretical and practical differences on the conceptualisation of peace operations between UN and AU. The AU PSC has a wide range of powers for peace interventions including stabilisation of fragile governments, as demonstrated in the case of Somalia. In this regard, the AU peace operations framework allows it to take sides in supporting a particular conflicting party. Additionally, the AU deploys where there is no peace to keep (African Union, 2016). On the other hand, UN peace operations are based on three principles; consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence, and defence of the mandate.

Theoretically, the UN has the global authority on peace and security and is tasked to develop overall peace and security policy guidelines that are adopted at the AU level. These policies are then passed on from the AU to RECs/RMs for further domestication and implementation at subregional or state level (De Sousa and Dias, 2013: 65). Ideally the hierarchy in this regard, determines the levels of responsibility. For instance, the UN and AU developed a ten-year capacity-

building programme aimed at developing AU peace and security functions, including mediation and peacekeeping. This development led to the establishment of a UN coordinating office at the AU headquarters and annual coordination meetings. While the UN Security Council has a *de jure* decision making status, the AU has a role to play in determining peace processes in conjunction with subregional institutions. The AU and SADC have at times conducted peace interventions without prior authorisation of the UN. However, it is generally acknowledged that regional peace interventions require 'moral authority' (Dorn, 1998) or unique legitimacy (Bellamy and Williams, 2005) that the UN confers, or require accountability to the UN itself (Weiss, 2007).[34]

AU and SADC cooperation is provided in the APSA framework and supported by several agreements between the two organisations. This cooperation is envisaged within the framework of working together for the common goal. While economic development forms a major component for integration, peace and security is top of the agenda within the AU-SADC cooperation and interactions. The principle of subsidiarity and comparative advantage has been proposed as the main norm for governing inter-organisational relationships within APSA, between the AU and subregional organisations such as SADC, and between the UN and AU. According to APSA the subsidiarity principle and comparative advantage applies in decision-making, division of labour and burden sharing during peace interventions[35]. However, there is a lack of consensus on how these are to be implemented (African Union, 2010, 2014). According to SADC Protocol on politics, defence, and security co-operation and memorandum of understanding on the establishment of SADC standby brigade, the SADC summit is the mandating authority for peace operations within the region. However, the

[34] Cited in Ricardo Real P. De Sousa 2013: 65 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Subsidiarity and The Horn of Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Centre of African Studies (CEA)/ISCTE-IUL, University Institute of Lisbon

[35] The decision-making mechanisms are mainly connected to formal procedures that conflict-management decisions have to go through to safeguard institutional legitimacy. Division of labour refers to which functions each party executes, and it is necessarily connected to the organisations' capacity to perform them. As stipulated by the Charter, the UNSC can entrust in other organisations the execution of missions, which reinforces the perspective of division of labour within the Charter. Burden sharing refers mainly to the financial costs of peace and security initiatives and who funds them.

SADC recognises the AU and the UN as another layer of mandating authorities. Despite the principle of subsidiarity and authorisation requirement, several peace interventions have started since 1989 without prior UNSC and AU authorisation[36]. The SADC, although technically a subsidiary body of the AU, does have direct interactions with the UN under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The UN Charter under Chapter VIII does not specify the nature of regional organisation, hence, both AU and SADC have the right to resolve conflicts under both Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter with UN Security Council authorisation in cases where force is used. It is from this complex background that leadership is produced in the AU-SADC joint peace interventions.

5.9 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has outlined the evolving nature of peace and security within the AU and structures that support peace interventions. The chapter has also introduced the regional and subregional peace and security structures that form the basis of the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7. The formation of continental and regional security structures demonstrates the importance of coordination; however, little is known on how leadership is produced in inter- and intra-organisational interactions in conducting peace interventions. The AU PSC as the focal point of APSA has the power to authorise or mandate peace operations and conflict mediation[37]. At the SADC level, the summit is the decision-making body, and coordinates with the AU PSC (that is formed in part

[36] This was the case of Burundi in 1993 and 2003 by the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and AU respectively; Central Africa Republic in 2002 by CEN-SAD (later taken over by ECCAS); Comoros in 1997 by OAU; Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 by OAU; Guinea Bissau in 1998 by ECOWAS; Ivory Coast in 2003 by ECOWAS; Lesotho in 1998 by SADC; Liberia in 1990 by ECOWAS; Rwanda in 1991 by OAU; Sierra Leone in 1991 and 1997 by ECOWAS; and Sudan in 2004 by AU. Even if not all interventions involved peace enforcement it is generally accepted that they all should have been authorised by the UNSC prior to deployment. See also Ricardo Real P. De Sousa (2013) African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Subsidiarity and The Horn of Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Centre of African Studies (CEA)/ISCTE-IUL, University Institute of Lisbon.

[37] AU mandated missions are those that are conducted by the AU itself, for instance AU mission in Burundi 2003, AU mission in Sudan (Darfur) 2004-2007 and AU mission in Somalia 2007- to the present, while AU authorised missions are those authorised by the AU and may be carried out by subregional organisations or RMs on behalf of the AU, for example African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) 2007, and the AU Observer Mission in Burundi: 2015. These two different missions have implications for AU leadership.

by SADC member states). Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and APSA explicitly recognises RMs as building blocks for conflict prevention and resolution in the African continent. However, the extent to which the AU through PSC interacts with SADC and national contingents remains unclear. With the operationalisation of APSA and ever-increasing emphasis of African solutions, it is important to understand how leadership is created and the extent of interactions that take place among the AU, SADC and national contingents in peace interventions. The study, therefore, contributes to leadership of regional peace operations and mediation by specifically investigating these two case studies. The study further contributes to the knowledge of contemporary conflict management in Africa.

The next chapter presents research findings and analysis on AU-SADC joint conflict mediation in Madagascar in order to draw conclusions on how leadership is produced between AU and subregional organisations. The chapter also assesses how the two organisations coordinate and interact in regional peace interventions.

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Chapter 6: African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Joint Conflict Mediation in Madagascar

6.0 Introduction

This chapter presents research findings and analysis on the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) joint conflict mediation in Madagascar from 2008 to 2014. The findings focus on regionalisation and leadership of peace interventions within the AU peace and security framework. Through these research findings, the chapter responds to the first two research questions by exploring how the AU coordinates with subregional actors in conflict mediation and how leadership is produced within regionalised peace in Africa. The research findings, therefore, highlights the extent to which the AU provides leadership for peace interventions in Africa and the nature of its leadership. The chapter further shows the shifting nature of leadership between the AU and regional institutions. The first part of the chapter presents research findings on AU-SADC mediation frameworks and discusses the hierarchy-network debate between these inter-organisational structures. Second, a contextual background of AU-SADC joint mediations in Madagascar is analysed. The third part of the chapter analyses AU-SADC relations and how they influenced the leadership of mediations in Madagascar. This is done in order to further understand the joint mediation dynamics between the two organisations. Fourth, the chapter discusses the mixed leadership dichotomy identified within the principles guiding the relations between AU and SADC. The chapter then provides a further examination of AU-SADC joint mediations, identifying challenges to the regionalisation of peace and security. Finally, the discussion shifts to theoretical implications of the research findings on regionalised peace and leadership within the AU, followed by a conclusion to the chapter.

Through the findings and analysis of leadership, the chapter contributes to knowledge of AU interaction with subregional actors that form the core of APSA.

The discussion in this chapter provides a conceptual framework for exploring leadership of regional peace interventions in Africa. There is a paucity of literature on the leadership of regional peace operations and mediation processes in Africa, which this study responds to. The literature review in Chapter 2 conceptualised leadership in both unitary and plural forms[38]. The research findings and analysis in this chapter, examine both hierarchical and shared leadership, in regional peace and security governance in Africa. To assist the analysis, some elements of leadership theory are drawn to examine the extent to which AU leadership was undertaken in joint mediation with the SADC. Specifically, the chapter examines the two ontological and epistemological approaches to leadership theory as discussed in the literature review. The first approach is the leadership tripod (leader-follower and common goals). The second school of thought is from the direction-alignment-commitment standpoint. In this regard, the chapter aims to provide further information in understanding the leadership of the AU peace and security framework. A further discussion on the leadership approaches within the AU is provided in Chapter 8.

The AU interaction with the SADC in Madagascar provides a significant basis for examining the APSA framework. This research, therefore, feeds into the debate of African peace studies in regard to regionalisation of peace and security. The findings are derived from interviews with senior officials at SADC and AU headquarters and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) specialised in African peace and security, and secondary data from research locations. The INGOs staff work hand in hand with both AU and SADC and provide expertise to both organisations in matters relating to peace and security. The INGO respondents provided an independent perspective of understanding AU - SADC interactions in Madagascar joint mediations. The next section provides the AU - SADC mediation frameworks in regionalised peace.

[38] Unitary leadership is where leadership is defined in its traditional and hierarchical manner where there is a leader at the top then followers and a goal to be achieved. On the other hand, plural leadership is where leadership is a collective action shared among participants in the organisation. Here there is less emphasis on hierarchy.

6.1 AU - SADC mediation frameworks: hierarchy versus network

As highlighted in Chapter 5, APSA provides institutional frameworks and coordination mechanisms for peace interventions in African subregional localities. The continental framework is guided by the principle of subsidiarity, complementary and comparative advantage, where subregional actors such as the SADC are first responders to conflicts within their region. APSA, in conjunction with the PSC Protocol, the AU Constitutive Act and a Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (AU-RECs MOU), defines regionalisation of peace and security and provides rules, norms and values that guide collective action in any mediation efforts in the continent. It is from this backdrop that APSA is not a stand-alone tool but is utilised in conjunction with other protocols and principles.

Articles 16 and 17 of the PSC Protocol stress the need for close collaboration between the AU and RECs in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability[39]. Additionally, Article XX (1) in the AU and RECs memorandum of understanding (MOU) provides for modalities for interaction and states that:

> *Without prejudice to the primary role of the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the RECs and, where appropriate the Coordinating Mechanisms shall be encouraged to anticipate and prevent conflicts within and among their Member States and, where conflicts do occur, to undertake peace-making and peace building efforts to resolve them, including through deployment of peace support operations.*

[39] The PSC Protocol Article 16 and Article IV (ii) of the MOU, outline the principles guiding the relationship between the AU and RECs, stating that; *the implementation of the MOU shall be guided by the recognition of, and respect for, the primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, in accordance with Article 16 of the PSC protocol.* Additionally, Article IV (iv) calls for the; *adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, in order to optimise the partnership between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability.*

The AU PSC, as the overall mandating authority in all regional peace interventions, makes decisions that can either be implemented by member states within RECs also referred to as RMs[40] or the AU mediation structure[41]. It is noted, in these provisions, that while the AU delegates conflict management to subregions, it retains continental leadership in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability. The AU-RECs MOU, Article XX (4) specifically states that: '*Nothing in this Memorandum shall prevent the Union from taking measures to maintain or restore peace and security anywhere in the continent.'* From this backdrop, the AU provisions, particularly through AU-RECs MOU and the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, provide for both hierarchical and shared leadership between AU and subregional actors.

Research findings, however, reveal a different interpretation of the AU leadership role in subregional peace interventions. Research participants at AU headquarters indicated that there is a hierarchy that puts the AU at the top as a continental body followed by the RECs. This assertion suggests that regionalisation of peace has adopted the first tripod of leader-follower and common goals. On the other hand, research participants from SADC and INGOs observed that regionalisation of peace within the AU is mainly a network rather than a hierarchy. They further indicated that the AU role is to complement the subregional initiatives in conflict resolution. The network perspective implies the second leadership ontology where the focus is on DAC (Drath et al., 2008). Within the DAC framework, the assumption in this study is that the AU and RECs work together in resolving regional conflicts. A further discussion on this hierarchy-network debate in the regionalisation of peace is done later in the chapter. The next section provides the contextual background of AU-SADC joint mediation in Madagascar. In doing this, it highlights the leadership production dynamics in

[40] Regional economic community (REC) is used interchangeably with Regional Mechanism (RM) and subregions.
[41] AU Conflict mediation structure comprising of Panel of the Wise supported by the staff from the AU Commission.

regionalised peace interventions and further examines the hierarchy-network nexus between the AU and SADC.

6.2 Contextual background of AU-SADC joint mediations in Madagascar

The AU-SADC joint conflict mediation in Madagascar started following the coup on 17 March 2009. Madagascar was suspended from AU membership on 20th March 2009 and from SADC on 30th March 2009. Both AU and SADC deployed their mediation envoys to resolve the conflict. Prior to the coup, the UN was already in Madagascar mediating the conflict between the Ravalomanana and Rajoelina camps[42]. The UN mediations were supported by the Malagasy Council of Christian Churches (FFKM), AU and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) special envoys. However, this mediation was unsuccessful partly because of divisions within the FFKM, and UN mediations were abandoned in February 2009 (Lanz and Gasser, 2013: 11). The next UN mediation attempts took place after the coup and included the special envoys from SADC, AU, OIF and four political camps of Rajoelina, Ravalomanana and two former presidents, Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy. This mediation attempt failed again due to divisions within international mediators, specifically due to the SADC stance of returning Ravalomanana to power (Witt, 2017).

Following two unsuccessful UN mediation attempts, the AU PSC established an International Contact Group that included representatives of the UN, EU, AU, SADC, OIF, Indian Ocean Commission, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), permanent members of the UN Security Council and African countries with seats in the Council. This time the AU took over the leadership of the mediation process from the UN. The processes that led the UN to hand over leadership to the AU are not known. It is, however, important to note that there is an established hierarchical relationship between the UN and AU provided in the UN Charter and acknowledged in the AU PSC Protocol. During

[42] Ravalomanana was forced to resign and Rajoelina was declared President of Madagascar by the military.

the second round of talks under the AU leadership, the Transitional Charter was drafted and signed although the conflicting parties remained divided on their roles in the transitional government of Madagascar. Following the SADC Summit recommendations on 21 June 2009, former Mozambican President, Joaquim Chissano, was appointed as the SADC mediator. He became the most senior official among the special envoys in Madagascar and assumed the leadership of the mediation process[43]. However, research participants observed that there was a lack of consultation between the SADC and the AU at the highest levels, and the AU insisted that the talks would be carried out under its leadership. The SADC takeover of mediation from the AU was a contested issue and is further discussed below on ontological factors in regionalised peace interventions.

In spite of the AU-SADC leadership tensions, peace talks continued, supported by the Joint Mediation Team with representatives from UN, AU, SADC and OIF. On 9 August 2009, the Malagasy parties signed a power-sharing deal under the leadership of President Chissano during the Maputo Agreement and included a 15-month transitional period followed by elections. The Maputo Agreement also included the formation of a government of national unity with a president, prime minister, deputy prime ministers and two legislative bodies. The allocation of the presidency during the transition period became a contentious issue and was only resolved on 6 November 2009, when the parties signed the Addis Ababa Additional Act, that made Rajoelina Transitional President alongside two Co-presidents from the other political camps.

Research findings however, reveal that the AU and SADC had different approaches to the aftermath of the Addis Ababa agreement. On 9 November 2009, the AU PSC released a communiqué calling for the establishment of a follow-on mechanism for the implementation of the Maputo and Addis Ababa

[43] The original four special envoys representing various organisations in Madagascar before former President Chissano were: Tiébilé Dramé (UN), Ablassé Ouédraogo (AU), Edem Kodjo (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, OIF), and Themba Absalom Dlamini (SADC).

agreements (AU 2009, para. 6), indicating the end of the mediation process. While on the other hand, President Chissano organised another meeting between the parties in Maputo in December 2009, which Rajoelina never attended and soon after retracted from the Maputo Agreement. The Joint Mediation Team was later dissolved in February 2010, signifying the stalled mediation attempts. However, SADC through President Chissano, remained the official mediator in Madagascar.

What followed was a different and parallel mediation attempt from France and South Africa leading to a bilateral initiative launched in Pretoria in April 2010. The France-South Africa initiative produced nominal results and essentially undermined the official mediation, specifically due to France's position, that 'was perceived as opposing the mediation effort conducted by Chissano' (ICG 2010a, 16; Nathan, 2013b; Lanz and Gasser, 2013). International Crisis Group reports in 2010 reported that France favoured Rajoelina over Ravalomanana[44]. Ravalomanana introduced English as the official language, replacing French, and expelled the French Ambassador in 2008. Rajoelina was an obvious favourite of the French (ICG 2010b, 6-7; Dewar et la., 2013; Lanz and Gasser, 2013). Hence, research findings reveal that France did not fully support Chissano's mediation, presumably because of Ravalomanana's SADC connections and SADC's initial support for Ravalomanana that would undermine their ally, Rajoelina. The research findings show the role of external partners in AU peace interventions and how they influence the production of leadership in African peace efforts. For instance, policy analysts at SADC headquarters in responding to the external influence in Malagasy mediations indicated that there was a significant French influence in the negotiations, and similar observations were made by GIZ programme officers. The following extract from SADC policy officer explains the depth of French influence:

[44] Ravalomanana had moved the country closer to SADC and challenged the interests of French entrepreneurs in Madagascar.

> *France is usually behind Francophone policies and actions. Madagascar mediation processes proved that. The proliferation of initiatives in Madagascar showed that France, through Francophone and the Indian Ocean group and its embassy was very active in driving the mediation initiatives, to the extent that SADC was not pleased… there were individual French interests in the negotiations and mediations (Extract 2A).*

The research findings indicate the French influence in the AU and SADC leadership of peace interventions in Madagascar. A further discussion on the French role in Madagascar mediations is undertaken later in the chapter.

After the failure of France-South Africa parallel mediations, the SADC continued the peace process in Madagascar. South Africa through the SADC and acting as the chair of the SADC Organ on politics and defence, played a vital role and on 17th September 2011 persuaded the parties to sign a roadmap to peace, that provided for the unconditional return of Ravalomanana and the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. Although this was not fully implemented, it signified the South African influence within the SADC. Research participants indicated that despite the South African and Chissano initiatives, the SADC mediations stalled, and the AU then played a pivotal role in the resumption of the mediations. A further examination of the AU influence in joint mediations is given below. In order to broaden the understanding of AU-SADC mediation structures and the hierarchy-network debate in Madagascar mediations, the next section examines the ontological factors that influenced the leadership dynamics between the two organisations.

6.3 Ontological factors in AU-SADC relations in Madagascar

There are several significant ontological factors that must be considered in understanding AU-SADC interactions in Madagascar mediations. Both AU and SADC were conceived in the 1960s and 1970s respectively, primarily as forums for African liberation from colonialism and economic building blocks towards the economic integration of Africa. In response to political instability and the eruption of conflicts in various African regions, subregional organisations including SADC

have over time, assumed the political function of preventing and resolving conflicts in their respective regions independently. It is from this backdrop that the AU, in liaison with RECs conceptualised APSA, where subregions were placed as building blocks for the peace and security framework. Research findings reveal that the historical policies of regional autonomy have persisted even after the adoption of the PSC Protocol and APSA. Research participants observed that the SADC, using its independent political system and regional sovereignty, took over leadership from the AU in Madagascar. Participants also observed that the AU-SADC leadership contestations in joint mediation cannot be separated from their political history. Research data indicate that their orientation differences are significantly attributed to the mismatch of the founding treaties of both organisations. The GIZ programme officer during interviews articulated the different origins of the AU and SADC that continues to hinder the cooperation between these two organisations in the following extract:

> *SADC was formed by its own treaty that is different from the constitutive act of the AU, and these documents do not mutually reinforce each other in terms of how the regional organisations should work with the continental organisation, and AU leadership becomes very difficult. But if we have an amendment where the constitutive act and the SADC treaty recognise the different roles of these organisations … then cooperation becomes easier … as it is now, we have two organisations (SADC and AU) that are totally different, mutually exclusive, they don't reinforce each other, and no one can see that purposeful and collective togetherness from one another (Extract 2B).*

The findings reinforce other scholars' arguments that historical origins of policies and organisations have an impact on future developments of institutions (Peters, 2012). Although several attempts have been made to bridge the AU-SADC gap through the AU-RECs MOU, APSA and the PSC Protocol, research findings reveal the widening gap in the AU-SADC approach to peace and security leadership within the SADC region. This research has shown that SADC has

maintained its independence in the decision making and leadership of peace efforts within its jurisdiction. Interview data further indicate that AU leadership over SADC peace and security processes is further challenged by SADC adherence to regional sovereignty. As highlighted above, research participants critically observed that SADC has mostly defined itself as a distinctive region whose nature of politics is different from other African regions[45], and holds the notion of sovereignty and territorial integrity so dearly. The politician at the AU emphasised that the SADC sovereignty significantly reduces the coordination with the AU and articulated that:

> *The issue of peculiarity is real in SADC, and the political liberation movement has not filtered out, but it's going through a transformation. This is a region that is young in terms of independence compared to other regions, so you will find that SADC leaders still hold on to their freedom and self-determination very dearly. There is little that is ceded to the AU, so that the region can be in tune with what the AU decides (Extract 2C).*

The conception of SADC sovereignty, self-determination and decolonisation discourse was repeatedly highlighted by the GIZ programme officer and appears to have played a role in the AU-SADC contestation of Madagascar mediations. It was observed that SADC has always been very sensitive when conflict mediation initiatives are led by Francophone countries, as they are perceived as a colonial projection of France. This revelation is precisely expressed in the following extract by GIZ programme officer:

> *When some AU initiatives have Western powers behind them, SADC has always been less supportive. For instance, SADC was suspicious of AU leadership in Madagascar because the Chairperson of AU Commission was from a Francophone country and France was also playing an active role in Madagascar (Extract 2D).*

[45] The comparative politics is mainly done with Francophone West African states, where the French colonial influence is still visible.

The Anglophone – Francophone divide highlighted in this extract provides another viewpoint of Africa's colonial legacy and geopolitics that influences the leadership and regionalisation of peace within the AU and SADC relations. The role of colonial or super power countries in African regional peace interventions is further discussed below. The next section discusses the AU-SADC leadership dichotomy within the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity in Madagascar as outlined in the AU PSC Protocol and APSA.

6.4 Mixed leadership dichotomy within the principle of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage

As highlighted above, leadership between the AU and SADC in Madagascar was construed from the conceptualisation of subsidiarity principles. The consensus among research participants was that the guiding principle in subsidiarity and comparative advantage is based on the capability of either the AU or subregional groups in resolving a given conflict in the regions. In light of this, the organisation that is well placed and has a better advantage in finding a solution should lead the peace processes complemented by others. The direct interpretation of this finding is that leadership is contextual within the AU. Although there are provisions for hierarchical leadership in AU-RECs relationships, leadership is determined by the capability factors of the AU and subregions. The challenge, however, lies in the definition of capabilities and leadership boundaries within the subsidiarity principle. Research findings reveal that there was no agreement on who decided or determined the merits and capabilities of either the AU or SADC in mediating the Madagascar conflict. During the discussion with the AU policy officer, it was stated that ideally using;

> *The principle of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, AU determines whether the sub regions are better placed to find a solution to the conflict in their region, but where AU has a big advantage to address the conflict then the sub regions support AU*

initiatives…but SADC was contesting AU leadership in Madagascar (Extract 2E).

The discussion with SADC policy officers revealed that in Madagascar, the SADC standpoint was that the principle of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, gave it an initial leadership role in Madagascar before the AU involvement. On the other hand, the AU politicians and policy officers observed that the AU has the primary role in African peace processes as highlighted above in the PSC and MOU provisions. Indicating the existence of a hierarchy that is undermined by SADC. It is important to note that the SADC contestation is not uncommon in regionalised peace processes within the AU[46]. Lack of clarity on hierarchical leadership boundaries within the principle of subsidiarity challenged the regionalisation of peace interventions, as evidenced in AU-SADC joint mediations in Madagascar. On the other hand, the power-sharing within AU peace interventions has implications for the different assumptions of shared leadership scholarship (Denis, Langley and Sergi, 2012). Interview data in this case study indicate significant power dynamics and influence coming from 'assumed followers or executors' (SADC). The political dynamics inherent in the AU-SADC inter-organisational background, illustrate that influence-sharing may not be an AU choice but a *de facto* condition of regionalised peace interventions (Pearce and Sims, 2002; Day et al., 2004; Pearce, 2004; Pearce and Manz, 2005; Day, Gronn and Salas, 2006; Morgeson et al., 2010).

Although Article 16 of PSC Protocol and Article XX (4) of AU-RECs MOU establishes a hierarchy between the AU and RECs[47], interviews reveal that

[46] Research participants mentioned the cases of East African Community (EAC) interventions in the ongoing Burundi crisis, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Mali, Central African Republic in 2012-2013 crisis, and the AU with ECAS and SADC intervention in the Madagascar conflict.

[47] AU leadership is clearly defined in the PSC Protocol Article 16 and further reinforced in Article IV (ii) of the MOU, outlining the principles guiding the relationship between the AU and RECs, stating that; *the implementation of the MOU shall be guided by the recognition of, and respect for, the primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, in accordance with Article 16 of the PSC protocol.* Additionally, Article IV (iv) calls for the; *adherence to the principles of subsidiarity[47], complementarity and comparative*

subregions are autonomous. The SADC-NGOs programme officer further observed the obscure leadership hierarchy between the AU and SADC in that;

> … *the relationship between AU and SADC (subregional organisations) is not vertical or horizontal, but the AU coordinates with subregional organisations, AU does not coordinate the RECs (Extract 2F).*

The SADC autonomy in Madagascar joint mediations, as highlighted in the above extract, reveals the limitations of the AU hierarchical leadership in subregional peace interventions. It is from this background that leadership within AU and subregional security governance inclines towards a shared or collaborative set-up than hierarchy. Indicating the shifting nature of influence between the AU and SADC. The SADC autonomy provides little basis for analysing leadership in a leader-follower framework, unless the principle of subsidiarity is further clarified, and leadership boundaries defined. The next section provides a thorough examination of research data in AU-SADC linkages in Madagascar.

6.5 Regionalisation in context: an examination of AU- SADC joint mediations

Although the APSA and PSC Protocol provide linkages between the AU and SADC, research findings reveal that there is a loose connection between the AU and SADC mediation structures. For instance, research participants observed that after the Madagascar coup in 2009, both the AU and SADC appointed special envoys to Madagascar without consulting each other. Additionally, as shown above, the appointment of former President Chissano to lead the SADC delegation and subsequent leadership takeover was unilaterally done by the SADC summit without consulting the AU PSC. Research participants further observed that the relations between these mediation bodies were not formalised

advantage, in order to optimise the partnership between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability.

during the conflict mediation in Madagascar and are yet to be formalised[48]. The disconnect between AU and SADC mediation structures is further articulated in the following extract by SADC policy officer:

> *AU doesn't have a formal mediation arrangement with SADC. There is nothing driven by the AU in order to deal with mediation of conflicts in SADC region, … joint mediations between AU and SADC were ad hoc arrangements... (Extract 2G)*

The research findings above indicate a significant gap between what is envisaged in the AU provisions, specifically Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, AU-RECs MOU and APSA. What is implied in these provisions, is a continuous interaction, communication and consultation between the AU and SADC, leading to a well-structured and coordinated approach to conflict interventions. Lack of formal arrangements in joint mediations, however, indicates little basis for accountability between the two organisations and subsequently little networking and communication. There was a consensus among SADC-NGOs programme officers and SADC policy officers that the SADC Summit is independent from the AU and only informs the AU PSC or AU Commission on issues relating to peace and security within the region. The SADC independence is demonstrated in the following interview extract from SADC policy officer :

> *… SADC Secretariat and mediation support unit takes instructions from SADC Summit, and it is not known how SADC Summit relates with AU. SADC is autonomous, it has never taken instructions from the AU... The AU-SADC relationship is quite loose, SADC Summit is in control and decides what is to be done in the region… (Extract 2H).*

This research finding has implications on the nature and extent of leadership the AU provides in subregional peace interventions. The findings point to an obscure

[48] During the time of my field research – August 2016 – the AU and SADC mediation structures were not yet synchronised and coordinated; however, there were proposals to discuss how such formalisation can be undertaken.

hierarchical relationship between the AU and SADC. Although the SADC is an AU pillar, it has not ceded any powers to the Union for peace and security.

Leadership of mediations in Madagascar was to some extent shared between the AU and SADC. In this instance, leadership of regionalised conflict mediations became a collective contribution, suggesting a shift in the unit of analysis from unitary to group leadership (Denis et al., 2012). It is important to note that shared leadership requires collaboration and division of labour, specialisation of expertise, and differentiated roles (to avoiding overlap and confusion), and complementarity (Hodgson et al., 1965 cited in Denis et al., 2012: 232). The case of AU-SADC joint mediation, however, demonstrates that there was little collaboration and division of labour between the two organisations, as shown in the following extract by a politician at the AU:

> *SADC during one AU summit in Addis Ababa in 2010, made a very strong declaration against the AU initial leadership in Madagascar and influenced a decision of the Assembly of the African Union, to declare that only SADC will be the mediator of the Malagasy conflict, given its proximity to the conflict (Extract 2I)*

The extract above questions the implementation of AU PSC protocols that envisaged the AU-RECs cooperation. Article 7(j) of the PSC Protocol states that the PSC is tasked to *"promote close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa"*. Although the PSC Protocol and APSA promote cooperation with subregional groups, these findings reveal that there are more competing logics in the relationship. The competition indicates that the parties to the joint mediation were not complementing each other, hence there was no division of labour. What is clear is that these structures are in constant competition with each other in undertaking dispute settlements instead of sharing expertise. Research findings indicate shortfalls for effective shared leadership between the AU and SADC. In this case, there was a

fundamental ambiguity regarding leadership boundaries and roles of the AU and SADC as a regional economic community. The extracts above have also revealed the lack of formal linkages between the AU and SADC mediation structures. This lack of synchronisation implies that there are no differentiated roles to avoid overlap in the framework of mediations.

6.6 Further challenges to the regionalisation of peace and security

Research findings reveal that despite the operationalisation of APSA, significant challenges remain in the coordination of regional peace interventions. The Madagascar case study, as outlined in the contextual background above, demonstrates a multiplicity of mediators that were fragmented. Multiple mediators can have a positive impact when they have the cohesion and well-coordinated approach to peace processes (Augsburger, 1992). The case of Madagascar, however, demonstrated that not all cases of multiple mediation are successful. The regional approach to conflict mediation was further compounded by two other factors: firstly, the overlap of subregional organisations and lack of consultation among these subregional groupings; secondly, the role of external actors, specifically France.

6.6.1 Subregional overlap in Madagascar's peace processes

Research data indicate that African regionalisation of peace and security is further challenged by the uncoordinated overlap of subregional economic and political groupings. Although the African continent is divided into security zones as shown in Figure 6.1.

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Figure 6.1 African peace and security zones

Source: African Peace and Security Architecture Handbook; 2014, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Addis Ababa Office and the African Union (AU).

The case of Madagascar demonstrates that these regions are unregulated by the AU. Research participants pointed out that regional arrangements in North and Central Africa are underdeveloped, while those in West, South and East Africa are more advanced in terms of peace and security structures and cohesion amongst themselves. As a result of this, it is significantly difficult for the AU to have a well-balanced conflict response and support in all regions of the African continent. The GIZ programme officer observed that because the RECs are at different stages of development, it is difficult to synchronise their activities in conflict interventions and ensure that the AU has a balanced response and

supports all subregions. The GIZ programme officer observation is well articulated in the following extract:

> *RECs/ RMs are in different stages of development and at the same time, they do not pull in the same direction, all the time in adhering to African Union decisions (Extract 2J).*

It is further observed in this research that while the AU and SADC have well-developed independent structures for mediations, they faced additional coordination challenges with other political and economic groupings affiliated to Madagascar. These included for example, the International Organisation of la Francophonie and the Indian Ocean Commission. These organisations are outside the influence of the SADC and it is not known if the AU coordinates with them. The challenge of multiple membership or the 'spaghetti bowl'[49] membership of AU RECs, is illustrated in Figure 6.2.

Contrary to the seemingly clear picture of African security zones provided in Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 illustrates the complexity of the regional leadership of conflict interventions facing the AU.

[49] A term borrowed from the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Africa Program: 2008, in describing African member states membership in various RECs.

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Figure 6.2 African Regional Economic Communities

Source: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Africa Program: 2008[50]

[50] AMU: Arab Maghreb Union; CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States; CEPGL: Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries; COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC: East African

What is evident in Figure 6.2 is the overlap and confusion of roles and functions of these regional affiliations in peace and security. Research findings show that the multiple membership of Madagascar challenged both the AU and SADC leadership in mediating the Malagasy conflict. This was mainly due to lack of differentiated roles, consultation and division of labour amongst mediation teams. The findings reveal that lack of leadership boundaries and coordination within multiple members resulted in an unstructured approach to mediation and created competition among mediating teams. The ambiguity in the leadership boundaries is further illustrated in the following extract by SADC policy officer:

> *Madagascar having multiple membership of AU, SADC, International Organisation of la Francophonie, and Indian Ocean Commission created significant problems as to which organisation should lead the negotiations. Although there was an International Contact Group and a joint mediation team, there was competition amongst mediation teams (Extract 2K).*

The SADC-NGOs programme officers also confirmed that both the International Organisation of la Francophonie and the Indian Ocean Commission are independent and not accountable to the AU or SADC. In other words, they have little or no connections with the SADC and AU. Research participants observed that there were no interactions between these two organisations with the AU or SADC prior to the mediation processes in Madagascar. This research reveals that the AU is challenged in reorganising these RECs and in providing policy guidance on when and how they should work together in conflict mediations and security. The growing proliferation and diversification of security partners in regionalised peace appears to be unregulated or uncoordinated by the AU as the continental body. The case of Madagascar also demonstrates the role of external

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Com- munity; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States; IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority for Development; IOC: Indian Ocean Commission; MRU: Mano River Union; SACU: Southern African Customs Union; SADC: Southern African Development Community; WAEMU: West Africa Economic and Monetary Union

powerful actors in African regional peace interventions that require further analysis.

6.6.2 The impact of external actors in Madagascar mediation

African subregional groups and member states have distinctive socio-political and structural differences that originate from their colonial legacy. A plethora of research suggests a Francophone/Anglophone divide in these African subregional organisations (Ekeh, 1975; Hull and Derblom, 2009; Witt, 2017). Several studies have also shown the persistent French influence in their former colonies in post-colonial Africa (Ekeh, 1975; Gregory, 2000; Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 2006; Adebajo, 2002b). This research further supports earlier studies and illustrates that the French colonial influence in Madagascar has not filtered out. This assertion is supported by research participants who observed that Madagascar colonial connections with France provided another challenge to AU-SADC leadership of the mediation processes. Research data indicate that France played a vital role in influencing the conflicting parties, and ideally promoted its own national interests during the mediation processes. The following extract from SADC policy officer further demonstrates the extent of French influence in the Malagasy mediations:

> *Madagascar's colonial connection with France is still active and France was influential in the negotiation processes. There were problems as to which affiliation should lead the mediation and SADC felt that it was overshadowed by the International Organisation of la Francophonie and France (Extract 2L).*

For instance, one SADC official mentioned that SADC peace processes stalled because Rajoelina was affiliated to France and could leave SADC mediation processes for Paris. This demonstrates that French interests overshadowed regional efforts to resolve the conflict in Madagascar. Research participants indicated that French mediators organised inconsistent parallel mediation structures at the French Embassy in Antananarivo, Madagascar, while the regional mediations were on going. This uncoordinated approach allowed

conflicting parties, mainly the Rajoelina and Ravalomanana camps, to exploit the situation and play mediators off against each other, further complicating the mediation processes. It is important to note that French interests and the conduct of Madagascar mediations was against African regional interests in resolving the conflict. On the other hand, it is not known how the AU played its role in ensuring that African interests were upheld in the regional peace efforts. While hosting a French mediation can be a sovereign decision of Madagascar through their bilateral arrangements, it is argued that Madagascar's transitional government was fragmented and had no capacity to consent bilateral agreements with France.

It is argued in this study, that the lack of consultations between France and African regional actors (AU and SADC) added another layer to leadership challenges and regionalised peace interventions. These findings reveal gaps in the AU peace and security governance that require more attention and a policy review. It was, however, noted that despite the regionalisation challenges in peace interventions, the AU and SADC worked together and resolved the conflict in Madagascar. The next section explores the dynamics leading to the conflict resolution in Madagascar.

6.7 AU-SADC complementary leadership in joint mediation

While previous sections have highlighted the challenges in regionalised peace interventions in Madagascar, this section examines the complementary leadership between the AU and SADC. The research findings have shown that after the leadership wrangle, the SADC established itself as a sole regional mediator while the AU stayed on the sidelines. The peace processes, however, stalled when Rajoelina withdrew from the SADC mediations. Research participants observed that the original intent of the PSC Protocol, APSA and AU-RECs MOU seem to have worked in facilitating the resolution of the conflict when the AU was invited back to mediations by the SADC. The complementarity of leadership between the AU and SADC is demonstrated in the following extract by the AU policy officer:

> *During the SADC led mediations in Madagascar, SADC was stuck in 2011 and invited AU to come in and assist. At this point, AU coordinated with SADC and resolved the stalemate. From this point forward there was no longer a competition; it was a synergy between these two organisations …. SADC led mediator was consulting the AU PSC … and the AU Peace and Security Commissioner visited the SADC mediator – former President of Mozambique, President Chissano in Maputo (Extract 2M).*

On the other hand, programme officers from ISS and GIZ observed that while the SADC contested AU leadership, it failed to bring all conflicting parties together and required a continental authority provided by the AU. In this light, the AU is considered to have more legitimacy when it comes to subregional peace interventions. It was observed by research participants that the continental status provides the AU with a more visible global recognition than the SADC and also managed to bring all conflicting parties together in Madagascar. This analysis of the AU position is evident by the compliance of conflicting parties in Madagascar, specifically the Rajoelina camp. On the other hand, we see a more noticeable implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage highlighted above. From this backdrop, the AU is considered to be better placed to provide leadership with support from sub regional institutions. This study reveals that the AU complemented SADC efforts and filled the leadership gaps. The NGO research participants further observed that the AU has experienced more resistance when a subregional group is not given an opportunity to take the lead in mediations[51]. These findings demonstrate that when a comprehensive collaboration and consultation is achieved between the AU and SADC, the regional peace efforts become successful in resolving conflicts.

[51] Research participants also gave an example of interactions between AU and East African Community (EAC) in tackling the Burundi crisis in 2015.

It is noted in the research findings that, while the SADC was leading the peace processes, AU maintained its liaison office in Madagascar and this office became more prominent after the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. Research participants indicated that the AU liaison office played a significant role in the post-conflict transition period in the country. On the other hand, the SADC mediation support unit left Madagascar soon after the elections. The importance of maintaining an SADC mediation support office in Madagascar in the aftermath of the elections was emphasised by research participants as one of the most important steps towards peace building in the country. Participants emphasised the significance of the SADC presence in supporting Malagasy peace building structures after presidential elections. It is important to note that Madagascar has had repeated a turbulent political environment soon after elections and since its first democratic elections in 1992. In this regard, the AU had a clear understanding of the country's political history and was determined to follow through the peace process road map. The following extract from the SADC-NGOs programme officer indicates that the AU reassumed the overall leadership of Madagascar peace process after the SADC departure:

> *The establishment of the AU liaison office played a critical role in ensuring that the peace process in Madagascar is adhered to. The AU liaison office was playing more leading role than SADC itself, of course there is no doubt that SADC has been communicating constantly with the AU officers and authorities in Madagascar; but in terms of the actual implementation of the peace roadmap, it was the AU liaison office that was responsible… and there is no reference to AU working strongly together with SADC at this level (Extract 2N).*

The SADC withdrawal and the AU takeover in the Madagascar peace processes present a further significant ad hoc perspective of regionalisation and leadership of peace interventions in Africa. In this instance, it appears that the complementarity and division of labour between the two organisations only lasted until the presidential elections. The brief coordination between the two

organisations confirms the earlier finding that regionalisation of peace between AU and SADC is less structured and operates on *ad hoc* arrangements. The next section discusses the research findings and their theoretical implications for the regionalisation of peace and construction of leadership within the AU.

6.8 Theoretical implications of regionalised peace and construction of leadership within the African Union

The research findings above provide significant knowledge on the regionalisation and leadership of peace interventions within the AU. This section dwells on how leadership is produced and conceptualised within the regionalised peace.

Research findings above have demonstrated that the implementation of regional peace and security governance is mainly within the shared leadership scholarship rather than the leader-follower and goal relationship. The case of AU-SADC joint mediation illustrates the variation of four different forms of shared leadership that adopt the direction-alignment-commitment (DAC) model (Drath et al., 2008). These strands focus on sharing leadership in groups, pooling leadership at the top of organisations, spreading leadership across boundaries over time, and producing leadership through interaction (Pearce, and Conger, 2003; Pearce, 2004; Denis, Langley, and Rouleau, 2007; Mayrowetz, 2008; Davis, and Eisenhardt, 2011; Denis et al., 2012). These four strands will now be explored.

6.8.1 Sharing leadership in groups within Madagascar peace processes

As outlined in Chapter 2, shared leadership mainly focuses on experiences and effects, rather than processing theories of leadership (Denis et al., 2012: 214). Shared leadership scholarship has a functionalist orientation, where the main objective is to find alternative sources of leadership that lead to organisational performance (Glynn and Raffaelli, 2009). While most literature in shared leadership pays little attention to significant power-sharing dynamics between hierarchical leaders and assumed followers, the case of AU-SADC relations illustrates inherent power struggles in this form of leadership.

Research results show the existence of both positive and negative forms of competitive coexistence in leadership production between the AU and SADC. The positive competitive coexistence is demonstrated by agreements between the AU and SADC after a period of contestation, leading to coordinated and complementary mediation in Madagascar. On the other hand, the negative competitive coexistence is shown by the blocking power relationship between the AU and SADC (Zounmenou, 2009; Park, 2014). Prior to the conflict settlement in Madagascar, the SADC and AU were engaged in a contestation of leadership that delayed the mediation processes. In this light, the study demonstrates that AU hierarchical leadership in regionalised peace is contested, hence, the key assumption in shared leadership that leaders determine the sharing of influence is lacking in the AU peace interventions. On the other hand, there is evidence of a developing coordination mechanism between the AU and SADC in joint conflict mediation in Madagascar, but with little alignment on the course of action. From this backdrop, the research shows the emerging regional and subregional commitment in peace interventions.

Other studies have argued for a specific series of conditions necessary for shared leadership to develop. These requirements include issue urgency, commitment, task interdependence, creativity and the degree of task complexity (Pearce, 2004; Pearce and Manz, 2005). The instability in Madagascar following the coup and near collapse of state institutions created the issue urgency, requiring regional commitment to mediations and task interdependence provided in the African peace architecture. It is, however, noted that the conditions for shared leadership were limited due to the regional leadership scramble. In this light, leadership sharing between the AU and SADC commenced when the SADC invited the AU to the mediations in 2011 and lasted until the presidential elections in 2013.

6.8.2 African Union as a functionalist leader supported by subregional groups

The design of AU and RECs as outlined in Chapters 5 and highlighted above indicates that AU is supported by subregional (RECs) pillars. This set-up indicates that AU decisions are implemented by the subregional organisations although RECs have their own leadership arrangement that is autonomous to AU. Within this framework RECs support AU leadership. What is implied, however, is that both leadership and authority is formally divided between the AU and RECs through the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity. Leadership in this case can be recognised through their collective contribution. Scholars in this strand of shared leadership have argued that successful collaboration and division of labour depends on specialisation of expertise, differentiated roles (to avoid overlap and confusion), and complementarity (Hodgson et al., 1965 cited in Denis et al., 2012: 232). Additionally, for successful shared leadership to exist, there must be shared cognition, trust, convergence around common goals, and directions among group leaders (Alvarez and Svejenova, 2005). It is noted in the literature that leadership does not operate in a vacuum, and competing logics are more likely to occur in co-leadership (Fjellvaer, 2010). Fjellvaer suggests that in order to mitigate these competing logics, extensive collaboration and participation of co-leaders is required. Lepsius (2016: 13-14) argues that trust in institutions orients or constrains the behaviour of actors and guides them towards collective action. The central argument from Lepsius is that trust development increases the predictability of outcomes in individual or organisational relations. However, the trust building process requires repeated fulfilment of expectations (Lepsius, 2016). The research results show that shared cognition, trust and collaboration has not yet developed in the AU-SADC relations, as demonstrated in Madagascar.

The significant power play between the AU and SADC in Madagascar indicates a lack of shared cognition and trust between the two organisations. This is demonstrated by SADC regional sovereignty claims and suspicions of Western interventions in Madagascar. It is noted in the research results that the division in the approach of the AU and SADC mediating teams created a subsequent

division in the conflicting parties in Madagascar. For instance, the SADC standpoint of restoring Ravalomanana as the President of Madagascar, and an unclear AU position undermined the unified approach to mediation. In this light, research findings demonstrate shortfalls for effective shared leadership as identified by Hodgson et al. (1965), Alvarez and Svejenova (2005) and Fjellvaer (2010). The fundamental ambiguity on leadership boundaries and roles between the AU and subregional actors within the principle of subsidiarity and comparative advantage has an impact on the type of leadership produced between AU and SADC. As a result of this ambiguity, roles are not lucidly separated for successful collaboration and division of labour. Although similar mediation structures at AU and SADC are promoted within APSA, there is less harmonisation of conflict mediation initiatives. The case of joint mediation in Madagascar indicates that these initiatives between the AU and SADC are still evolving and affect how leadership is produced.

The unclear roles within the AU leadership framework are further exacerbated by the “spaghetti bowl” membership of Madagascar. The multiple membership of Madagascar to other subregional alliances apart from the AU and SADC, has added another layer of confusion in coordinating joint mediations. It is evident in the research findings that the multiple membership is not managed by the AU and there is no hierarchy among the subregional groupings. Additionally, there are no indications of pooling leadership to the top among these other regional associations in the spaghetti bowl. From this backdrop, research findings show a lack of coordination among multiple mediating teams in Madagascar, resulting in an unstructured approach to mediation. The lack of AU influence in the spaghetti bowl alliances implies that, while the AU peace architecture was designed to pool leadership to the top, the subregional associations have restricted this effort. As suggested by Fjellvaer (2010), this research shows that extensive partnership and consultation is required to overcome the rift between the AU and SADC (RECs). What is evident from the research findings is that essential conditions for pooling leadership to the top are lacking in the AU framework of leadership. On the other hand, the research reveals the contextual and interactional nature

of leadership in AU peace interventions. The next section interrogates the nature of AU leadership further by focusing on the third strand of shared leadership.

6.8.3 Spreading leadership across organisational boundaries

As shown in Chapter 2, the work of Huxham and Vangen (2000a, 2000b), has analysed how shared leadership works in inter-organisational collaborations. Moving back to this research and guided by the work of other scholars in multi-sector collaborations (Latour, 1987, 2005; Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Bryson et al., 2009), the question of leadership roles and boundaries within AU peace and security architecture remains the point of focus.

The Madagascar case study has demonstrated the complexity of roles, authority and leadership boundaries of multiple mediating teams and stakeholders. The interviews reveal that the AU leadership structure is not well supported by participants within the continental peace and security governance. The design of APSA, as shown in Chapter 5, was aimed at constructing a predictable course of action to be taken by the AU PSC in conjunction with subregional groups or RECs. The complexity of the Madagascar mediation mission, therefore, required basic routines, such as command and control and reporting routines, to be followed to help pull different mediating teams together. This case study, however, indicates that inter-organisational collaborations were challenged among the AU, SADC and other mediating teams. The extensive partnership and collaboration was lacking, since there was no indication of prior consultations between the AU and SADC to agree on the agenda and division of roles in mediation. In this light, the leadership mechanisms for collaboration, such as routine processes and agenda setting among participants to a collective, are lacking in the AU-SADC mediation framework. This indicates that regional strategies for power sharing have not yet developed, thus challenging the harmonisation of peace and security agenda in the continent.

6.8.4 Leadership through interaction; discursive leadership in AU-SADC peace interventions

This strand, as discussed in the literature review, provides another conceptualisation of leadership that is relevant to this research. This strand is used to explore how leadership is constructed and implemented within the AU. As indicated earlier, the strand originates from a socio-constructivist epistemology, where leadership is viewed as a social phenomenon and a collective process. Scholars in this strand argue that formal structures and processes play a role in leadership, but interaction of actors matters (Lichtenstein et al., 2006; Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009). In this process participants or individuals influence and create leadership but are not "containers" of leadership (Denis et al., 2012: 254). Leadership in this case is disconnected from individual traits, but located in practices, and constructed through communication (Pearce and Conger, 2003; Raelin, 2005; Crevani et al., 2010; Uhl-Bien, 2011). What is defined as leadership in this scholarship is the participation and collective formation of goals, rather than exercising control and authority (Denis et al., 2012: 256-9). Hence, the influence of power and individuals is reduced, because leadership is collectively constructed in the situation, and regarded as a product of participants' local interactions (Drath et al., 2008; Denis et al., 2012).

The discursive leadership, as outlined above, has obvious flaws, as it fails to appreciate the reality and influence of power in political environments (Locke, 2003). Additionally, it assumes consensus among participants, and plays down any conflicts or personal/national interests (Locke, 2003; Reid and Karambayya, 2009). While the concept has these weaknesses, its power is in the analytical framework of leadership. Leadership through interaction is based on lived experiences, participants' interactions and their outcomes. This conceptualisation of leadership provides an alternative view of analysing leadership in organisations where the "leader-follower-goal" tripod framework does not exist. It also utilises some elements of the direction-alignment-commitment framework proposed by Drath et al. (2008). From this backdrop, this study uses the discursive conceptualisation of leadership to analyse AU

leadership in peace interventions, while paying attention to power and conflicts in shared leadership.

In this case study, the conflictual interactions between the AU and SADC determined an overall leadership outcome within the joint mediation framework. Leadership in this case was continually shifting to match given situations, from the AU to SADC and back to the AU. As shown in the AU and SADC relations, leadership is not a top-down or bottom-up linearity but seems to be a phenomenon that occurred when both the AU and SADC started to interact. Research results show that discursive leadership in Madagascar produced an overall positive outcome, in terms of conflict settlement, leading to general elections in the country. The AU and SADC managed to bring conflicting parties together in Madagascar and implemented a road map to peace that concluded with democratic elections in 2013. The collaborations produced and shaped leadership outcomes. From this backdrop, this study argues that leadership within the AU is constructed and deconstructed or transformed by the AU and SADC in a context of competitive coexistence. Consequently, leadership within the AU can be understood as a processual phenomenon that is shaped by multiple actors interacting in the context of APSA. In light of this, AU leadership is not given but is constructed through interactions with subregional actors. It is, however, important to highlight that the leadership processes within AU are continuously being negotiated in conflictual interactions with subregional actors and *ad hoc* in nature. Additionally, the hierarchy that exists between the UN and the AU is absent between the AU and SADC/RECs.

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the regionalisation of peace and leadership within the AU, through an investigation involving fieldwork and elite level interviews, to SADC and AU's interaction in the Madagascan political crisis and joint mediation post-2009. Through this examination, the chapter has addressed the first and second research questions, examining the extent of AU leadership in regionalised peace interventions and how its leadership is produced. The

regionalisation of peace in Africa remains complex and influenced by several interrelated factors. The roles and functions between AU and SADC in the implementation of APSA are unclear and subject to conflicting interpretations and leadership outcomes. While SADC is a building block of the AU peace and security framework, it has its own leadership mechanism that does not necessarily report to the AU. Although the AU has encouraged subregional organisations such as SADC to develop their own mediation structures, the research findings show that continental and regional mediation structures are not harmonised but evolving. The absence of established links between AU and SADC mediation structures resulted in *ad hoc* joint mediations that were challenged at the beginning of the mediations but developed over time. The research findings in this case study are in agreement with a few scholars, who acknowledged the possibility of rivalry in co-leadership (Heenan and Bennis, 1999; Spillane, 2006; Reid, and Karambayya, 2009), while others have argued that "shared" or "distributed" leadership can bring more chaos than solutions to collective action (Locke, 2003). It is, however, important to study the experiences of shared leadership in African peace interventions due to inherent dependency on collective action within APSA.

The chapter has shown that the basic principles and protocols guiding African security governance require well-defined boundaries of roles and authority. For instance, the implementation of the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, has produced conflicting narratives on leadership of subregional mediations. From this backdrop, the research has established that AU leadership in the regionalisation of peace requires comprehensive consultation with subregional groupings. At the same time, subregions have legitimacy limitations that require AU complementarity. This chapter has shown that the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa is a collective and shared undertaking that is continuously negotiated. In this light, the extent of the AU leadership is defined by the continental legitimacy and the platform it provides for other sub regional and international actors to function. In other words, the AU contributes to leadership of peace interventions and

complements other partners. This chapter has shown that, although international actors like France and individual African states and regional institutions have substantial influence in African peace interventions, they require the AU platform to effectively participate in resolving African conflicts. Despite the regionalisation challenges, this chapter has demonstrated that AU continental status provides legitimacy and capability for resolving African conflicts. This is demonstrated by the pivotal role played by the AU in the road map to peace in Madagascar. On the other hand, AU influence in leading peace efforts is limited by regional and external partners, indicating the need for comprehensive coordination and consultations in regional peace interventions. This chapter has shown that the African political history and geopolitics is too complex for the AU to lead peace efforts without the involvement of sub regional institutions and international partners. The SADC adherence to regional sovereignty and Francophone colonial legacy in Africa continues to limit the extent of the AU leadership.

The second research question has been addressed by analysing how leadership is produced within the AU peace and security governance. The chapter has demonstrated that AU leadership is constructed through interactions with subregional partners. In light of this, the conceptualisation of leadership shifts from the AU as a unit of analysis to a regional collective outcome. The chapter has shown that leadership within the AU peace interventions is processual and malleable. This study, therefore, adds another layer to understanding leadership in AU peace and security governance. The chapter has also established that the AU lacks the necessary prerequisites for successful shared leadership. For instance, shared cognition, trust, and convergence around common goals, coupled with clear division of labour/tasks is lacking within the AU peace and security governance. Further research in this regard could focus on how the AU can establish trust with subregional organisations and build a peace and security network with clear roles and authority.

While the design and implementation of APSA has significant emphasis on AU collaboration with RECs, the research shows significant inter organisational disconnect in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. The chapter

has explored how the coordination did not initially occur in the Madagascar joint mediations but was developed over time during the prolonged negotiations process. The next chapter explores the AU's leadership in peace operations in Somalia. This case study provides another angle to analysing leadership in AU peace interventions authorised by the AU PSC and conducted under the auspices of the AU. Unlike the Madagascar case, the Somalia peace intervention is a war fighting mission with significant implications for leadership.

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Chapter 7: Leadership dynamics in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

7.0 Introduction

The chapter presents research findings and analysis of African Union (AU) leadership in Somalia peace operations from 2007 to 2016. These peace operations are the first AU peace interventions in an active war fighting zone. This chapter will examine the extent of AU leadership and how it was produced in this new undertaking. It is argued elsewhere that clarity of leadership is crucial for successful peace operations (UN HIPPO Report 2015: para 268). The research findings and analysis examine how the AU has interacted with troop contributing countries (TCCs) and national contingents in the peace mission. Additionally, it examines the relevance of the AU peace and security architecture (APSA), AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for AMISOM and how they have facilitated leadership in the mission area.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides a contextual background and analysis of AU deployment in Somalia. Then it presents research findings on AU leadership frameworks within the Somalia peace operations. After this, the chapter presents and analyses the interaction among AU, national contingents and TCCs in AMISOM. Then the chapter analyses the role of external partners in AMISOM. The chapter also examines the AU functionalism in regional peace operations. Finally, the chapter discusses the theoretical implications of AMISOM leadership to AU peace and security framework.

The analysis of the research findings utilises some elements of leadership theory and examines the relations between AU and TCCs. The leadership ontological framework adopted in Chapter 6 is also used in this chapter. The focus, therefore, is on examining the usefulness of the leader-follower-goal tripod and the direction-alignment-commitment framework in regional peace operations. The

origins and mission planning of the AU peace operations in Somalia provide another angle to analysing the regionalisation of peace in Africa. The findings are derived from interviews with senior officials and diplomats based at the AU and SADC headquarters and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) in Ethiopia and Botswana, and secondary data from the research locations, as shown in Chapter 4.

7.1 Brief contextual background of Somalia conflicts and AU deployment in Somalia

The power vacuum created by the disposition of President Barre in 1991 plunged Somalia into chaos with several disparate groups scrambling for power. One of such power brokers was the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The Islamic Courts began operating in Somalia in early 1994, providing law and order, basic services to the people, as well as a degree of security for commerce within certain zones (Marchal, 2004; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Carter and Guard, 2015). The Courts' influence diminished in 1998 and revived again in 2003 under the leadership of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. UIC political ideology was based on a 'broad mosque', combining people from moderate and fundamentalist ends of the Islamic spectrum (Williams, 2009b: 515). By mid-2006 Islamic Courts emerged as the overall authority in Mogadishu after expelling the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism forces. It is noted elsewhere that this Alliance was essentially a union of warlords backed by the United States of America in its 'anti-Islamic terrorists' policy (Marchal, 2004; Williams, 2009b). The disposition of the Alliance was, therefore, a significant drawback to the United States (US) campaign against terror; and the US in conjunction with Ethiopian troops expelled the UIC (Samatar, 2007; Olsen, 2014; Hesse, 2015, 2016; Carter and Guard, 2015). The UIC was overthrown, although other scholars have argued that it had made some positive impact on the Somali security and political environment, in that;

> '[B]etween June and December 2006, Mogadishu was reunited [by the UIC] for the first time in nearly 16 years and relative peace and security

> prevailed. The sea- and airports were reopened, rubbish and roadblocks were cleared from the streets, squatters were evicted from government buildings, and the city enjoyed a degree of stability unparalleled for well over a decade' (Williams, 2009: 516b; see also Olsen 2014; Healy, 2008).

It should also be noted here that the US and Ethiopian campaigns against UIC were conducted before the al-Shabaab militants emerged[52]. The removal of UIC in 2006 was quickly replaced by an internationally constructed Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG)[53] which had operated outside Somalia since 2004 (Healy, 2008; Bamfo, 2010; Carter, and Guard, 2015; Hesse, 2015, 2016). A donor driven TFG first operated in Kenya in 2004 and was moved to Baidoa in Somalia in 2006. It is noted elsewhere that 'instead of bringing peace and stability to Somalia, the installation of the TFG in Mogadishu brought a significant deterioration in the security situation and a renewed phase of warfare' (Williams, 2009b: 521). It is this renewed warfare that prompted the formation of AMISOM. In the next section the discussion dwells on subregional attempts to resolve the Somali crisis prior to AU deployment.

7.1.1 Implementations of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) mechanism in Somalia

Prior to AMISOM deployment, several attempts were made by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)[54] to resolve the conflicts in Somalia. IGAD, as one of the building blocks of APSA had the initial mandate for interventions in Somalia. In January 2005 IGAD, through the active leadership of Uganda, proposed the deployment of a 10,500-strong peace support mission to Somalia to facilitate the establishment of TFG. However, 'IGAD failed to generate

[52] Al-Shabaab meaning 'the youth' is a terrorist and militant group formed from the remnants of the UIC after the UIC was routed by the Ethiopian troops in the Somalian capital Mogadishu. In 2012, it pledged allegiance to the militant Islamist organization *Al*-Qaeda. They became an established terrorist group that fought against AMISOM and Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu; hence the overall mandate of AMISOM is the removal of Al Shabaab from Somalia.
[53] The international community created the TFG through various Somali peace conferences to bring peace in Somalia.
[54] The regional grouping which brings together countries from the Horn and Eastern Africa. IGAD member states are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

many peacekeepers because most of its member states had their own vested interests in Somalia's conflict and hence were not regarded as neutral by most Somalis' (Williams, 2009b: 515; Bamfo, 2010; Hesse, 2015, 2016; Healy, 2008). During research interviews the AU military and policy officers also highlighted the challenges in the implementation of APSA, and one policy officer stated that:

> *AMISOM was supposed to be led by the sub region in the Horn and Eastern Africa, IGAD. But because of the complex historical politics around it, especially with the neighbouring countries of Somalia, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, IGAD failed to deploy in Somalia (Extract 1A).*

It is important to note that, despite the establishment of regional mechanisms within the APSA framework, the case of Somalia provided significant political challenges that prevented the regional structure (IGAD) to deploy its peace mission to Somalia. In other words, the geopolitical rivalries within IGAD especially between Somalia and Ethiopia prevented the regional institution from leading the peace intervention. This failure by IGAD, therefore, challenges the common understanding that countries close to the conflict have significant advantages in resolving conflicts within their region.[55] It was from this backdrop that the AU peace operation was formed and UN Security Council resolution 1725 (6 December 2006) authorised IGAD and AU member states to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia with a mandate to secure and maintain the peace, as described in Table 7.1.

7.1.2 IGAD and AU mandate in Somalia

Table 7.1 provides the initial mandate for IGAD and AU member states authorised by the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

[55] The concept of proximity to conflicts has been discussed by many scholars and forms the basic conceptualisation of APSA. Within this concept, it is assumed that countries close to the conflict have a better understanding of the conflict and are therefore better placed to resolve the conflicts.

Table 7.0.1 Initial IGAD and AU mandate

- monitor the progress of, and ensure the safe passage of those involved in, the political dialogue between the UIC and the TFG authorities;
- ensure free movement and safe passage of all those involved with the dialogue process;
- maintain and monitor security in Baidoa (where the TFG was based);
- protect members of the TFG as well as their key infrastructure; and
- train the TFG's security forces and help re-establish the national security forces of Somalia.

Source: UN Security Council S/RES/1725 (2006)

While the initial AU-IGAD mandate was brief and focused on establishing a conducive environment for launching the Transitional Government of Somalia, Table 7.2 shows how the mission has expanded. Additionally, it outlines the complexity of the mission in terms of achievable goals and how to measure them.

7.1.3 AMISOM Mandate (2016-2017)

AMISOM mandates have been renewed yearly and approved by the UN Security Council since 2007. Figure 7.2 is the recent mandate and has a wide range of activities.

Table 7.0.2 AMISOM Mandate 2017

- Reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.
- Provide security in order to enable the political process at all levels as well as stabilisation efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia.
- Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on the abilities of the Somali security forces.

- To continue to conduct offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.
- To maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, in coordination with the Somali security forces.
- To assist with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia and ensure the security of the electoral process in Somalia as a key requirement.
- To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU.
- To conduct joint operations with the Somali security forces, within its capabilities, in coordination with other parties, as part of the implementation of the Somali national security plans and to contribute to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the FGS.
- To contribute, within its capabilities as may be requested, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.
- To engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local populations, within its capabilities, which will allow for longer term stabilisation by the United Nations Country Team and other actors.
- To provide and assist, as appropriate, protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructures.
- To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel,

as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council.

- To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations.

Source: UN Security Council S/RES/2297 (2016)

As highlighted above, the mandates and tasks assigned to AMISOM encompass a wide range of activities that are not clearly defined and, therefore, it is difficult to assess their impact on the peace processes. While the discussion of the AMISOM mandate in this study does not engage in analysing the success or failure of the mission, it highlights the complexity of the mission and its leadership. The AMISOM mandate provides the framework in which the AU actors operate and interact with each other, thereby establishing the leadership boundaries of the peace mission. The AMISOM mandate is further discussed later in the chapter. The next section presents and analyses the formation of AMISOM and its leadership framework.

7.2 AMISOM formation and leadership framework

It is important to describe the formation of AMISOM, as the formation of policies has been identified as having a significant effect on their chances of success or failure (Skocpol, 1992; Pierson, 1996; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Peters, 2012). It is, therefore, important to describe and analyse the formation of AMISOM. This section first provides the composition of AMISOM and its leadership framework. Secondly, the discussion dwells on the SOPs of the mission. The SOPs provide the framework of interactions, chain of command and expected behaviour of participants in the peace mission. In this light, the SOP is used as a key document that establishes AU leadership in the Somalia peace processes. The SOP is not a stand-alone document but considered together with the PSC protocol and the Constitutive Act of the AU. It is noted in Chapter 5 that the transformation of OAU to AU was primarily done to foster sustainable peace and security on the African continent. While the contextual background above has highlighted the impact and

consequences of the bilateral agreements between the US and Ethiopia in Somalia interventions, the research findings reveal the significance of the AU in the peace processes.

The AU PSC as the mandating authority of AU peace interventions is the established overall leader of peace operations in AMISOM. As shown in Chapter 5, the line of authority devolves along the AU Commission Chairperson to the Commissioner for Peace and Security, then to the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) which has the operational control and supports all peace support operations. The AMISOM field mission in Somalia is headed by a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC), appointed by the AU Commission. The mission has three components: military, police and civilian. The military component is the biggest of the three components of the AU mission in the country with 22,126 troops and is headed by the Force Commander who is appointed by the AU Commission and comes from TCCs on a rotational basis. Drawn from the overall mandate of the mission, the military component is tasked to stabilize the country and create the necessary conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities. The research findings and analysis in this chapter focus on the military component of AMISOM since it is the biggest and most influential actor in the peace mission. The findings explore the interactions among the TCCs, national contingents and AU actors (PSC, SRCC, Force Commander and PSOD).

7.2.1 AMISOM troop contributing countries

AMISOM TCCs include Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Uganda. Uganda was the first to deploy troops under AMISOM in Somalia in March 2007. The Ugandan contingent remains the largest contingent in AMISOM with 6,223 troops.[56] The Burundi contingent was the second to deploy in Mogadishu in December 2007 and is the second largest with 5,432 troops.[57] In December 2011, Djibouti became the third country to contribute to AMISOM and

[56] Available at http://amisom-au.org/uganda-updf/. Accessed on 04 May 2017.
[57] Available at http://amisom-au.org/burundi/. Accessed on 04 May 2017.

has a contingent of 960 troops.[58] Sierra Leone deployed its 850 troops under AMISOM in April 2013. However, Sierra Leone had deployed its first police officers within AMISOM to Mogadishu in 2010.[59] It is important to note that apart from Sierra Leone, all troops in AMISOM are from the regional organisation IGAD, indicating a sub-regional commitment to the peace operations in the region. However, the four big African economies (South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt) with much more advanced military capabilities are not part of the troop contributors to this AU mission.[60]

Ethiopia and Kenya had unilateral military interventions in Somalia prior to their AU re-hatting, hence, this requires some brief background information. It is highlighted above that the expulsion of the UIC in Mogadishu fuelled the cause of jihadist insurgents (al-Shabaab) and increased the instability in Somalia (Williams, 2009b; Menkhaus, 2008, 2009 Bamfo, 2010; Hesse, 2015). The al-Shabaab fighters who withdrew from Mogadishu in 2011, increased their presence and activities along the Somali border with Kenya. Hence, the al-Shabaab terrorist activities destabilised the Kenyan national security and tourism industry due to kidnappings of tourists and aid workers (Carter and Guard, 2015: 53). Consequently, the Kenyan government made the decision to unilaterally intervene in Somalia with the aim of pushing the al-Shabaab fighters away from its border. On 16 October 2011, Kenya Defence Forces moved into Southern Somalia to pursue the insurgent group. One month later, the Kenyan government entered into negotiations with the AU to re-hat its forces under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).[61] On 22 February 2012, Kenyan troops were formally integrated into AMISOM after the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2036 and they are deployed in a sector along the Kenyan common border with Somalia. Likewise, after the Ethiopian initial intervention in

[58] Available at http://amisom-au.org/djibouti/. Accessed on 04 May 2017.
[59] Available at http://amisom-au.org/sierra-leone-police/. Accessed on 04 May 2017.
[60] These four countries are regarded as the hegemonies of Africa and biggest financial contributors to the AU budget. South Africa and Nigeria have been influential in peacekeeping and deployment of their troops in Darfur, Burundi, DRC, Sierra Leone and Liberia under AU, ECOWAS and UN.
[61] Available at http://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/. Accessed on 04 May 2017.

2006, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia officially re-hatted to become a TCC to the AMISOM on 1 January 2014 and the Ethiopia National Defence Forces have provided 4395 uniformed personnel located in a region that covers the most part of their common border with Somalia, including part of Mogadishu.[62] It is important to note that the integration of Kenyan and Ethiopian troops into the AU has had an impact on the leadership of AMISON. A discussion on the implications of Kenyan and Ethiopian re-hatting to become AU troops is done later in the chapter.

7.2.2 AMISOM Police Contributing Countries.

The police component in AMISOM currently has 386 police officers that include: 103 Individual Police Officers (IPO) from Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Niger, 280 Formed Police Unit (FPU) from Nigeria and Uganda, and 3 Senior Leadership Team (SLT) officers from South Africa, Uganda and Nigeria[63]. The component is headed by a Police Commissioner who is recruited through competitive processes from different AU member states. The AMISOM Police component has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor and advise the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organisation adhering to strict international standards, such as human rights observation, crime prevention strategies, community policing, search procedures and investigations.[64] AMISOM police have a significant role in ensuring that the Somali National Security and Stabilisation Plan is locally owned through training and capacity building of the Somali Police. The FPUs conduct joint patrols with the SPF in Mogadishu, assisting in Public Order Management and provision of VIP escorts as well as providing protection to the AU. IPOs are co-located with the SPF in as many police stations as possible. Over 4000 Somali Police officers have been trained in different categories of police work by AMISOM Police and its partners.[65] In order to further provide the AU leadership framework, the next section explores the significance of SOPs within AMISOM.

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[62] Available at http://amisom-au.org/ethiopia-endf/. Accessed on 04 May 2017.
[63] These data are current as at December 2017.
[64] Available at http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/amisom-police/. Accessed on 04 May 2017.
[65] Available at http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/amisom-police/. Accessed on 04 May 2017.

7.2.3 AMISOM Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

One of the essential guiding documents that establish routines and facilitate leadership in peace operations is the SOPs. The procedures formalise the interactional framework of the actors and leadership of the peace mission. Formulation of a code of conduct is part of the planning process and vital for any peace operation (UN, 2015). The mission planning also includes a range of activities such as the nature of the mission, command and control, designing achievable mandates, acquiring resources (logistical, personnel and financial), forging partnerships, and assessment of own capabilities (UN, 2015).

The AU SOP for AMISOM defines leadership and provides rules, norms and values that guide collective action in the peace operations. The role of norms and values in constraining behaviour of participants has been widely acknowledged (March and Olsen, 1983; 2006). An analysis on the role of norms and values in guiding AU peace operations is done later in the chapter. It is acknowledged in this study that SOPs are considered together with the Memorandum of Understanding of AMISOM. The purpose of AMISOM SOPs is:

i. To familiarise the defence forces of TCCs with the AU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution.
ii. To provide guidance to planners and leaders, both civilian and military, as well as their staff, on the planning and conduct of AU PSOs.
iii. To facilitate the standardisation of peace support procedures in AU PSO arenas, and in consistency with UN peace support procedures.
iv. To facilitate PSO training by member states.

AU AMISOM SOP para 1003 defines the AU command and employment of national contingents in peace operations and indicates that any issues pertaining to the employment of national contingents would be resolved through mutual consultations between TCCs and the AU. However, the AU retains the freedom

of action in utilising the operational capabilities of the forces assigned to the Union, in fulfilling the mandate authorised by the PSC. Within this para, the AU Head of Mission (HoM) is accorded the necessary flexibility and freedom of manoeuvre to deploy national contingents for the operational effectiveness of the mission. The AMISOM SOP specifically mentions that if any TCCs have reservations on the use of their forces in certain situations and ways, they must make this known at the outset when the troops are being offered to avoid compromising the safety and security of other contingents and the success of the mission as a whole.

Para 1016 provides that the overall political direction and control of the activities of the mission should be exercised and coordinated by an AU Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC), who would be designated by the Chairperson of the AU Commission as the HoM. All heads of major components, such as military, police and civilian, should report to the SRCC. In order to provide clarity in the chain of command, para 1017 provides that, notwithstanding the designation of an SRCC, operational control of the military and civilian police components of AMISOM is vested in the Force Commander and Police Commissioner, respectively, who would be appointed by the AU Commission Chairperson. By deploying their troops to AU missions, TCCs transfer operational authority and control of their troops to the AU and are only involved in administrative matters of national contingent (AU SOP para 17 and 20). The AU, however, encourages mutual professional consultations with subregional organisations as stipulated in APSA, with regard to command, control and decision-making (AU SOP para 10). While TCCs are encouraged to maintain their administrative channel of communications with their contingents and personnel; they are prohibited to issue any instructions to their military personnel, that are contrary to AU plans, policies, and implementation of their mandated tasks (AU SOP para 1013). This para provides clear instructions to national authorities of TCCs on the leadership of their troops that are committed to AU PSOs.

The research findings below, provide significant information on AU leadership through the implementation of the SOP in AMISOM. At this point this chapter shifts to research findings on the formation of the peace mission in Somalia and underlying structural interactions of actors underpinning AMISOM.

7.3 Underlying dynamics in AMISOM formation

The above description of the AMISOM SOP has established the AU hierarchical leadership in the peace operations and leadership structures that support the mission. While AMISOM is an AU mission, research findings reveal several factors that require further analysis in examining the extent of AU leadership. The interview extracts from research participants and secondary data provided below, show a significant gap in mission planning and consultations during the initial stages of AMISOM. As indicated above, the formation of peace missions requires significant consultations with TCCs and other stakeholders; however, the research findings reveal that the AU failed to conduct comprehensive consultations prior to its deployment in Somalia. For instance, during research interviews, the AU military officer indicated that:

> *During discussions on the deployment of AMISOM most member states of the AU expressed concerns about funding of the mission, logistics and dangerous conflict environment in Somalia; but Ethiopian government representatives were pushing so much and Ethiopian troops were already in Somalia by this time. As a result, most African member states were not interested to contribute troops to AMISOM, and some countries that originally committed some troops never deployed. (Extract 1B).*

It is noted in this extract that Ethiopian influence contributed to the lack of meaningful consultations in the formative stages of the mission. The extract shows the single state impact in the AU decision making processes in peace

intervention.[66] Additionally, the lack of extensive consultations implicitly discouraged other potential TCCs. Other scholars have also argued that PSC internal procedures were not followed due to the active participation of Ethiopia in the AMISOM formation (Williams, 2009b: 517). PSC Protocol Article 8.9 states that:

> '*Any Member of the Peace and Security Council which is party to a conflict under consideration by the Peace and Security Council shall not participate either in the discussion or the decision-making process relating to that conflict or situation. Such Member shall be invited to present its case to the Peace and Security Council as appropriate, and shall, thereafter, withdraw from proceedings.'*

It is argued that Ethiopia was a party to the conflict due to its unilateral intervention in Somalia, hence was not supposed to be part of the PSC deliberations on AMISOM deployment. The research findings reveal that the failure by the PSC to follow its own protocols was influenced by external powers, specifically the role of the US in Somalia. The contextual background above has shown that Ethiopian interventions were supported by the US. It is therefore, important to examine the role of external partners in the AU leadership of peace interventions.

7.4 The role of external partners in AMISOM

Research findings reveal that the origins of AMISOM have strong links to external powers outside Africa that influenced a few African member states to support the mission. While external assistance is important for the implementation of African peace architecture, the findings reveal that there was less consultation on the implementation of AMISOM. Although the stability of Somalia was the agenda of the AU PSC, the findings reveal that the AU failed to balance the external

[66] It is important to note that Ethiopia is not considered as one of the hegemonic powers within the AU but holds significant influence within IGAD and is the hosting nation for the AU Secretariat. Additionally, its bilateral agreement with the United States added extra negotiating powers at the AU platform.

initiatives and mission planning. Additionally, there was less consideration of the Somali security and political environment. It is highlighted above that the dangerous security environment in Somalia required comprehensive logistical support and military fire support weapons; however, such concerns were not fully addressed. On the other hand, research participants observed that the US war on terror ignored the role played by the UIC in Somalia. The role United States in Somalia is similar to French involvement in Madagascar mediation and demonstrates the influential role of external influence in AU leadership of peace interventions. The AU policy officer observed that:

> *African Union deployment in Somalia came in because … Somalia was considered a haven for terrorists, … and this coincided with the United States war on terror… it was the United States, through their war on terror that played a crucial role in the origins of AMISOM. By 2006 the Islamic Courts had already taken control of Somalia, and there was no more fighting, they were very powerful, and were in charge. Instead of engaging them…the Americans saw an extension of the al Qaeda… funded the Ethiopians, provided them military support to remove Islamic Courts from power. (Extract 1C).*

The AU politicians further noted the significant impact of the bilateral agreements between the US and Ethiopia on the AU decision making processes in the peace intervention in Somalia. Although bilateral agreements are a sovereign undertaking, it is shown that its outcome influenced the AU to take over Somalia peace interventions. The AU politician indicated that the formation of AMISOM was engineered by the United States in that:

> *The African Union PSC was basically commandeered to meet and decide so that AMISOM should reflect that it is coming from African member states.… when AU officials were trying to move from embassy to embassy in Addis Ababa, country to country looking for troops to deploy in AMISOM, they were not successful … You need to ask yourself a question; Why is it that almost 10 years down the line, no one else wants to bring troops to*

AMISOM, except those five troop contributing countries?... (Extract 1D).

These observations indicate a significant exogenous influence on the AMISOM formative stages, and at the same time question the powers and leadership of the AU PSC. The extracts further reveal the inability of the AU to generate enough troops for this peace intervention. These observations seem to explain the absence of the top four African larger economies with better equipped militaries.[67] These research findings reveal the implications of external influence on AU leadership in peace interventions. Additionally, the findings reveal the level of support coming from the AU member states to the peace mission, in that only a few members contributed troops to AMISOM. The next section examines the interactions between AU leadership and national contingents in AMISOM.

7.5 AU interaction with national contingents and troop contributing countries in AMISOM

This section focusses on the implementation of the AU mission as stipulated in the AU SOP above. Leadership is examined by exploring how the hierarchical directives were implemented by national contingents in the mission area. The UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report (2015)[68] convincingly argues that uniformed peacekeepers must have a common mindset and commitment to deliver on an agreed operational concept. The UN HIPPO report specifically mentions the implementation of the intent of the Force Commander and meaningful and inclusive consultation with troop and police contributing countries. The case of AMISOM, however, reveals challenges in the AU leadership structure and implementation of the Force Commander's intent. The AU policy officers and ISS programme officers observed that the Force Commanders appointed by the AU have little influence in the command and control of the peace intervention mission. For instance, the AU policy officer pointed out that:

[67] These countries are South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt

[68] This is the report presented to the Secretary-General on 16 June 2015 by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Available at https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf. Accessed on 25 December, 2017

> *The Force Commander has no powers over national contingents in AMISOM and that is why the AU was forced to create the Military Operation Coordinating Committee (MOCC)[69]. The MOCC is actually making military decisions for AMISOM. The committee has taken up the functions of the Force Commander to the extent that Sector Commanders take orders from the MOCC not the Force Commander. In fact, it has taken over the responsibility of not only the military component, but it is also making decisions on behalf of the Head of Mission, the Commission, and the PSC, ... (Extract 1E).*

These findings reveal that the AU leadership structures are challenged by national contingents and is replaced by the trop contributing countries structures. It is important to note that the MOCC was an *ad hoc* leadership structure not provided in the AU PSC protocol or any guiding document of peace operations. The military interviewees indicated that the formal AU military advisory committee in peace operations is the Military Staff Committee, made up of senior military officers from the member states of the PSC not the TCCs.

This failure to use established structures by the AU has implications for how leadership is produced within the AU in directing and aligning participants in peace interventions. The AU leadership, in this instance, can be argued to have little or no alignment. On the one hand, this indicates a problematic situation. The creation of the MOCC indicates a lack of trust in the institution, thereby endangering the AU's power to orient or constrain behaviour of actors and guide them towards collective action (Lepsius, 2016: 13-14). The repeated failure by the AU PSC to enforce the implementation of SOPs contributed to the loss of institutional trust. As noted by Alvarez and Svejenova (2005), trust is a prerequisite for effective leadership. Moreover, the creation of the MOCC also highlights the AU's failure in controlling troops in Somalia. Research participants observed that the major challenge was that Sector Commanders (from national

[69] The MOCC is made up of military chiefs from Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs).

contingents) were not taking orders from the Force Commander but their national capitals, contrary to established SOPs. From this backdrop, the AU PSC had challenges in implementing the SOP and constraining the behaviour of national contingents for collective action. On the other hand, while the formation of MOCC may indicate AU's leadership challenges, it also shows the flexibility of its peace architecture and ability to adapt to a changing security environment. Analysis of the flexibility of the AU leadership framework is provided later in the chapter.

As shown above, research findings reveal that the AU PSC has ceded more powers to the few TCCs. Research participants from ISS and the AU indicated that MOCC has effectively established itself as a *de facto* leadership structure of the peace intervention. For instance, it was further observed by the AU politician that:

> *The MOCC influenced the AU PSC through the AU Commission to appoint Force Commanders from troop contributing countries on a rotational basis… Basically, TCCs blackmailed the AU Commission throughout the whole process of selecting Force Commanders in AMISOM. (Extract 1F)*

This extract indicates that the MOCC took control of the peace mission in Somalia and the AU was used as the medium of the operation. Research participants at the AU observed that the formal recruitment procedure for Force Commanders is through a competitive process from all AU member states. However, this was not adhered to because the TCCs in Somalia warned the AU not to advertise the Force Commander's position. It is noted above that the Police Commissioner in AMISOM is recruited through competitive processes from different AU member states and the composition of the police component is relatively diverse.

It is also important to note that the research findings on AMISOM leadership are in contrast to broader norms which govern peace operations. Here, the UN

recommendations provided in the HIPPO report (2015)[70] stress the need for a shared understanding of the situation and common goals among the mandating authority in peace operations, mission leadership, and troop and police contributing countries. The report further indicates that leadership in peace operations is smooth when uniformed peacekeepers have a common mindset and commitment to deliver the agreed operational concept from the Force Commander. It is important to note that the military goals are not independent but are subordinate to the overall mission mandate and objectives in peace operations. In the case of AMISOM there are indications of less cohesiveness and lack of extensive consultation in the mission. It was acknowledged by research participants that flawless linkages between the mission leadership and national contingents are vital in driving and maintaining a proactive political and operational posture of a peace operation mission in AMISOM.

While hierarchical leadership is promoted in the working relations between the Force Commander and Sector Commanders, research participants observed that co-leadership is also encouraged within AMISOM. Force Commanders are encouraged to consult with Sector Commanders to make sure that whatever is done in terms of mission operation is planned jointly. Although this is done, military officers and politicians from the AU critically observed that there are underlying national interests that override the Force Commander's intent and employment of national contingents, hence the need to balance the mission mandate and national interest in the Somalia peace mission. The AU military officer in highlighting the complex leadership dynamics in AMISOM observed that:

> *Command and control in Somalia is difficult, … because national*

[70] The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report, reflects the acknowledgement of the changing dynamics of conflict in the world that necessitates a revision of the UN's tools in order for the organisation to maintain its relevance and ability to meet these challenges. The report involved extensive consultation between the UN and AU. The report reviewed the AU peace operations missions including AMISOM and made recommendations on how to conduct peace operations.

contingents are under command of the Force Commander, but are also bearing national interests. (Extract 1G).

The extract above indicates the prevailing leadership challenges from the onset of the peace intervention in Somalia. It is evident from AMISOM's background that the mission was influenced by significant national interests of the US, Ethiopia and Kenya and this significantly affected the AU mission leadership. As a result of this, the AU hierarchy established in the mission SOPs had been undermined and replaced with the TCCs through the MOCC. This is contrary to UN peace operations, where national contingents are at the bottom of the chain of command (Findlay, 2002: 12). The AU leadership challenge is also linked to its failure to generate enough troops for AMISOM. Research participants observed that the lack of member states contributing troops to Somalia forced the AU to re-hat Ethiopian and Kenyan troops in Somalia. Consequently, TCCs had more leverage to the mission leadership. As a result of this, the would-be followers had more powers that prevented the AU from taking decisive measures in ensuring adherence to SOPs.

Other research participants observed that AU leadership in AMISOM is challenged due to the war/fighting nature of the peace operation where stakes are high. It is acknowledged elsewhere that when the use of force is involved in peace missions there is a greater tendency to seek instructions from national capitals by contingent commanders (Findlay, 2002: 13). Additionally, the use of regional forces further challenged the management of the mission in Somalia. During the discussions with the AU military and policy officers on the use of regional troops in Somalia, one military officer observed that:

Command and control of troops has been one of the central problems of AU peace operations because AU conducts war fighting missions. These are high intensity operations where risks are very high. … AU is also struggling in terms of command and control because the forces are regional, and they are close to their national capitals, at the same time

they have to fight in very difficult situations that involve high casualties. So, in most things they report to their national capitals before they seek the guidance of the Force Commander. This is the biggest challenge in the AU mission in Somalia. (Extract 1H).

The extract above shows the complex nature of AU peace operations and the implications of using regional troops in high intensity operations. The need for comprehensive planning and consultations was widely emphasised by research participants. On the other hand, the findings acknowledge the consequences of hasty decisions in the mission planning. It is highlighted above that most AU member states expressed concern on the dangerous security environment in Somalia and the need for comprehensive logistical and military support. However, such concerns were largely ignored and some member states that had pledged to contribute their troops never deployed[71]. Poor planning can be the underlying cause of the challenged leadership of the AU mission in Somalia. Earlier studies have indicated the need for a well-coordinated overall mission plan, in consultation with troop contributors before any deployment.[72]

The AMISOM analysis agrees with other studies that indicates that the use of regional forces in peace operations is not a panacea for African solutions. The research findings reveal that Sector Commanders from national contingents, when ordered by the Force Commander to destroy insurgents/terrorist camps, could first report to their national capitals for authorisation. The research further reveals that peace operations in Somalia have significant political implications in TCCs. Research participants observed that being close to the conflict zone, casualty figures are easily leaked, and citizens are now demanding accountability

[71] Some of these member states that never deployed after the initial commitment are Nigeria, Guinea, Tanzania and Malawi. Tanzania offered to train Somalia forces but not to deploy peacekeepers

[72] See a report from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany), Life and Peace Institute (Sweden), Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and United Nations Department of Peace-keeping Operations, Lessons Learned Unit, 'Comprehensive report on lessons-learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia April 1992-March 1995', Swedish Government, Stockholm, Dec. 1995, p. 7.

and information on peace interventions, especially where casualty levels are high. This finding is illustrated by the following extract from the AU politician:

> *… Leaders from democratic countries are losing domestic legitimacy due to high casualties in Somalia. … political leadership in all troop contributing countries in AMISOM have been going through a crisis of legitimacy back home because of the troops they are using in Somalia. That is why some of them want to pull out of Somalia. (Extract 1J).*

Research findings demonstrate that the nature of AU peace operations in Somalia are complex and required wider and extensive consultations in both the AU and national capitals for local support. At the same time, the findings further reveal the need for tight coordination and cooperation within the mission when the use of force is involved; however, this was lacking in AMISOM. Research participants also indicated that the funding of AMISOM is another bottleneck to AU leadership. The next section, therefore, discusses the mission planning, focusing on the funding of AMISOM.

7.6 AU leadership and funding of AMISOM

The research findings reveal the linkages between funding and leadership of the AU peace operations in Somalia. Research participants observed that the power of the purse is influential to the development of AU peace operations. The research shows that the UN and European Union (EU) have been instrumental in sustaining the AU mission in Somalia. It is noted that the UN provides logistical support to more than 20,000 AU personnel in AMISOM (UN HIPPO report 2015:74). The United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is responsible for logistical and administrative support to AMISOM. A former UN and AU official during the interviews observed that AU financial challenges in peace operations are enormous and indicated that:

> *The other challenges to AU leadership in AMISOM are financial and logistical issues. … about 98 percent of the AU missions are funded by partners. (Extract 1K).*

The UN support to AU operations is provided in UN - AU partnership and illustrated in AMISOM. The UN commitment for stronger corporation with the AU as envisaged in the UN Charter, Chapter VIII, has mainly supported the AU deployment in Somalia (UNSC/2015/229). The prominence of the UN over regional arrangements is well acknowledged in the UN Charter. Apart from the logistical support, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) for Somalia heads the political mission of Somalia. Research participants, however, observed that the coordination between the UN and AU on political missions is not clear, since the AU also has a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC). In this light, both the UN and AU have political missions in Somalia and it is not known if there is any division of labour or how their mandates are synchronised. A former UN and AU official, however, indicated the significant UN impact in AMISOM in that:

> *The UN influence on AU leadership in AMISOM can be seen at three different levels. The political level, between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. The second level is the level of the peace operation mission itself, that is between AMISOM and the UN mission in Somalia. And the third level, is the supporting level, because AMISOM logistical support is from the UN. (Extract 1L).*

It is clear from the research findings that the UN provides necessary conditions for the AU to conduct its peace operations. It is also important to note that AU dependency on the UN and EU in AMISOM has implications for its leadership in the mission area. For instance, the EU pays for troop allowances and the number of troops in AMISOM is, therefore, determined by the EU budget. This implies that the AU can only deploy the number of troops that the EU can pay for. To underscore the AU funding dependency, the ISS programme officer observed that:

> *AMISOM has exclusive dependency on external partners, especially EU and UN and other bilateral partners. EU is currently cutting its contributions to AMISOM. All this creates challenges to AU leadership because when*

you are leading a mission you need to provide necessary resources and then you can exercise authority. (Extract 1M).

The old adage that *'he who pays the piper calls the tune'* is more relevant to AMISOM leadership. The AU leadership in AMISOM is therefore, dependent on the UN, EU and other external partners who provides financial and logistical support. In this instance, AU leadership is constituted by a collective and not specifically hierarchical through the AU. Despite the funding shortfalls, the AU provides a specific, functionalist role to regional peace interventions. The discussion on AU relevance to regional peace interventions in Africa is given below.

7.7 AU functionalism in regional peace operations

The study reveals the functionalist role provided by the AU in collective regional peace efforts. The research findings show that despite the significant leadership challenges, the AU provides regional legitimacy and ability to garner global support for peace operations in Africa. It is important to note that AU deployment came in due to IGAD's failed attempt to deploy its subregional force in Somalia. The AU is mentioned in UN literature as an important partner in regional peace operations. Research participants acknowledged that despite the challenges, the mission has made considerable peace progress in Somalia. The AMISOM military component has been instrumental in helping Somali National Security Forces push the Al Qaeda-affiliated terror group, Al Shabaab, out of much of southern Somalia, including most major towns and cities.[73] It is noted that through the AU peace mission, Somalia has achieved a relatively secure environment in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, although, Al Shabaab still poses significant security threats (Williams, 2014a).

AMISOM has also demonstrated the AU's resolve in tackling new security challenges that the UN cannot respond to, for example, terrorism. The following

[73] See http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/. Accessed on 03 May 2017.

interview extract from the AU policy officer points to the AU's significant contribution to the achievement of relative peace in Somalia, compared to previous international peace interventions:

> *Previous international interventions in Somalia have had more resources and equipment. They involved much more advanced militaries but failed to do what the under-resourced AMISOM has done. Somalia mission is also evidence of the evolving nature of peace operations that responds to new security challenges like terrorism and this is what the UN is not able to do. The African Union is generating new ideas of peace operations and has the willingness to see its implementation. (Extract 1N).*

The AU perspective on the progress of the peace intervention in Somalia indicates that despite the challenges in the leadership, there are positive contributions made towards continental peace and stability. In agreement with this observation AU policy and military officers noted that the AU peace operation cannot be underestimated, considering the relative peace in Somalia. In reference to previous interventions, the AU policy officer noted that:

> *UN was in Somali through the mandates of UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II between 1992 and 1995 and they had 58,000 troops, more than twice what the AU has. But they left the country in haste, they actually ran away from Somalia. United States was in that country in 1992-3 and was embarrassed, but now there is relative stability in Somalia. (Extract 1P).*

From this backdrop, the research findings acknowledge the positive impact of the AU operation in Somalia. In this light, the AU has demonstrated its relevance in continental peace and stability operations. The paradox, however, is in the nature of leadership provided by the AU. At this point, it is important to further examine how leadership was produced and implemented in AMISOM. The next section discusses the theoretical implications of leadership within AU peace operations.

7.8 Theoretical implications of AMISOM leadership on African Union

The AU norms and values in leadership production are established in AMISOM SOPs (March and Olsen, 1983, 2006). The SOPs outline the routines and sets out the logic of appropriateness for collective action in AU peace operations (March and Olsen, 2004).

The SOP further provides interrelated rules on reporting procedures and conduct of national contingents, defines who has the authority, and lays out routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations (March and Olsen, 1989: 21-6). The preamble to the AMISOM SOP states that "the purpose of SOPs is to provide authority, power and guidelines within AMISOM mission area and to provide uniform standing operating procedures to be followed by all." The research results, however, show that norms and values established within the AMISOM SOP were not institutionalised in national contingents and TCCs and could not constrain their behaviour. It is important to note that institutionalisation of SOPs takes place through interactions of participants. In the case of AMISOM, the values and norms that facilitate collective action through organising, enabling, and restraining of actors have not yet developed. The research results show limited socialisation of actors in mission planning and subsequent implementation. Consequently, there is minimal internalisation of norms and values to constrain actors from pursuing divergent goals.

On the other hand, the evidence from the research shows significant realist perspectives in collective action. The research shows persistent national interests in the mission formation and leadership. In this light, the study acknowledges the existence of rational action in TCCs and a weak normative framework in the guarding behaviour of actors within AU peace interventions.

The significance of consultations among peace operations' participants and stakeholders has been emphasised by others (Findlay, 2002; Durch, 2006;

Bellamy, 2009). The AMISOM SOP is exclusive on consultations and para 1003, in defining AU command and employment of national contingents, emphasises mutual consultations between TCCs and the AU. Similarly, Para 1010 of the SOP encourages mutual professional consultations with subregional organisations. Although consultations are emphasised in AMISOM, the research findings show that the nature of consultations and power sharing between AU and TCCs is limited.

Additionally, the findings provide puzzling theoretical implications that deviate from the broader framework of leadership theories. For instance, there is a reversal of hierarchy, where TCCs have more significant powers than the mandating authority. In the first instance, the AU established the leader-follower-goal tripod and set out parameters of expected behaviour of national contingents that are committed to the AU peace operations through the SOP. The assumption here is that TCCs are rational actors who would maximise their own interests; hence, the AU created rules to ensure that national contingents operate within the same framework and achieve the collective outcome of the mission. The research, however, shows that these rules were not complied with. For instance, national contingents were not taking orders from Force Commanders but their respective home countries, contrary to what is provided in the SOP[74].

What is evident in the case study is that the AU lacked the sanctioning power to avoid unnecessary divergence. In this case, AU lost its power to orient or constrain the behaviour of actors. Group actors (TCCs) in AMISOM had national interests they wanted to fulfil through their collective action; sanctioning power was, therefore, crucial to enforce the validity of AU SOPs. It has been argued by Lepsius and others that the nature and size of sanctions are crucial for

[74] Para 1020 of the AMISOM SOP states that; when national units/contingents and MILOBs/CIVPOL come under the control of an AU designated commander, the transfer of Operational Authority must be completed immediately. Generally, this process would take place when national military personnel and units arrive in the mission area. If required, the transfer of authority may be completed at a unit's home station (before deployment in the area of operations), or at an intermediate staging base, as dictated by operational exigencies.

compliance. The bigger the sanctions, in terms of losing morale or material results for not belonging to a given group, the higher the validity of the rules and regulations (Lepsius, 2016: 37). It has been highlighted above that the AU struggled to generate enough troops for AMISOM and could hardly pay them; hence, the few TCCs had a high leverage and grabbed any powers they could from the AU. In this light, there was no significant power sharing or shared leadership. The absence of any sanctioning powers from the AU PSC indicated that there were fewer incentives for national contingents or TCCs to institutionalise the SOP within AMISOM. At the same time the failure of the AU to control national contingents in AMISOM led to an unsuccessful trust building process of the AU leadership structure. However, the case of AMISOM demonstrates that leadership within AU peace operations is constructed and de-constructed by participants in peace interventions.

7.8.1 Construction of leadership in AMISOM

The spontaneous emergence of the MOCC in AMISOM can be perceived as both anarchic and paradoxically constructive leadership. What is evident is that the formation of MOCC was unplanned but developed as a result of resistance from "would-be followers". Research findings show that MOCC was an *ad hoc* arrangement and not provided for in any AU guiding documents on peace and security. These findings bring back the following question: How is leadership produced in AU peace and security governance? This research shows that there is an excessive mismatch between what is envisaged by the AU in APSA (in terms of its powers) and compliance by would-be followers or subregional partners. In other words, the implementation of AU mandates using the hierarchy is challenged. From this background, this chapter argues that AU leadership can be conceptualised in shared leadership terms, where the AU plays a functionalist role of acquiring international support and legitimacy for African peace operations. It is important, however, to note that research findings show a dysfunctional shared leadership, where sharing leadership is not a prerogative of hierarchical leaders. Although the AU leadership roles were stipulated in the SOPs, their implementation was obstructed.

However, there is evidence showing significant mutual direction and agreement from all parties in ending violent conflicts but with nominal alignment and varied commitment. In light of this, the study reveals the need for more attention on extensive consultation and communication before the deployment of any AU peace operations. It has been shown above that consultations on mission planning were not exhaustive. Member states could not agree on how to navigate the dangerous security environment in Somalia and required logistical support. As a result of this, few countries deployed, and AU faced leadership challenges from TCCs.

The findings also reveal that AU conceptualisation of leadership is malleable, where leadership is constructed and not given (Pearce and Conger, 2003; Raelin, 2005; Crevani et al., 2010; Uhl-Bien, 2011). In AMISOM, leadership is constituted as an outcome of interactions where AU is not an independent unit of analysis in leadership, but a participant in the interaction with TCCs and external partners. The creation of the MOCC in AMISOM can be viewed as an outcome of leadership where participants are engaged in conflictual interaction and produce new forms of leadership. In this regard, leadership is seen as a process and a consequence of group actors in their interactions. Leadership takes shape through interactions of the AU and national contingents/TCCs in AU peace operations. In this view, the AU, through interactions with stakeholders constructed a form of shared leadership where the leader in the "leader-follower-goal" tripod framework was replaced with a less structured form of leadership. From this backdrop, the chapter argues that AMISOM leadership was both constructed and deconstructed or transformed by actors in a context of interactions. The MOCC decisions were more complied with by national contingents and promoted coordination and cooperation in the mission area. At the same time, the MOCC operated within the AU structure in order to maintain its legitimacy and relevance in peace efforts. This chapter, therefore, shows that AU leadership structures are malleable, where processual and *ad hoc* outcomes are likely to guide collective action in the AU regionalisation of peace and security.

7.9 Conclusion

The chapter has shown that the APSA, PSC protocol and SOPs established the values, norms, rules and expected appropriate behaviour for peace operations actors. Additionally, these structures provide the AU's hierarchical leadership of peace and security, in relation to subregional organisations such as IGAD or SADC. Although the AU promotes extensive consultations with stakeholders in the formation of any peace operation, research findings show that this was not done extensively in the mission planning of AMISOM. As a result of this lack of proper planning, the mission leadership faced challenges in aligning the mission mandate and national interests of TCCs. The chapter has demonstrated the necessity for open and constructive deliberations in the formative stages of AU peace operations. These discussions are vital considering that these operations are significantly different from those of the UN, in that they involve actual war fighting and terrorism. In this light, AU operations require high level commitment to the mission chain of command, as the stakes are considerably high. Furthermore, they require unreserved commitment from TCCs on the utilisation of their national contingents. The case of AMISOM has further demonstrated that the leadership of the AU in peace operations is fluid and constructed through interactions of AU member states and external actors.

The chapter also shows that values and norms need to be institutionalised in order to constrain the behaviour of participants in AU peace operations. It is established in this chapter that the values and norms guiding the African peace operations have not been fully institutionalised within member states and subregional organisations. It is apparent that the AU leadership has not been given the powers to align all subregions and member states, towards its goals of unified and regionalised peace. On the other hand, the research findings also appear to show that the overall assumption of using regional forces in a particular conflict zone is problematic and cannot be generalised. AMISOM deployment has shown that the political and national interests of neighbouring countries have a greater influence on the AU peace and security architecture leadership. In this light, the extent of the AU leadership is limited in peace operations. Similar to the

conclusions drawn in chapter 6, the AMISOM deployment has demonstrated that the AU has mainly provided the platform for sub regional actors to launch peace interventions. The chapter has shown multiple levels of influence that undermined the AU leadership in AMISOM. First, the chapter has shown the Ethiopian government leading the peace intervention through bilateral agreements with United States. Second, it has shown the MOCC (a coalition of troop contributing countries) leading the operations on ad hoc basis. Thirdly, it is shown that the international donor partners like the EU and the United Nations having multiple influence through donor support. Consequently, the AU is seen as a participant among different players in its own peace interventions and contributes to leadership rather than providing leadership on its own. Despite the AU leadership challenges, this chapter has demonstrated that the AU continental status provides the necessary legitimacy for global support in African regional peace interventions. Additionally, the relative peace achieved in Somalia indicates the relevance of the AU in regional peace interventions and its contribution to peace. Significantly, the chapter has highlighted the importance of comprehensive coordination and consultations with regional and external partners in regional peace interventions. As shown in chapter 6, this chapter also highlights the limited AU influence in leading peace efforts due to geopolitical complexities and external influence. From this backdrop, research findings and analysis in the chapter provide insights on what leadership looks like and how it is produced in AU peace operations.

The AMISOM and Madagascar case studies have brought important questions on leadership in the AU peace interventions from mediation to peace operations. There are striking similarities on how subregional actors relate to the AU PSC as the mandating and authorising entity of AU missions in both conflict mediations and peace operations. In both case studies leadership boundaries are not clear and affect subsequent leadership outcomes where the AU leadership hierarchy is contested, and direction, alignment and commitment are not well balanced for collective action.

The next chapter discusses the research findings in relation to the overall research questions. The chapter goes further to reflect on how the research findings interact with liberal and cosmopolitan peacekeeping theories. Through this discussion, the chapter responds to the last two research questions.

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Chapter 8: Discussion of research findings

8.0 Introduction

This chapter responds to the overall research question of how leadership is produced in AU peace operations and conflict mediation, through a discussion of the research findings. The discussion reflects on the social construction of leadership within the AU peace interventions[75] and the extent to which regionalisation of peace has developed in the continent[76]. The interactions in conflict mediation in Madagascar and the peace operation in Somalia offer wide-ranging viewpoints when analysing African regional peace efforts. The study provides fascinating insights into the leadership and coordination of regionalised peace interventions. It is shown that the conceptualisation of leadership, in these case studies, departs from the traditional definition of leadership. The findings therefore, call for a debate on how leadership can be defined and understood in regional peace interventions in Africa. Additionally, the research findings offer an opportunity in which leadership of regionalised peace can start to be located and analysed in the African context. The research findings in both case studies demonstrate that leadership is defined beyond the tripod ontology, but also in terms of direction, alignment and commitment due to the absence of a clear hierarchy between the AU and subregional actors. The case of Madagascar and AMISOM shows high levels of direction and commitment from both AU and subregions in resolving conflicts. However, their interactions indicate low levels of alignment in pursuing the goals. It is demonstrated that a less structured approach in Madagascar produced a leadership framework that was not aligned until the AU was invited back into mediations by the SADC. Similarly, until the formation of the MOCC, leadership within AMISOM was not aligned. The

[75] As explained in Chapter 1, 'peace interventions' in this study is used to cover both conflict mediation and peace operations, i.e. peaceful settlement of disputes and the threat or use of force.

[76] As pointed out in Chapter 3, the term 'regionalisation of peace' has been used to describe the decentralisation of peace interventions in the AU, as provided by the APSA. Where subregional organisations are the AU framework for peace interventions but are also involved in peace interventions independently.

discussion in this chapter also focuses on the collaboration and coordination of peace interventions within the AU peace architecture.

The first part of the chapter discusses the AU leadership approach to peace interventions and examines situations in which the AU has successfully negotiated its leadership. The dominating theme in the discussion is on the social construction of leadership and how notions of power are separated from leadership. At this point, the chapter highlights the role of subregional actors[77] in the construction of AU leadership. The significance of leadership boundaries between the AU and subregional actors is also highlighted. The second part of this chapter discusses the regionalisation of peace, by looking at how different theories apply to African peace interventions. In this light, the discussion is on the relevance of cosmopolitan peacekeeping and liberal peace theories and how they connect with the leadership of the AU peace interventions. The theoretical discussion provides new knowledge on the limits of these theories in explaining African peace interventions. At the same time, the discussion sheds light on how AU peace interventions promote various versions of peace – specifically, negative and positive peace. Finally, the chapter discusses the implications for the regionalisation of peace and security in Africa, by focusing on what the study has exposed about the opportunities and limitations of AU peace interventions.

8.1 Social construction of leadership within the African Union peace interventions

The need for further research on regional level analysis of peace interventions has been stressed by several scholars (Katzenstein, 2000; Tavares, 2008; Bellamy and Williams, 2010; Bhattacharyya, 2010; Schulz and Söderbaum, 2010; Taylor, 2011; Rein, 2015). The discussion in this chapter, therefore, contributes to knowledge on how subregional actors and the AU navigate their roles in peace interventions. The APSA has provided a deeper sense of participation and decentralisation of peace interventions within the AU. From this backdrop,

[77] It has been highlighted that the term 'subregional actors' refers to AU member states and subregional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

subregional actors play a vital role in orienting peace interventions. The presence of numerous regional actors in AU peace architecture indicates that the AU leadership framework has to accommodate diverse political interests. Before engaging the discussion on the construction of leadership within the AU, it is important to review the AU approach to peace interventions.

Chapters 6 and 7 show that hard power is at the foundation of the AU approach to peace interventions. This is demonstrated in a propensity for the AU to prefer models of coercion as opposed to persuasions (negotiations) as leadership models[78]. Although peaceful conflict mediations have been attempted, the use of force or threat of using force and sanctions has dominated the AU peace interventions; for instance, the initial reaction of both the AU and SADC in resolving conflicts has been the imposition of sanctions and threat of military intervention in both Somalia and Madagascar. In this light, the AU has fundamentally relied on its member states for the implementation of coercive measures; hence, a hegemonic approach to peace interventions has mainly been implemented by a collection of member states. The production of leadership is therefore, located in AU interactions with subregional actors as hard power tools.

The study reveals that while conventional hegemonic perspectives are important in understanding AU approaches to peace interventions, they are not sufficient to explain the leadership dynamics that take place within the AU. Hegemonic leadership theories, as discussed in Chapter 2, have usually focused on dominating member states that can fund regional interventions and serve as a focal point (Mattli, 1999a, 1999b). However, scholars in African international relations have argued that Africa lacks such pivotal states (Hill, 2011; Nathan, 2012; Flemes and Lobell, 2015); for example, all TCCs in AMISOM are not continental pivotal states or aspiring hegemons. This development demonstrates that Africa's leadership of peace interventions is not mainly explained through hegemonic theories, although there is a significant footprint of external powers. It is rather a collection of economically weak states that are progressively shaping

[78] For a focus on the role of coercion, influence, authority, and manipulation, see Chapter 2.

the future of African peace interventions and playing a vital role in peace interventions through the AU platform. It is at this point that AU leadership is constructed to rally subregional actors for interventions (Burns, 1978; Nye, 2010b, 2011). From this backdrop, the interaction that takes place between the AU and subregional actors determines the leadership of African peace interventions.

The nature of leadership in AU peace interventions is complex. It has been shown in previous chapters that a conceptual focus on shared leadership provides a useful way of analysing the tension among African regional actors in peace interventions. A flexible understanding of shared leadership is necessary when it comes to the way the AU negotiates its peace efforts with implementing subregional partners. The AU leadership is, therefore, not structural in terms of power but situated in complex interactions among subregional participants. In this light, leadership is socially constructed through interactions between the AU and subregional actors. There is evidence in this research that AU leadership has worked where there is an agreement between AU PSC and subregional actors on shared leadership roles to peace interventions. It is important to note that shared leadership roles have mainly demanded AU flexibility in its protocols that establish hierarchical leadership; for instance, the establishment of a military operations coordination committee in the AMISOM and SADC leadership takeover in Madagascar. It is worth pointing out that the developments leading to shared leadership roles have mainly emerged through gradual interaction processes between the AU and subregional actors. There is significant evidence in this study indicating initial contentious interactions between the AU and subregional actors. However, through continuous interactions there have been compromise and progressive developments towards collaborative conflict resolution.

The study shows a degree of intersubjectivity among the AU and subregional actors on their roles within the AU peace architecture. Specifically, there is a common understanding that the principle of subsidiarity offers some level of

latitude on subregional discretion in peace interventions. From this backdrop, there are two dimensions of shared leadership that require further analysis. The first of these examines *'how much freedom of action exists?* (this is related to how much subjective freedom of action is being exercised by subregional actors in this study)*'* and *'what kind of freedom of action exists?'* (referring to what subregional actors are doing with that freedom of subjectivity[79]). The second dimension of leadership is contextual and examines the kind of political conditions that are shaping shared leadership within the AU. In this second dimension, the focus is on both the historical background of regional actors and background of peace interventions that are undertaken. It is demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7 that the political context in which regional interventions take place become both enabling factors and constraints to shared leadership. The second dimension of shared leadership therefore, examines the political factors that allocate particular roles to subregional actors.

8.2 The state of leadership in AU peace interventions

In discussing the first dimension of *how much subjective freedom of action is being exercised by subregional actor*s (SADC and TCCs), it is important to understand the underlying assumptions. The presumption in the first dimension of shared leadership is the existence of rules and procedures that regulate the relationship among actors that share leadership (Park, 2014). In this study this assumption is typified by the AU protocols that provide a framework of rules and procedures under which African peace efforts are coordinated. In this light, the chapter will be answering the research question on how the AU peace and security structures facilitate the regionalisation of peace interventions, by looking at the extent to which the AU structure of rules and procedures has worked in coordinating peace interventions. In answering this question, the discussion needs to navigate around the thin line that separates leadership from power.

[79] This analytical approach has been used by Colin Wight (2006) and William Brown (2012) in discussing agency in international politics.

The conventional leadership scholarship argues for the existence of sanctions or threat of sanctions attached to leadership in order to seek compliance to rules and procedures (Drezner, 1999, 2000; McGillivray and Stam, 2004). In this light, the AU as an intergovernmental coalition of states has the powers of inclusion or exclusion in its peace interventions. In other words, according to the AU SOPs for its peace operations, a member state that is noncompliant with the rules and procedures can be withdrawn from the peace mission[80]. However, this research shows that the AU has significant weaknesses in enforcing its rules and procedures and realizing compliance of subregional actors. In the case of Somalia, the AU lacks the command structures necessary to manage large scale war fighting military operations. As a result of this command and control deficiency, *ad hoc* leadership structures have emerged to fill up the gap. One example is the MOCC in Somalia. Consequently, the 'how much freedom of action' question becomes problematic as the *ad hoc* leadership structures replace the AU leadership framework.

This study demonstrates that *ad hoc* structures for peace interventions supersede the AU PSC leadership. The research findings reveal that subjective freedom of action being exercised by subregional actors is unregulated by the AU. In other words, there is no boundary that defines where subregional actors' leadership roles start and end. The question of leadership boundaries is central to the 'how much' question of subjective action (Nabers, 2008a, 2008b; Hill, 2011; Helms, 2014; Park, 2014). It demonstrates that the leadership boundary problems emanate from what constitutes subsidiarity in regional peace interventions. There is a consensus in the research findings that the vaguely defined subsidiarity principle, coupled with the AU weakness in forging a comprehensive coordination with subregional actors, has led to unlimited freedom of action among subregional actors in peace interventions.

[80] This provision is stated in the AU SOPs to ensure command and control of the peace missions, in which AU is both the mandating and implementing authority.

As a result of this, the 'what kind of freedom of action' question becomes problematic as well. The challenge of answering both the 'how much' and 'what kind' questions is the evidence that there is less structure in AU leadership roles, despite the existence of APSA. Consequently, leadership becomes a discursive outcome among the AU and subregional actors (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; Dunne, 1995a, 1995b, 1998; Nabers, 2008a), where the AU negotiates with subregional actors on how African peace interventions should proceed. From this backdrop, regional interactions become sources of leadership and legitimacy for peace intervention (Viera and Alden, 2011). It is important to note that regional influence is fundamental in leadership and attainment of goals (Hogan et al., 1994; Northhouse, 1997; Yukl, 2006).

The study shows that the leadership perspectives within the AU go beyond the tripod ontology and include a DAC framework. The contested hierarchy in AU peace interventions indicates that the tripod conceptualisation of leadership is not enough in understanding how leadership works in the AU context. A further discussion on regional dynamics that affect AU hierarchical leadership in peace interventions is provided below.

Moving on to the second dimension of shared leadership, the research has demonstrated that the regionalisation of peace interventions is shaped by the overall common interests and values in ending violent conflicts in Africa. Bull has argued that common interests and common values define a common set of rules in the working of common institutions (1995). Chapter 3 has also shown the role of norms and values in guiding collective action (Wendt 1992, 1994, 1995; Dunne, 1995a, 1998). The research has exposed that, while the AU agenda on peace interventions is promoted, the regional and subregional interests are in conflict on how peace interventions are implemented[81]. The evidence in this research shows that the norms and values of the AU in peace interventions have

[81] The AU common interests, as shown in previous chapters, focus on African unity and achieving a conflict-free Africa, where social and economic development can thrive and allow Africa to play its role in global affairs. The quest for Africa's self-determination in its own affairs is aggressively pursued, where the AU provides the leadership framework.

not yet been institutionalised in order to condition the behaviour of participants and guide them towards collective action (Peters, 2012). The interactions among the AU and subregional actors have not yet developed to establish a common agenda for collective action (Nabers, 2008b; Destradi, 2010). From this backdrop, the common set of rules and norms guiding the conduct of peace interventions does not necessarily resolve collective action problems among regional actors (Buzan, 2004).

The political nature of AU regional interventions has been analysed in Chapters 6 and 7. It is shown that subregional autonomy determines the level of AU influence within which collaborative efforts take place. Network analysis therefore provides another way of understanding AU leadership (Rosamond, 2005). Where the AU provides a framework for interaction upon which security governance is facilitated (Breslin et al., 2003; Rosamond, 2005), it is shown that subregional actors use the AU platform as a launch pad for continental and subregional peace interventions. In this light, the conceptualisation of AU leadership is seen as a network that provides relatively stable relationships that are non-hierarchical and interdependent with subregional organisations (Breslin et al., 2003). The AU provides linkages among a variety of subregional actors who share common interests with regard to peace interventions. The research results acknowledge the broadening understanding within the AU that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals in African peace interventions (Börzel, 1997; Wunderlich, 2008). Leadership then becomes a complex and multi-faceted process involving both formal and informal networks of subregional actors (Bressand and Nicolaïdis, 1990). Hence, within the AU leadership there is the existence of multiple centres of influence; interaction of multiple actors; formal and informal structures of leadership; and a collective purpose (Webber et al., 2004: 4-8). The multiple centres of influence are both internal and external to the AU. The increasingly complex and decentralized policy-making processes in peace interventions show that emerging subregional partners are taking up new leadership roles within the AU peace architecture. The interactions of subregional actors with the AU are providing continuous opportunities for socialisation and

networking that is allowing participants in peace interventions to develop shared ideas and a common understanding on the legitimate scope of action within each intervention[82]. In this light, AU leadership is shaped by subregional actors who have a specific interest in particular peace interventions and are in a position to influence the AU decision-making process in one way or another. This is in addition to external centres of influence – a topic which will be discussed further in this chapter.

This research also shows that AU leadership is shaped by political and conflict dynamics. For instance, it was only when SADC hit a deadlock in the mediations in Madagascar, that it stopped exercising its subsidiarity claims and requested AU involvement. The research shows that leadership in African peace interventions is not necessarily given by subregional actors or a hegemonic state (Wiener, 1995). It is rather produced by a widely accepted network of leaders through inter-subjectivity, and whose decisions are voluntarily accepted by the AU and subregional actors. Participation in AU peace interventions is voluntary and frequently shaped by states' political interests. The AU leadership is therefore, seen as socio-political constructions driven by collective political interactions among subregional partners (Wunderlich, 2008). Although there is evidence of rational actions by subregional actors, there is broadening evidence that through interactions and socialisation, the AU and subregional actors are coordinating their policies to find a solution to common political problems, albeit at a slow pace (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; Dunne, 1998). Consequently, the transnational linkages and networks are playing decisive factors in the AU leadership of peace processes. It is important, however, to note that the level of interaction among subregional actors and the AU has not yet developed to institutionalise trust (Wendt, 1994, 1995; Dunne, 1998; Peters, 2012). There is growing evidence that suggests a lack of trust in the AU institutional capacity to provide leadership in peace interventions. As a result of this, subregional actors through their interactions are continuously constructing *ad hoc* leadership

[82] For instance, SADC and MOCC have fundamentally defined the progression of peace intervention in each case study in this research.

arrangements with the AU. Hence, there are significant challenges to AU leadership that require further discussion.

8.3 State and regional sovereignty in AU leadership of peace interventions

The case studies provide valuable insight into questions of state and regional sovereignty that impact on AU leadership in regional peace interventions. The literature review has shown a plethora of research on ingrained adherence to sovereignty in Africa's international relations (Clapham, 1996; Wight, 2006 Lipton, 2009; Taylor, 2010; Brown, 2012). From this backdrop, the AU, as an intergovernmental organisation, has its sovereignty originating from member states. Chapters 6 and 7 have shown that AU decisions are an outcome of what states decide. Scholars in African politics have argued that states are the 'foundational element' in studying international relations of sub-Saharan Africa (Taylor, 2010: 8). State sovereignty is therefore, a critical element in understanding the leadership dynamics within the AU in peace interventions. It is shown in Chapter 6 that state sovereignty is projected further to include regional sovereignty within SADC. Consequently, AU leadership in the SADC region becomes a contested and negotiated issue. From this background it is noted that 'both the form and content of sovereignty, and the uses of sovereign power' become crucial elements that constrain AU leadership (Brown, 2012: 1899). National and regional interests, coupled with bilateral agreements with external superpowers, further exacerbate AU leadership challenges for peace interventions. For instance, it is demonstrated that the USA/Ethiopia; France/Madagascar; and France/South Africa bilateral agreements on peace interventions in Somalia and Madagascar respectively had an impact on what the AU and subregions can do in peace efforts. The study shows that bilateral agreements create another form of *ad hoc* leadership structure that runs parallel to the AU or subregional framework. Consequently, there are multiple actors' initiatives in the same peace intervention that are not harmonised and often contradict each other.

This study reveals a considerable gap in internal compliance with AU protocols in peace interventions. The scholarly debate on compliance enforcement using hard power and soft power is well established (Burns, 1978; Nye, 2010a, 2011; Helms, 2014). It is discussed above that AU interactions with subregions do not use hard power but a hard power approach is paradoxically used in peace interventions. Hence, compliance with AU protocols is dependent on a common understanding of participants to the peace intervention. Leadership within the AU is, therefore, to a large extent determined by subregional actors, and external participants involved in African peace interventions. Consequently, the adherence to the leadership norms and values of the AU by subregional actors is contextual. With entrenched state and regional sovereignty, it is shown that there is minimal internalisation of AU leadership norms and values within subregional actors. Member states involved in peace interventions have not yet genuinely aligned themselves with a common position of the AU PSC, as shown in the MOCC and SADC contestations. The AU PSC protocols and constitutive acts are therefore, not fully implemented, making it difficult for the AU PSC to lead peace interventions in a hierarchy.

Further exploration of leadership within the AU demonstrates significant elements of historical legacies that affect leadership. Accounting for historical specificity is another analytical task in understanding AU leadership constraints. It is further revealed that regional sovereignty has created geopolitical tensions that limit AU influence in peace interventions – for instance, the SADC peculiarity and Francophone legacies, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. Hence, the regional sovereignty claims, combined with subregional geopolitics, pose significant challenges to AU leadership in subregional peace interventions. The study shows that the accumulation of the past Francophone and Anglophone divide, in addition to the involvement of outside superpowers, still influences the form and content of AU leadership in subregional peace interventions, as seen in both case studies. Hence, situating AU leadership in a historical perspective is necessary to predict how much influence can be exerted by the AU Peace and Security Council in a given conflict intervention. The geopolitical tensions add another

layer that hinders AU leadership at both a national and regional level, where member states in a given region continue to shape the form and content of AU leadership. For instance, IGAD member states in AMISOM and SADC member states in Madagascar played significant roles in leadership production within peace interventions. In these examples, the form and pattern of AU leadership is socially and politically determined by subregional actors through a regional cohesion. From this backdrop, the AU leadership is contextual, socially constructed, negotiated and determined by subregional actors (Bhattacharyya, 2010; Schulz and Söderbaum, 2010; Taylor, 2011).

From this backdrop, the discussion will now reflect on the different theories that inform peace interventions. Specifically, the study will offer its contribution to the discussion on cosmopolitan and liberal peace theories and how they influence AU peace interventions.

8.4 Cosmopolitanism in AU peace interventions

Scholars in cosmopolitan thinking have applied some principles of democracy to international politics in order to create a peaceful environment for all citizens of the globalised world (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Archibugi et al., 2011; Brown, 2011; Archibugi, 2012). The Cosmopolitan school of thought has argued that the notion of human security must apply to all peoples without reference to ethnicity, race, culture, nationality, religion, state citizenship or gender (Brown and Held, 2010). In addressing the issue of global peace, others have provided a framework on how peace at the local and national level can build to a global level through the development of a cosmopolitan peacekeeping framework (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005). Woodhouse and Ramsbotham have looked at the need for necessary development and reforms at the UN for global level peacekeeping capabilities, followed by capacity building and empowerment at the regional peacekeeping coalitions, such as the EU, AU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The concept and development of regional peacekeeping is relatively new. The study of AU peace interventions in relation to the cosmopolitan peace agenda expands the view of regional peacekeeping. There

are significant linkages between cosmopolitan thinking and state sovereignty. Many cosmopolitans consider state sovereignty to be one of the most significant bottlenecks to the cosmopolitan agenda (Waldron, 1999; Tan, 2004; Brown, 2011; Archibugi, 2012; Van Hooft, 2014). Other attempts to find the compatible functionality of the cosmopolitan thinking and the state have been done, although not fully developed (Ypi, 2008). Cosmopolitan scholars have argued that the forces of globalisation and cross-border security challenges have weakened state sovereignty and states are unable to manage their human security challenges independently without assistance from external actors (Cabrera, 2004; Habermas, 2006; Brown, 2011; Hayden, 2017).

The argument advanced by Woodhouse and Ramsbotham is that peacekeeping in the international system should be conceptualised and practised through cosmopolitan thinking, where peacekeeping should not only focus on problem solving interventions but must move from the minimal requirements of ending violence (negative peace) to the capacity to address human security (positive peace) agenda (2005: 140). The idea of cosmopolitanism, therefore, provides a normative framework for peacekeeping in the post-Westphalian or post-sovereignty era of international politics. The major proposition in this regard is to have independent peacekeepers who are free from a state-centric control system and are accountable to a democratic institutional set-up at a global level (UN after massive reforms) or regional Level (AU) (Pichat, 2004; Bellamy et al., 2010).

Building on the earlier discussion of AU peace interventions, this study shows an African political history with massive claims of sovereignty that extend to regional prerogatives. To what extent then are AU regional interventions a contribution to cosmopolitan peacekeeping? While Woodhouse and Ramsbotham provide an innovative way of promoting a cosmopolitan agenda in peacekeeping, the political landscape of the AU member states (inasfar as sovereignty is concerned) poses a significant bottleneck to cosmopolitanism. Additionally, the geopolitical tensions have created further divisions between 'us and others'[83]. As a result of

[83] For instance, the military operations coordinating committee created a monopoly of leadership and selection of Force Commanders where any other member state is excluded from the

this, the continental and subregional peace intervention framework is not synchronised and does not pull in the same direction all the time. In this light, the creation of a regional peacekeeping force that is non-state-centric is a distant dream for the AU. From this backdrop, leadership of peace interventions within the AU continues to be influenced by the African states. Hence, the study of cosmopolitan peace keeping within the AU requires comprehensive analysis of the linkages between state sovereignty and the duty to promote of human security. The cosmopolitan perspectives of regional peace interventions can therefore, be located within the nexus of the cosmopolitan agenda and the state. Although most scholars have argued for an antagonistic relationship between the two (Waldron, 1999; Tan, 2004; Archibugi, 2012), African cosmopolitan peace interventions can only be envisaged with the state playing important roles. It is important to mention that there exists some form of compatible functionality of the cosmopolitan thinking and the state where African peace interventions can start to be located (Ypi, 2008).

While national interests of some African member states and external powers are apparent in AU peace interventions, this research shows a growing recognition that AU deployments in Somalia were 'forces for good' within the cosmopolitan peacekeeping ethic (Elliott, and Cheeseman, 2004: 24-28). AU responses to the ungoverned space of Somalia can be viewed as a preventive measure to threats of terrorism and protection of civilians. This is in agreement with Wheeler (2000), who argues that cosmopolitan theory explores the use of military force in saving strangers. The role of the US in Somalia, while serving its own interests can also be argued as a cosmopolitan driven agenda for the purpose of achieving peace elsewhere and the protection of civilians in Africa. Additionally, the UN and EU support for AU intervention promoted the cosmopolitan peace agenda through capacity building and the development of an African regional mechanism (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005). The regional peace interventions in Africa provide an opportunity to engage in an analysis on how African member states,

decision-making processes of AMISOM. Similarly, SADC dominance in Madagascar initially excluded the AU mediation mechanism. The exclusion was further exacerbated by the geopolitical tensions.

acting on behalf of an ‘African collectiveness’, have tried to utilise such narrative and space to respond to the crisis.

This study reveals that ‘African collectiveness’ in peace interventions is mainly reinforced along regional lines rather than continental. Both case studies in this research point to an increased participation of member states within a particular subregional organisation. While this approach is an encouraging development, it has exposed significant weaknesses in dealing with conflicts at an operational level of cosmopolitan peacekeeping. It is acknowledged in this research that the AU failed to deploy a robust force that could deter belligerents in Somalia. The AU initial deployment in Somalia demonstrates that regional actors lack the capability and resources to deploy timely for peace operations. There is a consensus among cosmopolitan peacekeeping scholars that a robust force with quicker deployment times should be deployed to protect ordinary people (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005: 153, Curran and Woodhouse, 2007; Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 26). This research demonstrates that the massive financial and logistical support of regional peace operations within Africa hinders the deployment time and the extent of security provided to civilians. Chapter 7 has shown that all the logistical and troop allowances in AMISOM are provided by the UN and EU respectively. The need for the AU to acquire requisite resources (financial, political, military) for effective action in regional peace operations has received much support from scholars (Goulding, 2002; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Francis, 2006; Diehl, 2014). On the other hand, the African initiative in Somalia through IGAD shows that African member states are developing a cosmopolitan thinking in ensuring the attainment of peace and the protection of civilians, albeit of a relatively modest kind. While capacity building is an important stepping-stone towards a possible cosmopolitan future in the AU regional peace intervention framework, this research suggests that it is not sufficient until the decision-making processes are reformed, where the continental leadership is clearly defined and synchronised with subregional initiatives.

From this background, the analysis of leadership in the implementation of cosmopolitan values within the AU is important in understanding future directions of peace interventions in the continent. The conceptualisation of cosmopolitan peacekeeping is intrinsically linked to the promotion of democratic principles in international politics and liberal peace. In this light, the implementing tools for cosmopolitan agenda within the AU remains a challenge due to counterfeit democracies in the continent (Cheeseman and Klaas, 2018). Chapter 7 has shown that significant troop contributing countries in AMISON have patchy democratic credentials and consequently lacks the moral authority in promoting cosmopolitan values in the continent. It is shown above that, while most scholars in cosmopolitan peacekeeping view the state as a bottleneck to the implementation of cosmopolitan agenda, African peacekeeping can only be implemented by the states. From this background, the AU leadership in promoting cosmopolitan ethics is limited to ending violent conflicts as demonstrated in Somalia and Madagascar. The next section discusses the liberal peace values in the regional peace interventions and how liberal peace garner collective action among member states and promote AU leadership.

8.5 Liberal peace in AU peace intervention

As highlighted in the literature review, a plethora of research on liberal peace theory has been the most influential epistemic knowledge system guiding peace interventions (Doyle, 2005; Bellamy et al., 2010; Richmond and Franks, 2009; Jackson, 2011; Richmond, 2011; Jackson and Beswick, 2018; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). The general argument within the advocates of liberal peace is that a liberal state provides conditions for human security and peace operations have mainly been conducted to promote human rights and democratic principles in states that are essentially autocratic and in conflict. The fundamental aim of peacekeeping has been to uphold peace through the building of a liberal state based on an international system (Jackson and Albrecht, 2011; Jackson, 2011). Indeed, most peace operations have concluded with the conduct of elections and security sector reforms supported by the international community (Richmond, 2011; Jackson and Beswick, 2018). The idea has been to construct a legitimate government in the post-conflict environment and allow a further transformation of

peace to human security (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). Some scholars have argued that the idea of liberal peace is a flawed logic (Rosato, 2003), while others have argued for a major review of conditions in which liberal peace is likely to succeed (Richmond, and Franks, 2009; Beswick and Jackson, 2015; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). Scholars have argued that peace operations have usually limited the spaces for negotiated conflict resolution and are driven by liberal epistemologies and ontologies[84]. In other words, peace operations have promoted liberalism. Richmond and Franks, in their framework assessment for liberal peace transitions, have argued that the kind of liberal peace that is implemented determines the sustainability of peace in a post-conflict environment. The questions that require to be answered in this section are: What kind of liberal peace is promoted by the AU in its interventions? and What strategies have been put in place to sustain this peace?

The study shows that AU entry into conflict zones has often adopted a state-centric top-down approach of liberal peace. In other words, the research points to a conservative model of liberal peace that utilises the military and the imposition of sanctions (Richmond and Franks, 2009, Richmond, 2009). The regional peace interventions in Africa have been implemented in a non-traditional peacekeeping context where principles of consent and non-use of force could not work due to continuing warfare. The study shows that AU peace interventions have presupposed a victor's peace that aims at defeat or mutual compromise between opposing sides (Richmond, 2011; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). Previous research by Chinkin and Kaldor, and Richmond has shown that the victor's peace approach is usually problematic and unsustainable. Those who emerge as victors do not necessarily ensure human security and end up abusing their powers. However, it can be argued that liberal peace is a prerequisite of cosmopolitan development, since the state establishes the structure upon which cosmopolitan thinking starts to grow. As indicated above, ending violence is only the first step

[84] Alex Bellamy, 'The "Next Stage" in Peace Operations Theory', in Bellamy and Paul Williams (eds), Peace Operations and Global Order (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 17-38, 4-5. See also Chinkin and Kaldor, The Liberal Peace: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding from Part IV - Jus Post Bellum, 2017.

towards a cosmopolitan agenda, but the state must also move towards the capacity of addressing the human security (positive peace) agenda (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005).

There is growing evidence that liberal peace thinking is taking shape in AU peace interventions. For instance, the imposition of the Transitional Somalia Government by the AU with support from the international donor community provides a framework in which liberal peace can start to be located in the AU peace interventions. The AU PSC has shown interest in promoting some elements of liberal peace in ungoverned Somalia. Similarly, the AU and SADC intervention in Madagascar was mainly motivated by the unconstitutional change of government, indicating some support for liberal peace. However, it is important to point out here that AU interventions have also been problematic. This research builds on others who have argued that most peace interventions have been led by a single state that has used a global or continental framework for legitimacy (Coleman, 2011; De Wet, 2014). This research also shows that regional peace interventions in Africa are undertaken to legitimise the aggressions of a few member states who have sometimes wrongfully intervened in the name of peacekeeping (De Wet, 2014). Additionally, the AU interventions have had a significant trail of external influence. The study background has shown that the formation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government was an international project that was imposed on the Somali people, suggesting the existence of liberal imperialism (Williams, 2009b; Duffield and Vernon, 2013). The model of liberal peace advanced by the AU therefore, poses big obstacles to the restoration of state building and a viable basis for sustainable peace through local ownership (Richmond, 2011). This research shows little local engagement by the AU in both Somalia and Madagascar. It is demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7 that the AU has mainly been engaged in military operations and negotiations with state elites while the local peacebuilding has been left to the UN and other donors in Somalia. Although this development can be interpreted as a division of labour between the AU and international partners, it poses challenges to the African capacity to establish sustainable peace. Research findings indicate that although

the AU mission is headed by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU, this office is merely symbolic when it comes to coordination of local peacebuilding and coordination with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General.

Another challenge of the liberal peace model of the AU is in the implementing actors. The argument here is that most intervening states in the AU have sketchy democratic credentials and significant human security challenges at home. For instance, Ethiopia has had long outstanding human rights violations, while Burundi's constitutional crisis[85] and gross violations of human rights persist. In other words, there are ironic circumstances surrounding African countries intervening and advancing liberal peace. The study therefore suggests that AU peace interventions have not fundamentally promoted democratic practices, such as the rule of law, human rights and transparency, but the attainment of negative peace (absence of violence). Although AU interventions have been epitomised by the conduct of elections, they have not institutionalised liberal principles (Morphet, 2000). The negative peace discourse has, therefore, profoundly shaped the nature of peace interventions, which is also deeply embedded in APSA. The asymmetric emphasis of military power to soft power indicates the top-down old war lens through which conflict is viewed at the AU (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). Additionally, the research shows the absence of any aspiration within the AU of moving the post-conflict states towards positive peace. For instance, soon after the democratic elections in Madagascar, SADC withdrew immediately followed by the AU two years later. The ability to sustain a vibrant peace mission with local ownership and inclusivity[86] is one of the significant steps towards peacebuilding (Richmond, 2011; Albrecht and Jackson, 2014; Beswick and Jackson, 2015; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). From this backdrop, the AU peace operations depart from the overall cosmopolitan and liberal peace

[85] It has been pointed out in Chapter 3 that the AU has unsuccessfully planned the deployment of a peace intervention force in Burundi since 2014; yet the country is one of the troop contributors in Somalia.

[86] The local ownership has mainly focused on the local civil society of the host country and inclusivity of all sectors of society, mainly the role of women in peacebuilding.

orientation of creating conditions for positive peace (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007: 1055-6; UN, 1992: 59). This study indicates a partial and inconsistent application of liberal peace in AU interventions. From this backdrop, cosmopolitan and liberal peace values have not necessarily promoted peace interventions and the augmentation of the AU leadership. The next section provides the broader emerging picture of AU regionalisation of peace exposed through this study.

8.6 The exposé of African Union regionalisation of peace

The work of Bellamy et al. (2010) observed the lack of necessary legal structures guiding the relationship between the UN and regional organisations such as the AU and EU in regional peace interventions. This research has also exposed that the legal bases for cooperation between the AU and subregional actors have not developed any further beyond the AU PSC protocols, the AU constitutive act and AU-RECs memorandum of understanding. The lack of institutionalised legal frameworks for coordination has weakened the AU leadership and affects the organisation of the whole intervention framework. The ambiguity in the interpretation of AU protocols and principle of subsidiarity has sapped the division of labour in the decentralised peace intervention. Although APSA provides the unifying platform for regional bodies functioning at the continental, regional and state levels, it remains underdeveloped in forging a partnership for robust peace interventions in Africa. The lack of a legal framework is also demonstrated by the *ad hoc* structures that coordinate AU peace interventions. For instance, the leadership swap in Madagascar between AU and SADC was mainly based on the seniority of chief mediators rather than the subsidiarity principle[87]. As a result of this lack of clarity in the legal framework for inter-organisational interactions, the relations between the AU and subregional actors in peace interventions are weak and this prolongs the conflict settlement period. For instance, the case of Madagascar has demonstrated that it takes time for the AU and subregional partners to reach an agreement on the mediation agenda. Similar observations have been made in the coordination between the AU and Military Operations

[87] See Chapter 6 on the case study background.

Coordinating Committee in Somalia. Hence the coordination has not yet developed to the envisaged relationship outlined in the UN supplement to the agenda for peace (1995), in which the forms of coordination include: (a) consultations; (b) mutual diplomatic support; (c) mutual operational support; (d) co-deployment of field missions; and (e) joint deployment of a mission.

The research shows a lack of meaningful consultations between the AU and subregions. Additionally, the relationship was characterized by considerable conflict, mistrust, and tension. As shown in the joint mediation in Madagascar, it is apparent that continuous interactions are lacking between the AU and subregions in order to build trust and reduce the geopolitical tensions that exist among regional partners in peace interventions. The research shows that the African regional diversity was not considered in the design and implementation of the AU peace architecture. This regional diversity is twofold: geopolitics and levels of development within the subregions. The discussion above has provided the geopolitical account; however, research findings also reveal that subregional organisations are at different stages of capability development. For instance, SADC and IGAD do not have similar financial, logistical and operational capabilities for peace interventions. Hence, with the lack legal or social structures within APSA designed to mitigate the diversity and coordinate the regional peace interventions, the AU remains challenged. Furthermore, the research shows a lack of mutual diplomatic support within the continental and subregional mediation structures. For instance, the multiple mediation envoys in Madagascar were not reinforcing each other. The research has therefore exposed a problematic execution of APSA as those responsible for the framework implementation operate independently without a unified outlook. Hence, co-deployment and division of labour is further challenged.

Additionally, the study has shown that the relational models between the AU and subregional actors are neither subcontracting nor partnering, as in the UN framework with regional organisations (Yamashita, 2012). While the AU-SADC relations share some common features of partnering due to the non-existence of

hierarchy, the research shows no evidence of sharing interconnected capabilities between the two organisations. In other words, there is no harmonised approach to regional peace interventions. Complementary and mutually reinforcing roles between the AU and subregional organisations are missing. The study has also shown that there are no linkages between the AU and other subregional political groupings involved in peace intervention[88], making it difficult to reach a consensus among multiple mediators on the conflict resolution plan.

Despite the AU weaknesses in navigating the regionalised peace interventions, this research reveals that the continental body has more legitimacy than subregional actors. The case studies show that the AU continental platform provides significant political legitimacy to peace interventions within the continent. It is acknowledged that the complex nature of conflicts and multiple mediators in Madagascar challenged SADC regional capabilities. The subregional organisation in this case was among other subregional political entities claiming legitimacy in negotiating peace processes, while the AU enjoyed the continental legitimacy. In this case, the AU demonstrated its potential as a major mediator due to its continental status and the number of member states within it. Chapter 6 has shown that the AU involvement in mediation brought more compliance of conflicting parties that led to conflict settlement. Additionally, the case of Madagascar shows that the AU is more capable of sustaining the mediation mission for a longer period than SADC. Similarly, the AU managed to deploy in Somalia after a subregional group IGAD, failed to do so. This development reveals that the UN, EU and other international partners are more likely to fund the AU peace intervention than the subregional one. This research, therefore, demonstrates that the AU continental status offers more legitimacy in peace interventions that can be further developed. It is, therefore, important to identify and establish legal mechanisms and institutionalised principles on which the AU and subregional actors can base their relationships in peace interventions in Africa. Although APSA has been adopted and operationalised, the *ad hoc* nature

[88] As in the case of Madagascar, these include the Indian Ocean Group, International organisation de la Francophonie and other regional and political organisations that are not affiliated to the AU.

of leadership structures indicates a further need for established legal structures that can broaden AU legitimacy in peace interventions.

This study has also revealed a strong commitment to enforcing peace within the AU. While the AU has experienced leadership, financial and logistics challenges in Somalia, its deployment shows significant commitment to and development of the regionalisation of peace. The case of Somalia demonstrates that AU peace interventions are gradually undergoing a transformation and responding to contemporary security challenges. The AU peace operation in Somalia has been posited as the only realistic option of resolving conflicts where the UN has declined to intervene (Francis, 2006). Chapter 7 has outlined that the AU mission in Somalia is at times akin to a peace enforcement mission and the UN has been reluctant to take up such missions due to its peacekeeping doctrine. Although the UN provides necessary logistical and political support to the mission, AU troops are involved in the most challenging and non-traditional peace mission against armed and organised non-state actors.

While the AU has taken up such assignments, the complexity of the mission requires extensive planning. This study reveals that the mission planning was hindered by lack of extensive consultations and preparation in both case studies. It also shows that the AU doctrine in fighting terrorists or non-state actors requires prerequisite capability development in terms of finance, logistics and command structures. Although Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, gives it the right to intervene in its member states in 'grave circumstances', such as genocide and crimes against humanity, the capacity to do so is still lacking. It is demonstrated that in these high-risk operations, TCCs determine when and how their troops should be used, despite the established AU leadership framework. It therefore links with similar studies in this field which have identified that throughout the AU's engagement in Somalia, peacekeepers have been ill-prepared and ill-equipped for deployment[89] (Williams, 2009b), and also agrees with the UN's

[89] See Williams (2009: 520) Into the Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union Mission in Somalia. The AU peacekeepers also lacked crucial pieces of equipment and material. So poorly equipped were the troops from Burundi that it cost about US$10 million in pre-deployment costs to get one

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (para. 35), which highlights that nothing is 'more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so.'[90]

At this point, this research raises some questions on the usage of regional mechanisms within the AU peace architecture. The following discussion, therefore, debate the deployment of regional forces within their regions.

8.7 The antithesis of subregional mechanisms in Africa?

The literature review in Chapter 3 discussed the advantages and disadvantages of regional peace interventions. This study builds on previous research and adds knowledge on subregional actors in peace interventions in Africa. Overall, the study provides mixed results that are contextual. For instance, the case of Madagascar has shown that South Africa's role in mediation was more productive when working within the SADC framework than through a bilateral arrangement with France. It is demonstrated that South Africa alone, became a vital player in SADC mediations in Madagascar. On the other hand, the role of Ethiopia in Somalia exacerbated the geopolitical rivalry and contributed to a complex regional peace operation. Ethiopia used regional arrangements to legitimise its bilateral agreements with the US in a conflict that had direct relevance to the two countries. Similar observations have been made in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with Nigerian interventions in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1997 under ECOWAS (Francis, 2006), and South Africa in Lesotho in 1998. This study suggests therefore that the potential advantages of using subregional actors in peace interventions should be considered on a case by case basis. Specifically, a thorough understanding of the conflict dynamics is necessary when planning African regional peace interventions.

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battalion operational (compared with approximately US$2-3 million for each Ugandan battalion). Cited in Paul Williams's interview with the US State Department official, Washington, June 2009.

[90] Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, A/50/60, 3 January 1995. Paragraph 35.

The research also reveals growing evidence that the AU's peace interventions have been more partisan than neutral. For instance, Chapter 6 has shown how SADC supported the incumbent president of Madagascar to retain power, a stance that had a significant effect on the peace processes. It is noted that the SADC standpoint derailed and added another layer of complexity to the mediation efforts and AU leadership. Similarly, AU peace operations depicted the regional partisan interest through the support of the Somalia Transitional Federal Government that was initially supported by IGAD and later by the AU. It is further shown that the AU intervening force was not neutral, but part of the conflicting parties through the re-hatting of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops. Additionally, the geopolitical factors and violent response by belligerents in Somalia indicate that the people in the region do not have a natural affinity with those in the same geographic area (Diehl, 2007: 541, Diehl and Balas, 2007).

The study reveals the need for due consideration of geopolitical factors in a given African subregion when regional forces are used. The role of South Africa in Madagascar appears to have positively influenced SADC mediation efforts, while Ethiopian involvement in Somalia seem to have exacerbated the instability, making AU peace efforts more complex. From this backdrop, both Madagascar and Somalia case studies have elements of constructive and disruptive leadership outcomes initiated by regional actors that are close to the conflict zone. In this light, the research poses significant questions to the design and implementation of APSA that put subregional organisations (and their member states) as first responders to the conflict within their region. The study shows that APSA cannot be implemented in its entirety but through a case by case comprehensive political assessment of the conflict.

The study further demonstrates that regional peace interventions in Africa have taken a different stance from the UN peace operations on neutrality. In both case studies the AU and subregional interventions are not neutral but support a particular agenda that is partisan in nature, as shown in the Somalia Transition Government and SADC Ravalomanana support in Madagascar. On the other

hand, the AU interventions appear to be progressive and responding to the changing conflict environments in Africa, rather than sticking to a more traditional UN approach of consent, neutrality and non-use of force.

8.8 Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated that the AU has mainly adopted a hard power state-centric approach to conflict resolution. The use and threat of using force coupled with sanctions has been the dominating discourse in peace interventions. However, the AU does not have the tools for implementation of its hard power approach and fully depends on member states and subregional organisations. AU leadership in this perspective is therefore negotiated and socially constructed through interactions. The extent of AU leadership is contextual and mainly shaped by subregional partners due to the lack of an enforceable legal framework guiding the regional peace interventions. The evidence suggests that the protocols signed at the AU level have not yet transcended into legal instruments establishing AU leadership. Hence, the limited and contested space given to the AU by its member states does not make for an effective leadership position. Consequently, the AU is still operating in restricted space bequeathed by its own member states and subregional organisations (Brown, 2012). This study, therefore, reveals the need for an established legal mechanism that guides the coordination of regional peace efforts between the AU and subregions, rather than depending on the principle of subsidiarity alone. It is shown that the principle of subsidiarity has largely been used to justify subregional ownership of peace efforts and at the same time has narrowed AU influence. Although there is considerable support for regional ownership of peace interventions (Goulding, 2002: 217), harmonisation with continental efforts is lacking.

The chapter also shows that the leadership of AU peace interventions is best understood in shared terms, where the AU provides the required legitimacy and garners international support, and member states and subregional organisations provide the implementing tools in the form of troops and special mediation

envoys. The hierarchy provided in the AU protocols has been challenged by autonomous subregional organisations and high stakes missions pursued by the AU. As a result of this failing hierarchy, AU peace efforts have mainly been led by *ad hoc* leadership structures where authority has been shared and mostly monopolised by subregional actors. The study shows significant AU leadership challenges when the subregional network of member states is not considered to be part of the leadership framework for peace interventions. This finding indicates the need for APSA reform to incorporate clear leadership structures that take into account both regional and subregional structures. In this light, the research has shown that *ad hoc* leadership frameworks have been used to provide leadership for peace interventions.

The chapter in the case of AMISOM indicates that African states with poor economies have committed themselves to intervene in violent conflicts, while those with better economies have stepped back. From this backdrop, the study shows partial hegemonic leadership coming from African member states in peace interventions. Hegemonic influences in the study are mainly emanating from Western Governments through bilateral agreements with TCCs.

The discussion in the chapter has also examined the application of cosmopolitan theory in AU peace interventions from both a strategic and operational level. The main contribution, in this regard, is that the state is a significant enabler of a cosmopolitan agenda and peacekeeping in Africa. Indeed, other scholars have considered the idea of responsible cosmopolitan states in fostering a cosmopolitan outcome in international politics (Archibugi, 2008; Ypi, 2008; Brown and Ainley, 2009; Waldron, 2006). This chapter has demonstrated that states in Africa continue to have a critical level of significance in the implementation of peace interventions. Hence, ignoring the role of the state in Africa would render a cosmopolitan world a mere fantasy. It is also demonstrated that state and regional sovereignty is the major bottleneck to a cosmopolitan agenda in Africa. However, the research points to the need to find innovative ways of working with states in harmonising the ostensibly incompatible concepts of cosmopolitanism

and sovereignty in attaining both negative and positive peace. The chapter has also underscored the lack of resources among African states for the implementation of cosmopolitan peacekeeping (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Curran and Woodhouse, 2007; Williams, 2013b; Curran and Williams, 2016). From this backdrop, the study points to the need for further research on building an African force capable of cosmopolitan peacekeeping.

The study has also demonstrated that liberal peace theories continue to dominate African peace interventions; however, this remains problematic. The chapter has shown that the AU with assistance from the international community has supported the imperialist liberal approaches in Somalia. For instance, the internationally constructed TFG was imposed through a victor's peace, through the removal of UIC and in the process excluding the local voice. Additionally, the implementing partners of the peace intervention have had a long, outstanding deficiency of liberal democracies. The approach taken by the AU in regional peace interventions therefore, suggests the promotion of negative peace while ignoring positive peace, which is the ultimate aim of both cosmopolitan and liberal peace. At the same time the adopted path to liberal peace is unsustainable, in that the victor's peace and absence of local support usually leads to a recurrence of violence (Richmond, 2011; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). It is important to mention that the victor's peace in the case of Somalia has not yet been achieved and remains a challenge.[91] The chapter has also demonstrated that liberal peace promotion has mainly been pursued up to the level of conducting elections. In other words, a partial version of liberal theory is promoted within the AU. Nevertheless, the AU and subregional partners have supported liberalism in enforcing constitutionality where an unconstitutional change of government has occurred, as demonstrated in Madagascar.

[91] This information was accurate during the fieldwork and at the time of writing this project. Continued resistance to and terrorist attacks on both AU troops and civilians continues to threaten the Somali peace processes. The Somali armed forces have not yet developed the capacity to ensure civilian protection and the Government is sustained by the international (AU) intervening force.

The next chapter concludes the entire study by focusing on what has been accomplished in this research and the overall implications. Additionally, the concluding chapter suggests areas for further research in African regional peace interventions. While this study has answered specific questions on the leadership and regionalisation of peace and security in Africa, it has also raised more questions that require further research in the field of regional peace and security.

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Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.0. Introduction

This chapter concludes the study in two parts. Firstly, it outlines what the study has achieved in answering the research questions and the implications of the research findings to theory and practice of the AU leadership in peace interventions. Secondly, it highlights areas for future research arising from this study. The chapter outlines important conclusions by showing the nature and extent of the AU leadership in peace interventions and how this leadership is constructed. The main argument is that the AU leadership is contextual, shared and socially constructed. It is shown in the study that the AU provides an important platform for global support that allows sub regional actors and international partners to launch regional peace interventions. In this light, the AU participates in shared decision-making process of peace interventions and does not necessarily provide hierarchical leadership. Although, there are significant leadership challenges within the AU, the study demonstrates that regionalised peace efforts have progressed over time and AU legitimacy has increased with the practice of peace interventions. At this point, the chapter reflects on the impact of liberal peace and cosmopolitan ideas in AU peace interventions. The chapter shows that, although liberal peace and cosmopolitan thinking promotes collective action and subsequent leadership of democratic values and peace, the AU peace interventions have been partially driven by such values.

In summarising areas for further research, the study suggests ways in which the AU can respond to leadership challenges faced in regional peace interventions and how it can relate with other regional institutions. This chapter therefore, highlights the research contributions to knowledge and invites further debate on the topic of leadership and regional peace interventions within the AU.

9.1 Evaluation of leadership ontologies in AU peace interventions

This study has made contributions to the concept of leadership in regional peace interventions. In particular, it demonstrates that in the context of AU peace interventions, there is evidence that the hierarchical leadership conceptualisation is insufficient in defining leadership between the AU and subregional actors. By defining leadership within the tenets of a hierarchy, one would argue the non-existence of leadership in AU peace interventions due to the fluidity of influence between the AU and sub regional institutions. The research has shown that the AU hierarchy is contested by subregional actors, hence, leadership within the AU peace interventions is not constituted as hierarchy but shared and defined through the leadership outcomes of Direction, Alignment and Commitment (the DAC Ontology). The study has shown that the AU does not lead sub regional institutions but participate in the leadership by providing the legitimacy for peace interventions. The leadership analysis within the AU, therefore, changes from unitary to multiple direction of influence. The study shows that the AU operates in a leadership bubble among different participants that influence its decision-making processes. It is shown that the African member states and regional institutions largely influence the AU Peace and Security Council decisions in the design and implementation of peace interventions. The extent of the AU leadership is, therefore, shaped by subregional and external actors. In this light, the research reveals that the AU leadership is defined by situational dynamics in specific conflicts rendering DAC ontology useful, as it emphases on leadership processes and outcomes (Drath et al., 2008). The study shows that the lack of supranational characteristics in the AU implies that its decisions are only implemented through intersubjectivity and negotiations with subregional actors. Leadership in this case becomes a product of real situations and negotiations between the AU and sub regional institutions. From this backdrop, although the AU PSC protocols and related Memorandum of Understanding with subregional actors stipulate AU hierarchy, the leadership of peace interventions is processual and not given (Pearce and Conger, 2003; Raelin, 2005; Crevani et al., 2010; Uhl-

Bien, 2011). A further summary of the AU limited influence in leadership is provided below.

Apart from the AU limited influence in peace interventions, the study makes important contributions in the theoretical underpinnings of the AU leadership. The study has shown that the context in which the peace interventions occur determines the mode of shared leadership between the continental and sub regional institutions. The significant role played by context allows leadership to start being located in shared leadership outcomes (Drath et al., 2008; Denis et al., 2012). There is evidence in the study that the AU and SADC have a shared direction and mutual agreement on their aim and vision in peace interventions. Specifically, they share similar goals in ending violence and creating an environment for economic development. On the other hand, the study reveals partial alignment, which affects the commitment in achieving goals.

It is demonstrated in this study that the joint mediation in Madagascar, between the AU and SADC was initially unstructured and contested, but later transformed into an *ad hoc* leadership structure for joint mediation. On the other hand, the peace operation in Somalia started with a well-established AU field mission structure that was significantly challenged by troop contributing countries, leading to a similar *ad hoc* (MOCC) structure. From this backdrop, the study has shown that the AU leadership is being produced through a loose and dynamic framework that is continually transforming. Hence, that the extent of the AU leadership in contextually driven by sub regional actors and constantly shifting within the shared direction discourse.

The study also indicates a variation of mutual commitment in achieving mission goals. For instance, the Madagascar case study shows gradual processes within SADC and AU to integrate each other's efforts in mediations. Similarly, the AMISOM case shows the AU willingness to integrate the demands of national contingents/TCCs and, in the process, giving up its hierarchy and sharing its leadership in collective action. From this backdrop, the nature of leadership within

the AU peace interventions is located within the discursive and shared outcomes and not necessarily in the hierarchical leadership ontology. It is acknowledged in this study that the tripod ontology provides a significant framework for analysing leadership; however, the situational and shared leadership through the DAC framework is useful in the understanding of leadership outcomes within the AU. This conceptualisation of leadership becomes more relevant in the AU, where the hierarchy in contested and nearly non-existent. By locating leadership beyond the tripod and in the shared DAC framework, the study has made a theoretical contribution to the leadership of AU peace interventions.

Another theoretical contribution originating from this study is that leadership in AU peace interventions is socially constructed through competitive coexistence and interactions between the AU and subregional actors (Lukes, 1974; Park, 2006, 2014; Helms, 2014). Both the elements of positive and negative competitive coexistence are shown in the study. It is demonstrated that both the AU and subregional actors adopt blocking power strategies in an attempt to outwit each other and establish themselves as sole leaders in peace interventions. However, such strategies in both case studies become ineffective and actors are seen to re-strategise and establish *ad hoc* structures for shared leadership. The interactions in which regional peace interventions take place play a vital role in the production of leadership. The research has revealed increasing willingness of subregional institutions such as SADC and IGAD to operate within the AU legitimacy in peace interventions. Despite the subregional contestations of AU hierarchy, evidence in the research shows that subregions require the AU structure for their interventions to be effective. The need for AU legitimacy is shown in the SADC stalled mediations and IGAD failed attempts to deploy troops in Somalia. In both cases the AU involvement reveal its relevance in regional peace interventions.

This research, therefore, demonstrates that the AU continental status offers more legitimacy in peace interventions that can further be developed. At the same time the study points to the need for more harmonisation between the continental and

subregional peace and security architectures. The *ad hoc* nature of peace interventions within the AU reveals a structural gap that requires more attention. From this backdrop, the study makes a policy contribution by illuminating the importance of identifying and establishing legal mechanisms on which the AU and subregional actors can base their relationships in peace interventions. Although APSA has been adopted and operationalised, the *ad hoc* nature of leadership structures and the ambiguity of subsidiarity principles, indicates the need for established legal structures or mechanisms that guide peace interventions.

9.2 Gradual regionalisation of peace

The study's second main contribution relates to debates on the regionalisation of peace. The study has shown the progressive nature of regional peace interventions from a traditional UN peacekeeping to a broader intervention within the AU. The research shows that the AU is increasingly responding to conflicts where the UN is failing to intervene. These conflicts have relevance to contemporary security challenges such as terrorism and involve situations where consent from conflicting parties cannot be granted (Bellamy et al., 2010). Regional peace interventions within the AU are therefore, the only realistic way to respond to conflicts in the region when the UN and other international partners fail to do so (Francis, 2006). However, the study shows that the AU is still lacking the necessary tools for the job. Consequently, regionalisation of peace in Africa cannot be constituted without the involvement of international donors and the UN. From this background, the research has shown that the leadership of regional peace interventions within the AU is also influenced by donor dependency and external partners.

The study therefore, provides a thread that links the 'African Solutions' connotations to a stronger international partnership. While the notion of 'African Solutions' bases its centrality on self-determination and ownership of African peace processes, the study reveals a significant footprint of Western powers in regional peace interventions. The Western influence, through bilateral

agreements with AU member states, adds another layer of complexity in regional peace interventions and AU leadership. The bilateral agreements between global hegemonies and AU member states are seen to be beyond the influence of the AU. The US and France involvement in the case studies indicates that global hegemonies have significant influence on the extent of AU leadership in peace interventions. Consequently, the AU leadership in peace interventions is both promoted and narrowed by external actors and exacerbated by the historic obsession of sovereignty among African member states. In this light, the study shows that the global hegemonic influences and African political history play a significant role in regionalised peace and African political affairs.

The development of AU interventions is also evidenced by growing regional alliances in conflict resolution. SADC and IGAD member states (IGAD in the case of Somalia) have increasingly committed themselves in high stakes missions that have political implications and consequences in home countries. TCCs in AU missions continue to pay a high price for peace through the ultimate sacrifice of troops in dangerous environments. This shows that the values for peace are gradually taking shape, albeit with limited alignment in the leadership structures, and inadequate consultations in mission planning. In both case studies, the study has shown little consultation in mission planning and its impact on goal attainment and peace mission leadership. From this background, the study makes a policy contribution by showing the need for better planning and coordination between the AU and subregional actors. Specifically, the need for a better understanding of the political environment of the mission during mission planning. The study therefore, reveals that the AU is undergoing a learning curve in its peace missions.

On the other hand, the study has revealed a loose connection between the AU and sub regional institutions in peace interventions. While UN and AU relations in peace interventions are mainly guided by partnership and sub-contracting (Gelot, 2012; Yamashita, 2012), AU and subregional interventions are neither of the two. It is shown that the AU peace interventions were designed with the

assumption of a hierarchy, where the AU Peace and Security Council would assign subregional organisations to intervene and take over peace missions when necessary. In this light, the study reveals that there was no anticipation of competitive coexistence and shared leadership. Consequently, there are no provisions for partnering or sub-contracting within the AU and regional institutional framework. From this backdrop, the study highlights the need for further research in developing a working arrangement between the AU and subregional institutions in conducting peace interventions.

9.3 Contributions to liberal peace and cosmopolitan approaches to peacekeeping

The study has shown that AU peace interventions have not specifically aimed at promoting liberal state building (at least from the AU perspective) but focused on ending violent conflicts. Although conducting elections have been part of the peace process, there is no evidence of AU engagement and promotion of liberal values in post-conflict state building. Similarly, subregional organisations have not promoted liberal peace in post-conflict countries, as evidenced by the immediate withdrawal of SADC after elections in Madagascar. From this background, AU and subregional organisations have applied partial liberal peace in response to the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar and statelessness in Somalia. The theoretical implication is that AU peace interventions have moved away from a general post-Westphalian and Western idea of changing non-liberal states to become liberalised (Jackson, 2011). Additionally, the AU operations have only focused on negative peace and have paid little attention to a positive peace that is sustainable. Most literature has shown that when liberal peace is well implemented by paying attention to the relevant context of the targeted country, there is an increased likelihood of peace being sustained (Paris, 2004; Jackson, 2011; Richmond, 2011; Richmond and Franks, 2012; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017; Jackson and Beswick, 2018). This study has, therefore, shown that the AU has not operated within the liberal epistemological knowledge in its peace interventions. Indicating that the collectiveness in the promotion of human rights and democracy in responding to

conflicts is lacking in the AU. Additionally, there are no strategies for sustainable peace after interventions.

On the other hand, there is evidence that the UN and international organisations have been influential in implementing liberal peacebuilding in Somalia, suggesting that African peacebuilding continues to be shaped by global partners who may not pay attention to the relevant African context (Albrecht and Jackson, 2014). From this background, the study has shown that liberal values have not yet been institutionalised in the AU, indicating that implementing tools for liberal ideas from the African perspective are still missing. This study suggests a need to use liberal states in peace interventions and peacebuilding, while at the same time orienting post-conflict states towards liberal values. There is a consensus in the literature that liberal democratic political structures, and social and economic institutions promote peaceful competition and sustainable security (Doyle, 1997; Duffield, 2007; Beswick and Jackson, 2015). However, the liberal approach should not create imperial liberalism and result in autocratic post-conflict regimes that blur accountability (Jackson, 2011). The need to create a liberal state that is relevant in post-conflict environments is the work of social and policy engineers who pay attention to context and match it with ideas of liberal state (Jackson, 2011; Richmond and Franks, 2012; Beswick and Jackson, 2015). Both cases in this study have shown a focus on a one-size-fits-all form of liberal peace where elections were conducted without due consideration of the post-conflict environment (Richmond and Franks, 2012).

Within the cosmopolitan thinking, the study has shown that the AU peace interventions have been partially driven by cosmopolitan values. Indicating that the central tenets of collectivism in the promotion of human rights and democracy have not strengthened the AU leadership in peace interventions. On the other hand, the study has made its contribution to cosmopolitanism within the AU member states. The study outlines growing values for peace in AU peace interventions and this indicates a potential evolution of African peace interventions towards cosmopolitan thinking. African troops have been deployed

to save strangers, thereby signifying the beginning of cosmopolitan states and ethics (Wheeler, 2000). While most scholars have viewed sovereignty as a significant bottleneck to the cosmopolitan agenda, this study shows that African peace interventions cannot be separated from state roles. In this light, the cosmopolitan agenda can start to be located within African states. The developments in subregional peacekeeping forces within APSA indicate significant steps towards a cosmopolitan idea (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). However, there is a need for more research on its capability, training and utilisation, considering the African geopolitical structure. The research also points to a nexus between cosmopolitan peacekeeping and national interests that require further studies. There is a blurred picture in the separation of the cosmopolitan agenda and national interests and how they influence each other in the promotion of peace elsewhere.

The next section outlines the common features of regional peace interventions originating from the research findings and discussion. These features provide a basis for future research emanating from this study.

9.5 Common relevant issues deriving from the study

The outline below provides a summary of points arising from the study. The summaries are given in Tables 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3:

Table 9.0.1 Leadership in AU peace interventions

1. Leadership in AU peace interventions is not hierarchical but located in leadership outcomes (of Direction, Alignment and Commitment).
2. Leadership is produced through collective contributions of regional and subregional actors using *ad hoc* structures.
3. Leadership is socially constructed through interactions in competitive coexistence.
4. Problematic shared leadership set-up due to ambiguous leadership boundaries that define roles and limits of authority between the AU and subregional actors.

Table 9.0.2 Regionalisation of peace in the AU

1. Evidence that the regionalisation of peace is developing within the AU.
2. Little connection between bilateral peace intervention agreements, and subregional and regional interventions. Resulting in poor regional, subregional and international coordination.
3. Ambiguity in the coordination principles of the AU and subregional actors within APSA resulting in leadership contestation.
4. Significant AU dependency on international donor funding resulting in substantial Western hegemonic influences in regional peace interventions.
5. Significant focus on state and subregional territorial sovereignty, without due consideration to capabilities and complementarity.

Table 9.0.3 Liberal peace and cosmopolitan principles in the AU peace operation

1. State-centric liberal peace approach with little engagement of local voices – leading to less sensitivity to context.

2. Limited promotion of liberal peace values within the AU peace interventions.
3. Often a focus on one-size-fits-all forms of liberal peace – post conflict elections and lack of sustainable peace.
4. Evidence of emerging cosmopolitan values and ethics within the AU.
5. A need to strike a balance between cosmopolitan principles and state sovereignty.

9.6 Areas for further research

The first area for further research is on establishing legal mechanisms for coordination between the AU and subregional actors. The research in both cases has highlighted the dominance of *ad hoc* structures and competitive coexistence between the AU and subregions. What is apparent in the study is the need for established and predictable mechanisms for conflict resolution between the AU and subregions. Future research in this area could look at the nature of mechanisms that can bind the participants to peace interventions in Africa. Some studies have highlighted the need for the AU to develop supranational characteristics in order to enforce compliance among subregions (Olivier, 2010). Studies developing from this research could investigate the kind of regional and subregional networks or coordinating principles that can be created to ensure smooth and predictable coordination – paying attention to context and historical developments in African geopolitics. Future research could interrogate how the AU can integrate a legal system to provide predictable leadership outcomes in AU interventions.

The clarification of roles and limits of authority could specify how regional and subregional actors relate to each other in intervention processes. One narrative that needs to be interrogated is the clarity in subsidiarity policy and rebalancing of state and regional sovereignty. Sovereignty is not only defined in terms of total freedoms but also capability and responsibility (Chandler, 2004). Significant focus on the state and subregional territorial sovereignty, without due consideration to

capabilities and complementarity, has raised questions on the leadership of peace interventions. Additionally, it has raised big questions on who has legitimacy in peace processes between the AU and subregions (RECs).

The second area for further research is on leadership and trust building within AU peace operations. This study has exclusively argued that leadership within AU peace interventions is located in shared terms and not hierarchical. At the same time, the design of APSA did not anticipate the competitive coexistence and shared leadership. Consequently, there is a need for further studies to examine how shared leadership can be promoted with less conflict; how trust can be established in leadership production considering the DAC framework in leadership analysis. Future studies could focus on striking a balance between regional territorial sovereignty and AU legitimacy in peace interventions.

There is significant evidence showing little connection between bilateral peace intervention agreements (between African member states and Western states), and regional and subregional interventions. Research results suggest that the AU has failed to link subregional and international actors, resulting in unstructured approaches to peace interventions that lack trust between the AU and subregional actors. The diversity of African subregions has created a web or spaghetti bowl of subregional initiatives in peace interventions that are not structured and lack a unified platform. Research in the area could look at how the AU can create unity of purpose by tapping into the specific capabilities of these subregions and obtaining commitment to common goals, building institutional trust in the AU, thereby making it the only point of contact in African peace interventions and creating a unified platform that can lead peace processes in the continent.

The third area for further research is the task of comparing more AU interventions in order to expand the DAC framework. The theoretical gains made in this research on the DAC framework requires to be built on by taking the model elsewhere to see how the model can be developed further in understanding peace operations. Further studies could examine how the model affects the

quality of decision making in peace interventions and in highly structured organisations such as the military (in peacekeeping).

The study has also highlighted the AU dependency on international donor funding and subsequent significant international influence in regional peace interventions. The research shows that external factors affect the production of leadership in AU peace interventions. Future developments in the DAC framework could focus on how feasible leadership structures can be created to incorporate international and AU interests in regional peace interventions, where international donors become part of the participants in leadership production.

The fourth area for further research is on liberal peace and cosmopolitan ethics within the AU peace operations. The study has highlighted the limited influence of liberal peace values in AU peace interventions from the African perspective. Future research in this area could look at how AU peace interventions can promote liberal ideas. This study has added another voice in highlighting the problems with a one-size-fits-all form of liberal peace, indicating the need for African countries to adopt a context-specific liberal peace. In this light, future research could investigate the mechanisms and modalities of involving AU member states in the promotion of context-specific liberal peace. This research has also shown that the AU has adopted a state-centric approach to peace that has significantly excluded a local voice, thereby being less sensitive to context. Previous research has shown the international tendency to ignore local voices in peacebuilding and state building (Richmond and Franks, 2012; Albrecht and Jackson, 2014). Future research could therefore investigate how AU peace interventions can navigate the international tendency and engage local actors in peacebuilding and state building.

It is concluded from this research that cosmopolitan values and ethics are limited but emerging in AU peace operations. Earlier research has suggested how cosmopolitanism can develop over time, specifically through the engagement of international and regional initiatives that promote peace everywhere (Wheeler, 2000; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Kaldor and Salmon, 2006; Curran

and Woodhouse, 2007). The AU, through subregional organisations, has developed regional peacekeeping forces that are placed on a rotational AU rota for a period of six months. While this peacekeeping force and arrangement has not been tested, there is evidence of cosmopolitanism developing in the continent. With reference to research findings in this study, future research in this area could investigate the feasibility of deploying an SADC peacekeeping force in any region of the AU, paying particular attention to geopolitics, regional sovereignty and colonial legacies.

In conclusion, AU peacekeeping is outlined as the next generation both within policy and academic literature. The need to understand institutional leadership is paramount in order to better prepare for peace interventions. Although these two case studies are specific to the Southern African Development Community and African Union mission in Somalia, the conclusions drawn are applicable to other subregions of the continent. Indeed, the study has highlighted similar leadership developments in AU relations with other subregions.

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Annex 1: Interview Guide

Interview Guide 1 (AU Fieldwork)

Introduction

This research is being conducted to investigate how leadership is produced in African Union (AU) peace interventions, how regional and sub regional actors interact with each other, and the extent of AU leadership in peace operations and conflict mediation. I am conducting this research for my PhD studies at Coventry University in the United Kingdom. Specifically, I am interested with the opinions of the decision makers and high-level officials in peace and security, and I will be interviewing other officials as well. The questions I would like to ask you relate to coordination of peace interventions (conflict mediation and peace operations) among AU, SADC and troop contributing countries in Somalia. Everything you tell me will only be used for this research project and will not be shared with anyone outside. Also, unless you give me your express consent, your name will not be used, and you will not be identified with any answers you give. You have already consented to the interview with the consent form. Do you have any questions before we begin?

Interview number: _____

Opening Questions

1. Can you tell me how AU initiates peace interventions?
2. How does AU identify different actors to be involved in peace interventions?
3. How does AU engage sub-regional organisations in peace interventions?
4. Can you tell me the specific mode of coordination and interaction between AU and SADC in Madagascar joint mediation?

Key questions

5. What circumstances made AU to decide to deploy peacekeepers in Somalia?
6. What were the AU motivations for peace operation deployment in Somalia?
7. How was the coordination between AU and troop contributing countries?
8. How are decisions made in Somalia peace mission?
9. How does the AU coordinate with the UN in the peace operation in Somalia?
10. What measures are taken by the AU to ensure that troop contributing countries have deployed well equipped and professional peacekeepers?
11. How was the AU coordination with IGAD (as a sub-regional organisation) in deploying peacekeepers in Somalia?
12. What is your perception of AU leadership in peace operation in Somalia?

Closing questions

13. What do you think are the major challenges of the AU in providing continental leadership of PSOs?
14. What do you think should be done to address these problems?
15. What are your hopes for 'African solutions to African problems' with regard to deployment of peace missions?

Concluding Remarks

Thank you for your time and willingness to help in this research project. Your participation is the significant part of my studies. Once again, I appreciate your time.

Interview Guide 2 (For SADC Fieldwork)

Introduction

This research is being conducted to investigate how leadership is produced in African Union (AU) peace interventions, how regional and sub regional actors interact with each other, and the extent of AU leadership in peace operations and conflict mediation. I am conducting this research for my PhD studies at Coventry University in the United Kingdom. Specifically, I am interested with the opinions of the decision makers and high-level officials in peace and security, and I will be interviewing other officials as well. The questions I would like to ask you relate to coordination of peace interventions between AU and SADC in joint mediation in Madagascar. Everything you tell me will only be used for this research project and will not be shared with anyone outside. Also, unless you give me your express consent, your name will not be used, and you will not be identified with any answers you give. You have already consented to the interview with the consent form. Do you have any questions before we begin?

Interview number: _____

Opening Questions

1. Can you tell me how SADC initiates peace interventions?
2. How does SADC engage with African Union in peace interventions?
3. Can you tell me the specific mode of coordination and interaction between AU and SADC in Madagascar joint mediation?

Key questions

4. How was the coordination between SADC and AU mediation teams in Madagascar conflict?
5. What is your perception of AU leadership in SADC mediations?
6. How does SADC Peace and security Architecture relate to African peace and Security architecture with regard to mediation mechanisms?
7. What were SADC motivations for peace intervention in Madagascar?
8. What is your perception of the SADC mediation in Madagascar?

Closing questions

9. What do you think are the major challenges in SADC - AU relation in continental leadership of peace interventions?
10. What do you think should be done to address these problems?
11. What are your hopes for 'African solutions to African problems' with regard to African peace interventions?

Concluding Remarks

Thank you for your time and willingness to help in this research project. Your participation is the significant part of my studies. Once again, I appreciate your time.

Annex 2: Written Survey Statements.

Introduction

This research is being conducted to investigate how leadership is produced in African Union (AU) peace interventions, how regional and sub regional actors interact with each other, and the extent of AU leadership in peace operations and conflict mediation. I am conducting this research for my PhD studies at Coventry University in the United Kingdom. Specifically, I am interested with the opinions of the decision makers and high-level officials in peace and security. After this survey, you will be interviewed to expand on the survey's prompts. The open-ended qualitative responses from the interviews will be analysed to determine corroboration with related quantitative survey responses.

Interview number: _____

1=strongly agree 2=agree 3=disagree 4=strongly disagree (**please circle one rating on each statement**)

AU is a preferred organisation to conduct peace interventions in Africa than any regional organisation.	1	2	3	4
AU has professionally led peace interventions so far	1	2	3	4
AU depends on individual countries for peace interventions and without them no action can be taken	1	2	3	4
AU cannot on its own conduct peace interventions in the continent without support from outside Africa	1	2	3	4
AU has clear leadership in continental peace interventions	1	2	3	4

AU has clear policies and procedures in conducting peace interventions	1	2	3	4
AU easily solicit troops from Troop Contributing Countries for PSO	1	2	3	4
AU has authority over the conduct of peace interventions in sub regional arrangements like SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD etc	1	2	3	4
AU has direct access and control of regional standby brigades/peacekeeping force	1	2	3	4
African Peace and Security Architecture(APSA) is a guiding document for sub regions and States participating in peace interventions	1	2	3	4

Annex 3: Participant Consent Form

Research Project Title: Leadership, regionalisation of peace operations and conflict mediation: African Union and Southern African Development Community in perspective

	Please initial
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.	☐
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.	☐
3. I understand that all the information I provide will be anonymised unless I give express consent to be identified and the information will be stored securely.	☐
4. I give express consent to be identified in certain aspects of the information I share in this study.	☐
5. I understand that I reserve the right to change my mind about participating in this study and that I can freely withdraw on or before 30th September 2018.	☐

6. I agree to be recorded during the interview. ☐

7. I give consent for the information I tell **Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri** to be used in the following ways: in his PhD thesis/ in a report to organisations/ for teaching at universities/ in academic publications e.g. journal articles, monograph, books and these might be posted on the internet. ☐

7. I agree to take part in the research project. ☐

Name of participant: .....

Signature of participant: .....

Date: .....

Name of Researcher: Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri

Signature of researcher: ……Date…….

Annex 4**: Participant Information Sheet**

Research Project Title: Leadership, regionalisation of peace operations and conflict mediation: African Union and Southern African Development Community in perspective

Name of the researcher: Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri

Purpose of the study:
I am a PhD candidate at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University in the UK. The purpose of this study is to investigate how leadership is produced in African Union (AU) peace interventions, how regional and sub regional actors interact with each other, and the extent of AU leadership in peace operations and conflict mediation. The study has ethics approval from Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations- Ethics Reference Number P42230

What is the research about?
The study investigates how leadership is produced within the AU peace interventions and the extent to which African Union (AU) leadership in Africa peace interventions. Specifically, the study examines how the AU relates with sub regional actors through the example of AU joint mediation with Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Madagascar, and how AU interacts with troop contributing countries through the example of AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The study aims to investigate the nature of interaction and coordination in regional peace architecture and measures taken to strengthen the efficacy and synchronisation of African peace interventions. The study therefore, explores how leadership looks like in African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The study is undertaken from the view that, high levels of violent conflicts in Africa necessitate the need to comprehend the harmonisation of regional strategies and capacities to undertake peace support operations.

Who is organizing and funding the research?

The research is organised by Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri and is a PhD research project based at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) at Coventry University. The researcher has a PhD scholarship from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission (UK Government).

Why have I been chosen to participate?

I am interviewing policy makers, academicians and peace and security think tanks from a cross-section of continental and sub regional levels in African society. In this regard representatives of organisations and institutions who have had experiences and are knowledgeable in African peace and security. Hence, you have been identified as an important contributor to this research.

Do I have to take part?

No. Participation is entirely voluntary. Even having completed the interview you may request for your comments to be excluded from the study. You can withdraw by contacting me by email and providing me with your participant information number. If you decide to withdraw all your data will be destroyed and will not be used in the study. There are no consequences to deciding that you no longer wish to participate in the study. However, please be aware that there will come a point in time where it will be difficult to withdraw your data from the research. You will be able to withdraw your data, without a problem up until 30 September 2018. After this date, if you want to withdraw, please get in touch and we can discuss whether or not it will be possible.

What will my participation involve?

I will ask you to have a short interview (approximately 1 hour) which I will record on a digital audio device if you give me the consent to do so. If no consent is given on recording the interview, then I will take notes during the interviews. After the interview I may contact you again by email or phone to clarify certain points or to invite you to take part in a second interview. The information you give me is

completely confidential. After the interview I will transcribe, anonymize the data and use it for analysis for my PhD thesis.

Will the email data be secure?

Yes, the email data will be protected, however, information sent on email can never be completely secure. Hence, caution must be exercised by both myself (the researcher) and you as a research participant. I will only use Coventry University email account in such communications, and I will delete all the emails in my inbox and trash as soon as I take away the information. You will be requested to use your institutional email account and same procedures in deleting the information to ensure data safety.

What are the possible disadvantages of taking part?

Time. This will take part of your time. I intend to keep the interview as short as possible. If, however, you feel that you have a lot to share I may invite you to spend more time discussing this with me, which would involve you dedicating a longer period of time to the study.

Will the data be protected, and my confidentiality ensured?

Yes. The information you share will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous, unless you give express consent to be identified in the study. I will not name you or the organisation you belong to in the final publication. The interview data will be kept private and will be destroyed 10 years after the completion of the study. I will not discuss the comments you make during the interview with any third person.

How will you use the data that I provide?

The information collected will be analysed and written in my final PhD thesis. There is the possibility that all or extracts of this thesis will be published in academic journals or presented at conferences. The findings of this study may also be shared with policy makers and other sub regional institutions working in the area of peace and security including the United Nations.

What are the risks associated with this project?

There are no risks associated with this project. The aim is to find a common ground and clarity in conducting peace interventions in Africa. It is also to document the leadership challenges faced in peace interventions and how they can be resolved.

What are the benefits of participating?

One of the benefits is that your voice will be heard and documented, (although anonymously) and you will be part of the construction of knowledge in resolving African peace and security challenges.

Who has reviewed the study?

The study has been reviewed and approved by my Director of Studies, Professor Alpaslan Özerdem, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University.

Further Questions or Complaints

If you have any questions or queries, contact Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri via e-mail: botiphim@coventry.ac.uk. If you feel unsatisfied with my response, you can speak to Professor Alpaslan Özerdem, the Director of Studies, E-mail: aa8681@coventry.ac.uk. Phone: +44 24 659069

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant, any complaints about the project or feel you have been placed at risk you can contact **Professor Mike Hardy**, Executive Director, E-mail: ab0974@coventry.ac.uk Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry CV1 5FB. Tel: +44 (0) 24 77655765

Contact for further Information

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